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The fight against the price volatility of agricultural and food products and, more 
generally, public intervention in agricultural markets are longstanding subjects of 
debate among academics and the government authorities of various countries equally. 
Trade and market regulation are the crux of this debate between those in favor of 
liberalization in the strict sense and the supporters of intervention or of more or less 
moderate regulation. Other actors’ organizations (such as farmers’ and consumers’ 
unions, local and multinational companies, and NGOs in different fields) are involved. 
This is because the level and instability of agricultural and food prices have considerable 
consequences for all citizens of the world and in particular for those near the poverty 
line. Indeed, for poor consumers, a sharp rise in prices means entering a situation of 
hunger and/or indebtedness, and for poor farmers, a drop in prices begins or speeds up 
a process of impoverishment, loss of land if the farming household was forced to 
mortgage its last assets, and ultimately eviction. Every year, more than twenty million 
people find themselves pushed out of farming in this way and join already saturated 
urban areas and labor markets. It is not surprising, in this context, that, for years, this 
issue has stood as a major obstacle in international trade negotiations. 
 
In the spring of 2008, the sharp rise in prices, which hit the urban poor hardest, sparked 
riots in many cities in developing countries close to national and international authorities 
and under the eyes of television cameras. According to the FAO, one hundred million 
more people were added to the hunger statistics in 2008. The specter of hunger reared its 
head, and the debate on markets was revived. The shunned idea of regulation and public 
intervention re-emerged in forums and at the very center of international negotiations. 
Accountability was demanded of the international organizations in charge of agriculture 
and food; and, to sustainably raise the issue of food security at the highest level, the G8 
and United Nations began to elaborate a “Global Partnership for Food Security.” This lead 
to the opening up of the FAO’s Food Security Committee (FSC), the mobilization of global 
expertise by creating a panel of high-level experts, and additional financial efforts devoted 
to the development of food crops. For its part, the G20 has expressed alarm at the 
deregulation of markets, first the financial markets, then the commodities markets and 
finally the agricultural markets. France, which assumed the presidency of the G20 in 
November 2010, included the issue of regulation in these three—closely correlated—
fields on the agenda for the next summit.  
 
The Groupe de Recherche et d’Échanges sur la Régulation des Marchés Agricoles (GREMA, 
agricultural market regulation research and exchange group) was created by NGO activists 
and scientists somewhat in the minority at the end of 2004 to elaborate the positions to 
take and arguments to defend in the process of preparing for the WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Hong Kong (December 2005). Five years later, against the backdrop of a 
serious blockage of WTO negotiations, GREMA has found itself involved in a debate on 
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market regulation that is now more open and has been introduced within the G20 by 
some member countries. GREMA’s study, delivered to the French authorities prior to the 
G20 presidency, offers analyses and proposals elaborated based both on theoretical 
reflections and the observation of experiments with regulation attempted in 
approximately fourteen countries. This report is an extension of other studies that were 
previously conducted in a similar vein, notably the study produced by the ECART group 
(Galtier et al. 2009). However, let us point out that, well before the 2008 crisis, while the 
major international order-givers and most governments, relying on pro–free trade 
convictions, affirmed the dangers of public intervention in the life of markets and 
denounced the upsets introduced in their natural tendency towards optimal equilibrium, 
the same could not be said of other actors concerned by the organization of agricultural 
trade, starting with agricultural farmers’ organizations and international solidarity 
associations who saw the damages in the field caused by the policies inspired by an 
uncompromisingly liberal doctrine. Nevertheless, the liberal discourse of governments 
coincided often poorly with the policies implemented and negotiating positions. If any 
proof is needed, it suffices to review the stages in the trade negotiations over the past 
decade and a half, for instance the WTO Ministerial Conferences, and examine the tones 
successively adopted In each of them: 1994 in Marrakesh, end of the Uruguay Round, 
creation of the WTO and announcement of the launch of a new negotiation cycle; 1999 in 
Seattle, failed launch of this new cycle, informal alliance between developing countries 
and non-governmental actors within a movement described as “anti-globalization” before 
it adopted the term “alter-globalization”; 2001 in Doha, one month after the events of 
September 11, obligatory statement of good intentions but without results; 2003 in 
Cancun, new blockage; 2005 in Hong Kong, timid proposal of a negotiation framework and 
methodology; then no forward movement until July 2008 in Geneva where, during a 
special meeting, India came out of the woodwork and, with its alliances (notably with 
Brazil), blocked the negotiations by demanding the right to invoke a safeguard clause in 
the case of market surges—a demand that was refused. Since then nothing, dead calm on 
the negotiating table, and attention has shifted to how the food crisis was handled, to the 
need to reformat the international mechanisms in charge of food security, and to the 
search for practical solutions to enable markets to operate properly. This report aims to 
find answers on this last point. 
 
More precisely, this book addresses the following questions: 
 
- In which cases is markets regulation desirable? Is it necessary to allow a real 
improvement in food security in world poorest countries?  
-  Is it feasible? Which conditions have to be fulfilled? Which modalities will be best 
adapted according to specific contexts? Which kind of institution and capacity building 
should be promoted? 
 
These topics have already been analyzed in a large number of academic studies. Several 
experiences have been undertaken over the last fifty years. Yet,  the question is still highly 
controversial. Here, we proceeded in two steps (i) Combining theoretical and empirical 
approaches to summarize the main arguments for and against public intervention, (ii) a 
two days workshop followed by a one day seminar to allow intensive exchanges between 
 7 
experts, scientists and policy makers with contrasted positions and to present the main 
finding to a larger audience. 
 
To reflect this approach, this book contained four parts. Part A discusses the main 
arguments justifying or denying direct public intervention on markets, the factors of 
successes and the main reasons for failures. It combines academic and empirical 
approaches. 
 
Part B is made of the minutes of the seminar held the 1st December 2010 in Paris, 
a contribution of Peter Timmer( emeritus Professor, Harvard University) on the main 
conclusion to be drawn from the debates, and a detailed picture of actors’ behavior along 
the commodity chain in Burkina-Faso and its implications for market regulation realized by 
inter-réseaux. It also supplies web links to the presentations of Philip Abott (Professor at 
Purdue University (USA), Andrew Dorward (Professor at The School of Oriental and African 
Studies, (University of London), F. Gérard (CIRAD) Maximo Torrero (IFPRI), Kako Nubukpo 
(Professor at the University of Togo). 
 
Part C contains  the abstracts (and the web links to the main texts )of a set of seven notes, 
each of them presenting a subject related to public intervention on agricultural markets,. 
Similarly, Part D is made of the summaries of the fourteen case studies which have been 
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While the issue of market regulation is not new—one can recall the common agricultural 
policy during the heyday of the levy/refund mechanism or during that of supply control 
through the setting of dairy quotas for each farm; one can also recall the establishment 
of international product agreements and the Common Fund—the debate around the 
notion of regulation is now situated in a new context that can be described rapidly as 
follows: 
 
- No one—or almost no one—now denies that the market has a central role in 
organizing trade on all geographic scales, trade in which billions of farmers and 
consumers as well as millions of micro- or macro-businesses participate. It is no longer a 
matter of planning flows or setting prices. For everyone, markets must be able to “live 
their lives” and continue to be the breath of the economy. This does not prevent one 
from noting that market deficiencies and failures do exist, that markets can be 
manipulated, and that the most powerful and best organized actors can subjugate 
markets. Furthermore, everyone is aware that the economic field in which markets 
operate and “merchandise” is sold covers only some of humanity’s concerns and cannot 
be assimilated with the general interest. It is not the market’s job to be concerned with 
enforcing universal rights, the sovereignty of peoples and nations, the preservation of 
nature and the common heritage, etc. The expansionism of the market, which operates 
by turning “things” into “goods” and public goods into private goods, must be contained 
within the bounds that it is up to lawmakers to define and the public authorities to 
enforce. There can be, and often is, a contradiction between the dynamic of market 
expansion and respect for the general interest. There are limits to what is acceptable 
and what is not that must not be crossed and, in the field of agriculture and food, what 
is unacceptable is mass hunger, the degradation of the common heritage, and the 
massive exclusion of hundreds of millions of farmers towards economic and social 
nothingness. When things get out of hand on the small scale, they can be overcome with 
aid or social policy, but when there are massive, lasting and cumulative upsets and 
imbalances, one must envisage tackling the analysis and treatment of the causes of 
these unwanted changes.  
 
- The globalization of agricultural markets and their financialization have 
increased in recent years. The integration of markets into a large global market has 
developed in line with natural market dynamics but also thanks to proactive policies to 
open geographic borders as well as the struggle against all obstacles likely to hinder 
trade. This integration was supposed to lessen the volatility of agricultural markets 
through offset mechanisms between deficit and excedent zones or periods. This 
assumption has not been confirmed in recent years. This market integration bluntly 
raises the question of the contagion of market ills, and the measures to take to protect 
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against them between two or more national markets and between one or more national 
markets and the global market. In recent years, market integration has been 
accompanied by strong financialization of agricultural trade. This trade was not of 
particular interest for international finance, which found more profitable and less risky 
prospects elsewhere. The crisis in financial markets, agricultural price volatility and the 
prospects of raising price levels generated strong speculation movements that 
themselves increase volatility. The instability of financial markets and the strong 
variations in exchange rates have become major elements in the instability of 
agricultural markets, and this does not simplify ways to address this instability. P. 
Chalmin has compared the attempts to stabilize agricultural markets to trying to 
stabilize the surface of water in a sink in a sailboat navigating a stormy sea! Agricultural 
markets are increasingly correlated to other markets, for example the energy market. 
Unable to hope for general stabilization, one must therefore evaluate to what extent it 
is possible to protect oneself from the instabilities of neighboring markets.  
 
-  Everyone, or nearly everyone, believes that the exaggerated volatility of prices 
and their excessive unpredictability have harmful, even dramatic, consequences for 
farmers and consumers. For farmers and producers near the poverty line, sudden price 
hikes or drops can have catastrophic consequences, as we indicated above. But for all 
farmers, this unpredictability greatly hinders farm innovation and investment, that is to 
say farm modernization, particularly when these investments require one to commit 
most of the household’s assets or borrow heavily. When a farmer is at the edge of 
poverty, taking risks is neither responsible nor even possible. It is difficult to correctly 
measure the scope of the silent dramas occurring in the countrysides when poor 
farmers are faced with the necessity of overcoming this rule of prudence. Because, in 
most countries around the world, countless peasants are in crisis. For instance, think of 
the “suicide belt,” the districts around Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka in India. There, 
over the last ten years, several thousand peasants committed suicide, victims of the fall 
in cotton and groundnut prices and prisoners of the “debt trap” because they had to 
mortgage their last plots of land. The “center for social development” in Hyderabad 
mentions seventy suicides every week, 55% of which involving men between the ages of 
31 and 45! The dramatic consequences of price volatility are now universally known. 
More and more experts admit that curing only its consequences without addressing its 
causes is insufficient. Of course, social and economic urgency – for instance, when many 
farm are all on the edge of bankruptcy – may call for social policies and safety networks. 
But beyond such situations, these policies that only mask problems are questionable. On 
the one hand, they alter market signals, sending producers erroneous information 
regarding scarcities. On the other, they are costly, with enormous budgetary outlays for 
the countries that can afford them, but out of reach for the less affluent countries that, 
indeed, would need them the most. 
 
As a consequence, more and more experts believe that the very causes of the price 
volatility must be tackled, and, to this end, one must first determine what they are. In 
chapter 2, the corresponding theory has been revisited. A distinction has been made 
between two sorts of causes: exogenous and endogenous. Then, in chapter 3, actual 
policies put in operation in fourteen countries have been evaluated in the light of the 
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above analysis in order to see to what extent the latter correspond to reality. Finally, 
chapter 4 describes the actions that have (or could have) been envisaged at the 
international level. The conclusion is that to improve consumer safety and enable the 
modernization of agriculture, it is therefore appropriate to envisage placing limits on 
price volatility—that is to say, negotiate the price ceilings and floors that will determine 
the bands or ranges that are acceptable for both producers and consumers and 
sufficiently wide to allow markets to live their lives as markets. To be accepted by all the 
parties present, these bands/ranges must be negotiated with all the actors concerned. 
These are sensitive negotiations because these actors usually have conflicting interests, 
all the more as wisdom would dictate that the bands not be too different from the price 
levels practiced in international markets if one wants to avoid excessive external 
pressure and the emergence of a black market economy. Once the ceilings and floors 
have been set, an authority will still need to have the power and resources to keep 
prices within acceptable ranges. And, to do so, this authority must have a range of tools 
that allow it to intervene on both the supply of products—that is to say primarily on 
national production, imports and de-stocking—and on demand, that is to say first on 
national consumption, export, stocks and the diversification of agricultural products 
toward non-food uses. A panoply of measures must, in this way, make it possible to 
improve the predictability of price changes so as to limit disruptive and self-fulfilling 
anticipations, a major source of volatility. We shall analyze this panoply of instruments, 
regulations and measures throughout this study, keeping in mind the fact that cures for 
the causes of price volatility will not cure other ills. For example they will be inactive in 
fighting inequalities. The reduction of inequalities requires other cures, for example 
agrarian reform if the crucial question is land access, or policies supporting poor 
producers incomes or the most deprived consumers, or fiscal policy allowing wealth 
redistribution. 
 
- After the food crisis in 2008, the need for market regulation and the necessity of 
fighting price instability have been accepted by a growing percentage of experts and 
decision-makers, but doubts remain as to the public authorities’ real power to intervene 
on the factors of market instability, as do fears about government leaders’ ability to 
resist—in certain socio-political situations—the temptation to use this power and these 
regulatory instruments to serve private, even personal, interests rather than use them 
to defend the general interest. We shall see that the rigor with which regulatory actions 
are implemented, the objective and predictable conditions that trigger these actions, 
and the democratic control of leaders and their actions are decisive, and that for each of 
these questions, measures must be taken to ensure the credibility of market regulation 
policies. Nevertheless, these doubts and fears, while they inspire caution, must not 
cancel the need to fight market instability. Let us say, first, that all the actors concerned 
by agricultural markets—and even other actors that provide no value added and 
therefore in theory have no place in these markets—intervene in these markets and do 
so according to their own interests. This being the case, one can wonder why a public 
authority mandated to defend the general interest could not intervene to avoid the 
serious consequences for consumers when prices rise above the ceiling, or the serious 
consequences for producers when prices fall below the floor price. While we 
acknowledge this mandate for the political authorities, two questions that we have not 
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asked remain: that of the authorities’ real power to intervene, and that of corruption in 
the use of regulatory instruments.  
 
Taking into account regulatory bodies’ real power and the existence of safeguards to 
avoid abuses of power is decisive for the design and choice of regulatory instruments. 
Indeed, at present, there are numerous limits to the affirmation of national sovereignty 
and, even more, to the emergence of a real international authority; and the safeguards 
that could emerge as opposition forces are deficient. This is the “policy space” issue 
being weakly debated in international negotiations.  
 
- Limits to the affirmation of national sovereignty and the emergence of an 
international authority exist. First, there are the WTO agricultural trade agreements, 
which serve as the keystone of and baseline for all trade agreements, and which 
determine what is forbidden and permitted when it comes to trade and public 
agricultural policy. Then, there are the conditions, notably those that address market 
openness, imposed by international financial institutions during the negotiation of loans 
and the repayment of public debt, and during the distribution of international aid. Next, 
there are the quality of statistics and the ability to analyze very imperfect data and 
predict changes in the markets. Finally, there is the poverty of public instruments able to 
allow regulatory action: customs administrations and border control agencies, agencies 
in charge of verifying compliance with the rules by the various market actors, law 
enforcement, storage infrastructures, etc.  
 
- The corruption of regulatory instruments exist as well. Market interventions to 
avoid market instability and keep prices within acceptable bounds create opportunities 
for corruption or insider trading, especially when intervention decisions—public 
purchase or sale decisions, allocation of import or export permits, cession of production 
quotas, etc.—are unpredictable. 
 
Issues Addressed by the Study and Organization of the Study  
 
Should state intervention be limited to creating a conducive environment for private 
activities through the provision of public goods such as infrastructures and political and 
economic stability, or are direct interventions of the state on markets sometimes 
desirable? In particular, is it necessary to allow a real improvement of food security in 
the world’s poorest countries? Or are more market-friendly interventions, such as 
warrantage or insurance subsidies, possibly combined with ex-post compensation for 
poor consumers, better suited to the situation. 
Is the direct intervention of the state on markets feasible? Or are the difficulties, costs 
and inefficiencies associated with public interventions combined with the positive 
impacts on stability expected from trade liberalization in a favorable market 
environment sufficient to give up direct public intervention? How can the adverse 
effects of direct interventions on markets be minimized? What conditions need to be 
met? What modalities will be most appropriate for specific contexts? What kind of 
institution building should be envisaged?  
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Several instruments exist. They were extensively analyzed in a study undertaken last 
year (Galtier et al., 2009) which proposed a typology (Box 1). It is possible to distinguish 
between public and private instruments and between instruments aiming at minimizing 
price variability or its consequences. Theoretically, each source of price instability should 
be treated by a specific instrument. Most of the time, however, it is impossible to apply 
this recommendation because of the complexity of price formation and the relationships 
between markets. In reality, various sources of instability generated in several markets 
are inextricably combined, one reinforcing the other and generating cumulative 
disequilibriums that spread from one market to another. 
In the current study, we will discuss the main controversies related to direct public 
intervention in markets, first concentrating on theoretical arguments (Section 2) and 
then comparing theory with reality by analyzing several national experiments used to try 
to determine the main factors of success and causes of failure (section 3). Finally, the 
question of what could be done at the international level will be addressed in Section 4. 
 
Box 1 : Instruments for Handling Food Price Instability: A Typology  
 
Galtier et al. (2009) proposed a framework to describe the different instruments available to 
handle food price instability. Based on followed objectives and forms of governance, four 
categories were identified. The objectives sought can be to stabilize prices or manage price risk; 
forms of governance can be market-based or public.    
 Stabilize Prices Manage Price Risks 
Market-based A-instruments B-instruments 
Public C-instruments D-instruments 
 
The central tenet of A-instruments is that the arbitration of market actors causes prices to be 
homogenized over time, space and between products, which will lower their instability. They 
include the construction of storage infrastructures, the development of quality standards, and 
the creation of warehouse receipt systems or exchanges. 
 
Also based on the market, B-instruments are intended to limit the effects of price instability on 
incomes by enabling economic actors to cover themselves against the risks linked to price 
variability (futures contracts) and harvests (insurance). 
 
C-instruments aim to stabilize prices by controlling production (input subsidies), regulating 
imports and exports (variable taxes and subsidies, quotas, bans), and using public stocks. 
 
D-instruments enable household incomes to be supported during periods of high prices 
(targeted social transfers). 
 
The conclusion of the study is that the strategy based on a combination of A, B and D 
instruments has not stood the test of time. A-instruments are not enough to solve the chronic 
price instability problem, which remain unchanged. Private risk management instruments are 
used very rarely, and safety nets do not successfully prevent the deterioration of vulnerable 
households’ nutritional status. The authors argue for the use of a combination of instruments to 
fight against agricultural price instability according to its sources. 
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Chapter 2 – Price Instability and Market Failures: A 
Case for State Intervention 
 
 




The necessity of agricultural market regulation is a long-standing controversy in 
economics. Over the last fifty years, development prescriptions have shifted from very 
interventionist, to liberalized market-led policies.  None of these policies have been 
widely successful in promoting food security, and the existence of failures under both 
approaches is now widely recognized.  This consensus will be the starting point for our 
analysis. A lot of academic studies have analyzed these topics and the experiments 
undertaken in the last fifty years. This section aims to point out main areas of consensus 
and main controversies, and try to document them using economic theory.  
2.1 Is Direct Public Intervention on Prices Desirable?  
 
The Key Role of Prices: Coordination of Decentralized Decisions 
 
From a theoretical point of view, standard economic theory tells us that no intervention 
is needed if markets are functioning properly. In this case, private actors concerned with 
their own interests only are led to act in such a way that the economic system reaches 
an optimal situation. In particular, private trade and storage will transfer the necessary 
quantity of products through space and time; prices will be stable and predictable.  
 
The basic market coordination mechanism is price. Market prices signal buyers’ 
willingness to pay a set amount for a good or a service, and potential suppliers are then 
willing to incur the costs of supply this good or service if these costs are lower than the 
price. This is how market economies function, and history has proved the superiority of 
this system over state-led decisions. Markets then have the difficult task of generating 
prices able to efficiently drive actors’ behavior for the satisfaction of consumers. Prices 
have the key role of coordinating individual decisions conveying the information 
necessary for efficient decisions. Any surplus or shortage can be eliminated with market 
clearing at equilibrium price. In economic jargon, the marginal utility of each consumer 
equates price, so that it would be impossible to increase the welfare of one consumer 
without depriving another from the same quantity of happiness. Even more, any 
intervention on prices at this stage is likely to introduce black markets, bribery, and 






The Negative Effect of Price Variation 
  
For the above reasons, some agricultural economists consider that lowering price 
variation may actually be a cost. Yet, the large price variations that can be seen on actual 
markets have obvious costs too: when a price goes from 0 to 3 in the space of a few 
months, it is impossible to conclude that such a change reflects a corresponding change 
in the marginal cost of production. Now, any discrepancy between the price and the 
marginal cost means that either the consumer or the producer incurs a loss, while the 
other side benefits. However, elementary economic theorems show that the winners 
always benefit less than the losers lose. Thus, in this case, price volatility is not a 
blessing. Moreover, if actors cannot correctly forecast future prices because of price 
variability, the basic function of markets—i.e. determining prices equating supply and 
demand and conveying adequate information to actors so that they can make efficient 
decisions—is not fulfilled. 
 
Another point to be considered is that the mean price level is not the only determinant 
in producers’ decisions. The risk involved in price variations is also important for 
producers. When there are large price variations, credit will be more difficult to obtain, 
impeding modernization and capital accumulation. This is especially important for poor 
farmers in developing countries: they are poor because, due to a lack of capital, the 
productivity of their labor is low. If they could borrow, they could increase the quantity 
of capital in operation, and therefore increase productivity. But banks do not grant loans 
to poor people subject to large variations in the price of their outputs... 
 
The above considerations, thus, cast a new light on the price variation issue. While 
small, progressive price changes are obviously desirable, large, sudden swings are 
detrimental, and do not guarantee an optimal state of the economic system, quite the 
contrary. Indeed, they stand as a major obstacle to the efficient use of existing 
resources, lowering production, and, in the long run, increasing the mean price level at 
the expense of the consumer, without any benefit for the producer. In such a situation, 
according to the most orthodox economic theory, it is the public authorities’ duty to 
correct excessive and unnecessary price variations in order to let the economic system 
return to path to long-term equilibrium from which it should have never been diverted. 
This is the basic justification of the State intervention in agricultural markets.  
 
However, while price intervention for stabilization purposes is justified, it has also to be 
efficient, that is, curing the evil at its root and avoiding unexpected side effects. To 
achieve such a target, a careful examination of the causes of price variations is 
necessary. Without such careful examination, one runs the risk of curing only the 
symptoms at considerable cost without having a deep and lasting effect. Let us now turn 








The Causes of Agricultural Price Instability 
 
Agricultural markets exhibit very unstable prices. The reason for the high volatility of 
agricultural prices compared to the prices of manufactured products is a point of 
agreement among economists: little reaction in demand in response to price variations 
(called in economic jargon “low elasticity of demand”), high dependence on natural 
conditions, high transportation and storage costs in relation to the value of the product, 
and production lags. All these specific characteristics stand as obstacles to smooth 
market operation, and explain large fluctuations. 
 
The low elasticity of demand means that even large changes in prices will not change the 
quantities demanded by very much. This is because food is a very basic need. 
Consumers need a certain amount of calories and proteins. They are willing to give up 
any other satisfaction to meet this need. At the same time, as soon as the required food 
objective is met, any other increase in food consumption is deemed futile, thus implying 
that no consumption increase is to be expected, even for free. For this reason, per capita 
food demand is relatively constant whatever the price. If price is really too high, a 
fraction of consumers dies, and some elasticity is added to the demand curve. However, 
everyone agrees that such a situation is not desirable.1  
 
Furthermore, agricultural markets try to match a fluctuating supply, which is fixed in 
the short term because of the long production lags associated with high storage and 
transportation costs, with a rigid demand. In these conditions, a small supply shock 
results in large price changes.  
 
All economists agree that this is the basic reason for agricultural price volatility. They 
disagree strongly, however, on the consequences of this phenomenon and weather or 
not it justifies public intervention in markets. Because demand is generally seen as 




In theory, private storage and trade activities should solve the problem, allowing the 
dilution of supply variations through space (market enlargement) and time (storage). 
But, as explained in Box 2,  transfer costs from one market to another, through space or 
time, define a band that can be wide if transport and storage costs as well as risks are 
considerable. It explains why prices sometimes move independently from one market to 
                                                      
1 Of course, the above argument should not be taken too literally. Some foods are “elastic,” for instance 
goose liver or champagne. An increase in the price of goose liver would certainly decrease the demand for 
this commodity by a significant amount. But in such a situation, the demand for goose liver would probably 
shift to other foods, leaving the total demand for calories unchanged. Indeed, because of substitution, it is 
possible to observe high values for the demand elasticity of a specific product taken in isolation, but this 
high elasticity does not imply much flexibility in the overall demand for food. 
2 Even so, the total demand for food and agricultural products does change, first because the number of 
consumers and their food habits change, and second, because there is a non-food demand for agricultural 
products. However, these evolutions are generally progressive and foreseeable.  
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the others, separated by space or time. Within the band, domestic price instability is 
affected neither by trade nor by storage, and domestic policies have no harmful impacts 
on commercial partners. Simmetrically, even stable international prices do not provide 
stable domestic prices within the band. 
 
The most natural explanation for supply shocks is indeed the subject of a consensus 
among experts: shocks are a result of nature, which creates different conditions for 
plant growth. Some are “better,” others are “worse” than “normal.” For instance, a 
drought can decrease yields over large areas. An epizooty can kill a large fraction of 
cattle. Conversely, a small amount of rain at the right time can increase yields by a 
surprising amount. 
 
It has been claimed that such events carry their own remedies themselves: when supply 
is low, prices are high, thus maintaining farmer incomes by offsetting the loss of quantity 
with the increase in price (and conversely in case of “large” production). This constitutes 
natural insurance against price instability and, in this case, public intervention in 
markets aiming at stabilizing prices will worsen producers’ situation by destabilizing 
income. This might be true in a narrow market, where all producers are subject to 
similar weather conditions. As soon as markets are widened to allow for natural shock 
dilution, this is no longer true since a given farmer can very well be subject to natural 
conditions entirely different from those that trigger the change in price. In addition, 
while such a mechanism might protect farmers’ incomes, it never works for net buyers, 
which is the status of numerous poor producers in developing countries, and leaves 
unresolved the situation of consumers, who may suffer from high prices. Thus, this 
argument should not be invoked to justify blind faith in markets’ capacity for self-
regulation.  
 
When shocks are the consequence of nature, it is usually possible to rely on the “law of 
large numbers” to mitigate their consequences. The law of large numbers says that 
many independent small shocks cancel out each other, in such a way that their sum is 
null. This is the theoretical basis for insurance. Because each contract is “small” in 
comparison to the total portfolio held by an insurance company, and because the 
damages on one contract are independent of those on another, the overall outlay of the 
company is fairly constant, thus allowing costs computations and the definition of 
contract prices. Of course, the independence of risks is a prerequisite for insurance:  
companies never contract risks likely to be tied to each other. For instance, drought is 
rarely insured, because droughts affect not only one farmer (leaving the others 
untouched), but all farmers in a region. In this case, the reimbursement of all 
simultaneous accidents would jeopardize the liquidity of the company, and must be 
avoided. However, even in this case, insurance can be envisaged if the risk of drought is 
spread over a very large area in such a way that the weather in one sub-area can be 
seen as independent from the weather in another sub-area.3  
This reasoning is behind the doctrine of the WTO and other organizations that says that 
liberalization is the best way of stabilizing world agricultural commodity prices: if supply 
                                                      
3 We have to mention that experiments in developed countries have not been encouraging. When there are 
no subsidies, demand for insurance by farmers has been very low. 
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shocks occur because of weather and other fortuitous events, since such events are 
not spread over the entire world, and most of the time are independent from one 
region to another, then merging markets at world level should normally secure a fairly 
stable overall supply, hence a stable world price. On this point, all economists agree. 
 
The same line of reasoning also applies over time. Droughts (and more generally, 
weather events or epizooties) are independent from one year to the next, thus allowing 
for a pooling of risks over a large number of years. Of course, any step in this direction 
involves financial considerations, since transactions through time implies lending and 
borrowing. But with a financial system as developed as it is nowadays, this should not be 
a problem. “Catbonds,” “futures markets” and similar instruments should provide all the 
necessary facilities for that.  
 
The only difficulty in this case (and the main difference between risk sharing across time 
and risk sharing across geography) is that physical supply is roughly constant across 
geography, but not across time. Thus, while financial risk sharing can be efficient in 
protecting producers’ incomes, it does not resolve issue of consumers facing famine... 
But this problem can be solved with storage. And, in theory at least, private storage 
should do the job: to make money, the speculator holding an inventory should buy when 
prices are low (thus pushing up prices when they are “too low”) and sell when prices are 
high (thus pushing down prices when they are “too high”). 
 
As explained in Box 2, price stabilization based on these self-regulations mechanisms will 
be hampered by transfer costs between markets. Because these costs are high for 
agricultural products, especially in poor countries due to poor infrastructures and high 
risks, domestic price instability will remain high even if international prices are stable. 
This emphasizes the need for direct public intervention (C-instrument), on national 
isolated markets. The fact that prices instability remains high despite market expansion, 
after more than 30 years of globalization, is therefore explained partly by these costs 
and partly by an only partial liberalization process as numerous states continue to 
intervene in agricultural markets. 
 
However, following this line of reasoning, safety nets are currently the main 
recommendation to protect the poorest from huge variations, while others buy 
insurance. The social implications of such an option should not be underestimated. To 
some extent, it implies that a large segment of the population of the poorest countries 
will be marginalized, because of resource access, if they are not able to leave the 
agricultural sector. In the current international context, opportunities for development 









Box 2 : Price Transmission Between Markets  
The law of one price stipulates that in a perfect world, without transport costs and officials 
barriers to trade (such as tariffs), identical goods will sell everywhere for the same price if they 
are expressed in the same currency as a direct result of the profitability of buying a product at a 
low price on one market to sell it at a higher price on a different market. In reality, transfer costs 
from one market to another are high for agricultural products. This includes transportation costs 
and all transaction costs—that is, all costs related to negotiations and contract searching costs, 
risk-induced costs, and the costs incurred by meeting the licensing or other requirements of rent-
seeking government agencies or officials. Market liberalization policies aim at reducing this last 
kind of cost. But other types of costs remain. They constitute a protection, especially important 
for landlocked countries, but also for all cases where risk is high. They act exactly as a tariff, 
making prices in the country higher and then increasing supply and lowering demand, decreasing 
trade compared to a situation without transfer costs. Overvaluation of the exchange rate also 
acts in exactly the same way. 
 
Transfer costs determine a price band within which trade is not profitable and domestic prices 
are not stabilized by the international market. For example if the price is 100 on the international 
market and transfer costs are 50%, it will not be profitable to import (export) before the price on 
the domestic market reaches 150 (66).  Within the band, which can be wide especially when 
transport facilities are poor and risks high as is often the case in LDCs, domestic price instability is 
not affected by trade providing space for domestic policies to deal with this harmful 
phenomenon without destabilizing external markets. 
 
Domestic markets are connected to the international market when the domestic price equals the 
upper or lower limit of the band. Then, international price fluctuations will be transmitted to the 
domestic markets, in proportion to the exchange rate, while the volume of exports or imports 
will affect the world supply and demand balanced by the international market. If the country has 
an important share of world trade, this variation may affect the world price. This is not the case 
for small countries. 
 
It is by this price transmission mechanism that the market is enlarged by trade, with the price 
equating world supply and world demand and allowing for the dilution of small independent local 
accidents. The same mechanism is at work when import prices rise, increasing domestic prices 
when the country is importing or exporting, at the expense of domestic consumers. It is 
impossible to obtain prices stabilization through international trade without accepting to share 
the burden of adjustment and thus tolerate some import price volatility. But, as explained above, 
instability will be removed only if it is generated by shocks related to natural events and resulting 
in prices exceeding the band. One positive aspect of this phenomenon is that, within the band, a 
public stockpiling scheme may stabilize domestic prices (let us say between 80 and 120, to 
continue with the example above) without destabilizing external markets. 
 
The same mechanism applies over time according to storage activities. Transfer costs from one 
period (which include storage costs but again also risk and other transaction costs) to the next 
determine a band where private activities aiming at transferring the product supply from one 
period to another is not profitable and where prices fluctuate independently. 
 
Some instruments aim to minimize transfer costs between markets through space and time, thus 
minimizing the band where prices fluctuate independently (A-instruments). Decreasing storage 
and transportation costs will indeed improve the market functioning and decrease price 
instability. Lowering risk-related costs is, unfortunately, much more difficult. 
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Price transmission is not limited to vertical linkages. The fundamental role of exchange 
rates was mentioned above. The importance of the costs of transfer from one market to 
another indicates a first link with energy markets. Energy markets also determine input 
prices and therefore production costs. Moreover, the recent development of biofuels 
creates new strong links between energy and agricultural products. Agricultural product 
markets are also linked together through to major channels: (i) consumers’ choices and 
arbitrations between products according to relative prices that create a strong link 
between product prices, with the substitution effect transmitting price variations from 
one product to another, and (ii) the competition for land and other scarce production 
factors necessary to agricultural production that generates contagion phenomena. 
 
Self-Regulation Failures Related to Expectation Errors  
 
Another explanation for price vagrancy exists, however. It is based on supply dynamics 
and the difficulties of forecasting in situations of large price fluctuations. Ezekiel (1938), 
followed by  Boussard (1996) and many others  shows how production lags combined 
with the low demand elasticity and the difficulty of future prices forecasts generate 
endogenous price instability and that this instability has no chance to be reduced by 
trade. 
 
Because prices variations are due to either natural shocks, as explained above, or the 
issuing of a signal that more (or less) supply is necessary to satisfy consumers, it 
becomes very difficult for actors to decode the information provided by markets. Prices 
variations are sometimes signals, reflecting changes in fundamentals and requiring 
supply adjustments but sometimes they are the result of accidents requiring no changes 
in supply.  This problem holds true for both farmers and traders. It occurs on domestic 
markets and on the international market. In this way, markets do not fulfill their role of 
providing the appropriate information to actors, leading to coordination failures.  
 
When deciding what and how to produce in what quantity, the producer never knows 
what the price will be at harvest time. Actually, any economic calculations at planting 
time have to be made on the basis of “expected” (not “equilibrium”) output prices.  In 
case of a discrepancy between the expected price and the real price, the producer may 
either earn an unjustified reward or receive a dramatic punishment. Bad forecasts 
generate inefficient decisions; supply will be too high or too low to meet consumers’ 
needs, generating huge prices variations and widespread drop in real incomes. 
 
Another complication comes from the necessity of funding investments (long-term 
investments such as building a stable, and short-term investments such as buying seeds 
or fertilizers, with the latter applying in particular in the case of poor peasants, even 
when they do not trade on markets: in shortage situations, they sometime eat the grain 
normally reserved to make seed, thus pushing famine back to the following year). If 
incomes were low last year, money to fund investments this year will be lacking, thus 
decreasing supply.  
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In this case, the problem arises because of expectation errors: if, at a certain time, all 
producers expect a “high” price, they will probably all increase production, often going 
into debt to do so. It might happen that the overall increase in production goes beyond 
consumers’ capacity to buy. Prices then collapse. As a consequence, the next year, 
farmers see price as being “low,” which does not encourage them to invest again, 
especially as their incomes had dropped, they have to repay their previous loans, and 
they are short of money. As a result, production is low, prices soar, and so on... This 
mechanism is called a “cobweb” because the diagram used to illustrate it for on a basic 
supply and demand scheme actually resembles a cobweb. 
 
The same mechanism affects storage decisions, hampering market operation: too often, 
speculators drive prices even higher in the case of shortages, and even lower in the case 
of gluts. This is because they are wrong: they expect prices to rise or fall even more (see 
Box 3). In these cases, fluctuations are generated by expectation errors due to imperfect 
information and the major influence of expectations on the commodity price formation 
process (Mandelbrot, 1973). As already emphasized, this happens on domestic markets 
as well as on international markets.  
 
Box 3 : The Controversial Role of Speculation  
International markets for agricultural products are often coupled with futures markets, which 
allow the exchange of the risk associated with price fluctuations with a premium through 
forward contracts. They offer a way to manage price instability. However, transaction costs 
(especially for small farmers in poor countries) are high and they are better suited to traders 
than to farmers. Moreover the duration of contracts is around one year, which is too short to 
allow investment planning. Speculators are key actors on the markets because they are willing 
to bear the risks other actors like to avoid. When the markets are running smoothly, speculation 
stabilizes prices, diluting shocks in space and time exactly in the same way that trade and 
storage do. Because speculation is at the heart of fervid discussions, it is interesting to refer first 
to its definition. Derived from the Latin word speculor (to observe), to speculate is to buy or sell 
in the hope or deriving monetary gain. Useful arbitrations in space and time by merchants 
belong to this category.  They stabilize the prices when markets are functioning well and 
expectations are accurate, and destabilized it when herd behavior, panics, crashes, and other 
destabilizing behaviors take place on the market.  The heart of the question is still the same: 
expectations and their accuracy, the fact that they may completely change in a few seconds, 
and the key role they have in the price formation. The financiarization of the commodity, which 
is the fact that investors, in their search of uncorrelated assets, recently entered agricultural 
markets, may magnify the risk of destabilizing behaviors.  
 
 
Many types of cobwebs have been described in economic literature. But all of them 
share the fact that they are not curable by the same recipes that work for shocks 
generated by natural events. For instance, while two isolated markets fluctuate in “anti-
phase” (high prices in one market correspond to low prices in the other), merging them 
will just result in phase “synchronization.”  
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Insurance schemes are not feasible, first because prices are the same for everybody at 
the same time, thus precluding any geographical risk sharing, but also because there is 
an almost perfect autocorrelation between two adjacent periods, ruling out any sound 
financial risk sharing across time.  
 
In presence of this category of shocks, the market itself is at the origin of fluctuations. If 
one wants to avoid these fluctuations, the only possibility is to intervene directly to 
regulate market operation. The idea is not at all to suppress the market, just to help it 
play its role of informing producers of consumers’ wants and consumers of production 
difficulty. Various possibilities exist for that, and will be described below. Yet, a very 
general rule must be pointed out: it consists in creating the conditions so that a minimal 
supply can occur. If a minimal supply is “sure,” then prices cannot soar up to a very high 
level. And because prices cannot be too high, they also cannot be too low because 
producers are never encouraged to overproduce. The practical enforcement of this rule 
depends upon circumstances, especially the scale of the production basins over which it 
is applied and the capacity of governments to manage imports and exports, as will be 
seen below. The important thing is that to avoid excessive price volatility, we need to be 
sure that a regular and sufficient quantity will be provided on markets.  
 
Coordination Failures Justify Direct Public Intervention in Markets 
 
In other words, while liberal recipes stand as the best solution to get rid of shocks from 
nature, there are other sources of fluctuations that are best cured by State intervention. 
Unfortunately, in practice, both sources of fluctuations are at work: harvest sizes are 
affected by the weather, and actors expectations are not always fulfilled. The difficulties 
involved in accurately assessing the causes of a given price variation is perfectly 
illustrated by the ex-post analysis of the 2006-2008 price surge (Box 4). As seen above, 
the problem is that the appropriate remedies are completely different in each case, but 
the sources of large fluctuations are inextricably intertwined. To cure the first kind of 
shocks (caused by nature), measures aiming at improving the market operation by 
providing a better environment for private storage and trade activities and lowering 
transfer costs through improved information and transparency on markets (A-
instruments) are well suited. Insurance could resolve the problem for the remaining 
instabilities of this kind due to transfer costs (B-instruments). But, for the second kind of 
instability, generated by the market itself in an uncertain world, direct public 
intervention in markets is necessary. The importance of agriculture, both as the provider 
of basic food and as the main source of income for the large majority of the poor, makes 
ex-post instruments such as safety nets (D-instruments) impossible to use. Beyond issue 
of human dignity, the governments of poor countries do not have access to the 
necessary financial resources. It is also worth considering that if safety nets are 
necessary in cases of extreme events; their use will be far less costly if direct public 
interventions on markets minimize the probability of occurrence of such events. 
Moreover, these instruments have the same implementation difficulties as direct public 
intervention (rent-seeking and so on). This is what makes setting up a sound agricultural 
and food policy is so difficult.  
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The controversy turns around the relative importance of the two kinds of instability 
described above. For some, the instability related to the difficulty of self-regulation in 
agricultural markets is negligible and, because of the inter-relationships between 
markets, it is better not to intervene so as to not to transmit price instability to other 
markets. Compensation, outside the market, could be used, if necessary, for the 
poorest while others will take out insurance. Coordination failures do not take place. 
For others, despite the difficulties and costs associated with public interventions, 
building a conducive environment for private activities is necessary but unlikely to be 
enough, at least in the medium term. Public intervention is required.  
 
Price Instability, Dynamics Involved, and the Poverty Trap 
 
Food markets often exhibit very unstable prices. Does this mean that they are 
unpredictable? If not, the worst impacts are concentrated on poor consumers, who 
often spend more than half of their budget on food, which can be compensated for, 
avoiding at the same time social unrest and economic instability. Instruments that aim 
to compensate the poorest, such as safety nets (D-instruments), could then be used. If 
so, they lead to inefficient behaviors by actors. For producers, as explained above, risk 
discourages investments and even market participation for the poorest. It may explain 
why some economies seem stuck in a low equilibrium trap (Dorward et al., 2004; 
Poulton et al., 2006; Timmer, 2000). Then, in certain circumstances, and at least at a 
specific stage of development, market-related public policies can be necessary to 
escape from vicious circle of low labor productivity leading to low incomes and low 
investments. 
 
Impacts are also considerable in developed economies as the business is too risky to 
allow efficient investment decisions. Periods of low prices, generating farm 
bankruptcies, especially among indebted farmers, are followed by periods of high prices 
due to scarcity. Even if the impacts on consumers are lower because consumers are 
richer and consuming highly processed goods in which raw material costs account for a 
small share of the final price, the general impacts on the economy are not negligible. 
Moreover this does not allow for progresses in terms of sustainable agricultural 
development. 
 
The problem of economic policies is not only—and not even primarily—to allocate a 
fixed supply between consumers but to create conditions such, in the long run, allow 
supply be large enough to smoothly match at least the basic needs of the population 
with practices not too detrimental to the environment and product safety. At the same 
time, this target must be hit with an efficient use of existing resources, without 
squandering them in over-supply. The question, then, is whether a completely free 
market and large price fluctuations can help reach this target.   
 
In presence of large price variations, capital is often wasted. This is because when prices 
are high, producers tend to overinvest. When prices fall afterward, they cut production, 
and part of the investment is left unused (hence, squandered). Most of the time, when 
prices rise again, the unused share of capital is not usable anymore (or only usable at 
 24 
high cost), so new capital must be invested again...Obviously, this is not an efficient 
process. It is therefore detrimental for the general welfare. 
 
These are very strong cases for price regulation indeed, even assuming “risk neutrality.” 
But the detrimental effects of risks also have to be considered. When planning 
production on the basis of expected prices, a farmer (or the farmer’s banker) cannot 
ignore the fact that expectations might not be met: this puts constraints, including 
precaution, on decisions, and advocates for a prudent use of existing resources, 
especially credit. In this way, many development opportunities are missed, and the 
poorer the farmers the more opportunities are missed: the poor are, in general, more 
“risk averse” than the rich. This may explain (along with the lack of capital) most of the 
“backwardness” often negatively attributed to traditional peasants. In any case, risk 
considerations in general prevent resources from being fully utilized.   
 
This is the basic rational for direct intervention on markets. Far from negating the 
virtues of a liberal economy, they should be designed to increase the quality of the 
messages carried by prices in order to inform producers of consumers’ desires, and 
inform consumers of the difficulty in producing, without forgetting externalities which 
are not carried out by the markets as widely explained by economic theory.  
 
Finally, every one agrees on the fact that private activities such as storage and trade are 
necessary, and that the provision of public goods in the form of infrastructures is 
essential to allow markets to function as well as possible. The controversy is whether or 
not it is enough to avoid coordination failures. Empirical evidence all over the world 
seem to prove it is not (Dorward et al., 2007), but some argue that this is due to a partial 
liberalization process that discourages private activities (Kerralah et al., 2002; Jayne et 
al., 2002).   
 
When referring to the coordination failure associated with price instability, it is 
impossible to manage this type of failure through ex-post instruments aiming at 
compensating the losers because coordination problems affect the whole system. Food 
prices are indeed key variables, determining wages, employment and inflation in less 
developed countries, as well as social peace and political stability. The risk is therefore 
systemic, and the option of ex-post compensations, as a safety net, becomes too 
expensive.   
 
All these considerations explain why a purely economic approach may lead to the 
conclusion that large and sudden price variations are not efficient and should be 
avoided as much as possible. It does not mean that price signals must be neglected: 
obviously, techniques and preferences vary over time and relative prices must vary to 
indicate these changes to producers and consumers.  
 
However, these evolutions are generally smooth, and take a long time to become 
significant, thus leaving ample room for progressive adaptation. For instance, the long-
term trend of dropping agricultural prices (something between 1% to 5% per year) 
reflects technical progress for the benefit of consumers. But it is not the kind of price 
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variation facing most farmers, especially in poor countries. Most commonly, a given 
agricultural price goes from 1 to 2 and then to 0.5 in the space of three years. What 
message does this send to producers? How can they interpret it 
 
Which Level for Action? 
 
When public interventions should be envisaged, one has to decide at which level. Should 
it be a task for an international authority, a local community, a government, or a group 
of regional governments?  
 
As pointed out in Boxes 2 and 4, there are no (or very few) completely independent 
markets, whether geographically or over time. Any decision taken at any level at any 
time is likely to impact other entities, at the same instant or at another time.  
 
For instance, during the 2007-2008 crisis, some governments decided to cut rice exports 
in order to maintain domestic prices at reasonable levels as far as possible. They 
undoubtedly increased the world-wide penury, which let prices soar to incredible levels. 
They were severely condemned by the world public opinion for doing so. At the same 
time, they not only protected their own citizens as consumers, but they also avoided too 
much enthusiasm among their producers for increasing production next year. And that 
was sound, given the fact that the price of rice decreased by a large amount the 
following year. Indeed, because they were large operators, by doing so, they helped 
stabilize prices in the year after the peak. 
 
 
Box 4 : Ex-Post Analysis of the Causes of the 2008 Price Spike 
Over the period 2007-2008, most international agricultural prices doubled or even trippled. Milk 
was the first product to be affected, with the quick increase taking place during the spring of 
2007, followed later in 2007 by spikes in wheat and maize prices. The price of rice, the last 
commodity to be affected, skyrocketed in a very short period during the first half of 2008. 
Almost all agricultural food products were affected with the exception of sugar. Tropical 
products and meat fared better than grains. A few months later, prices began to drop. The 
sudden rise in prices and the sharp drop a few months latter were unexpected. At the time, 
neither economic models nor international institutions predicted the price spike; experts were 
mainly concerned about the long term downward trend in agricultural prices.   
 
Several studies have analyzed ex-post the possible causes of the food price spike. The main 
causes that have been identified are: (i) rapid economic growth in certain developing countries 
such as China and India which, together with higher incomes, led to a nutritional transition and 
increased demand for grains; (ii) adverse weather conditions in certain key production regions 
such as Australia and eastern Europe; (iii) a weak US dollar; (iv) high oil prices leading to higher 
production costs for agricultural products; (v) biofuel production; and (vi) speculative behavior 
(see, among others, Abbott et al., 2008, 2009; Von Braun J., 2007). There is a widely shared 
opinion that these different causes act together and that it is difficult to evaluate the impact of 
each one individually. Using the Aglink model, Dewbre et al. (2008) found each of these factors 
to be equally important. The resulting impact, when all shocks are combined, is much lower 
than the price increase that was seen, underlining the fact that other mechanisms may have 
been neglected in the analysis.  
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Some Causes Are Controversial  
Headey and Fan (2008) argue that neither the argument involving growth in middle-income 
countries—China and India do not show trade deficits for agricultural products over the 
period—nor the weather shock argument—the fall in output in several countries in 2007 was 
offset by increased production in other countries (Argentina, Kazakhstan, Russia, United States) 
and ultimately world grain production declined by 1.3% in 2006 but increased by 4.7% in 2007—
are convincing. 
Several studies have focused on the biofuel explanation. As underlined by Keyzer et al. (2008), it 
is clear that in the context of a scarcity of fossils fuels, biofuel production increases competition 
for land, fertilizer and labor. Moreover, the policy adopted results in high production subsidies 
for biofuels, and generates a completely rigid demand that bears a significant share of the 
responsibility for the food crisis. Some experts stressed the fact that, while the explanation is 
convincing for maize, it is less persuasive for wheat and rice (Headey and Fan, 2008). But 
Mitchell (2008) explains how the substitution effect induced by land competition for crops not 
directly concerned by the demand for biofuels may generate contagion phenomena.  
 
Another controversial issue is the role of speculation in the process. In the press, financial 
speculation has often been accused of being responsible for the price spike. It is true that 
increased financial activity took place at the time of the price rise but the causal link is not at all 
clear. One must remember that higher volatility necessarily induces speculation because of 
speculators’ function in markets (bearing risks). Consequently, as underlined by Headey and Fan 
(2008), speculation may be a symptom more than a cause of price volatility, "l’écume sur la 
vague” (the foam on the wave) (Chalmin, 2008). Despite several studies, it is difficult to assess 
precisely the role of speculation in the phenomenon, underlying the difficulties in economics of 
discriminating between alternative processes. As underlined by Gilbert (2008), uninformed 
speculation may be destabilizing and generate explosive price behavior. A new class of actors 
has entered commodity markets through index-based investment, viewing commodities as an 
asset comparable to others. The money involved may be substantial. However it is difficult to 
evaluate its influence on the price boom. 
 
Finally explanations focusing exclusively on fundamental factors leave an important share of the 
price hike unexplained. Moreover, the rapid rise in prices followed by the quick fall some 
months later suggests a bubble phenomenon. Piesse and Thirtle (2009) explained the rice price 
increase by panic leading to export bans from major exporters, and underline that such 
behavior is costly for the world community.  
 
On the other hand, Boussard, Gérard and Piketty (2008) show a model that, in 2005, predicted 
the phenomenon fairly well from purely endogenous relations and market mechanisms, without 
requiring any other assumptions such as drought, biofuels, changes in consumption, or 
speculation. It has been said that their model was a good predictor only by chance, just as a 
stopped clock indicates the right time twice a day. Yet, this model at least does not contradict 
the “endogenous hypothesis.” In addition, similar results have been found with another model 
(Munier, 2010).   
 
This observation leads to the conclusion that a world authority should be in charge of 
the problem. Yet, there are objections. The most important is that it will be very difficult 
to determine the proper international prices or bands of prices. Whatever steps are 
taken to stabilize markets, they will generate instant private rents or preclude private 
gains. Moreover, as seen above, international price stabilization will not affect a large 
share of domestic price instability, the portion that takes place within the band defined 
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by transfer costs from one market to another. Because most poor consumers face very 
high transaction and transport costs, large price fluctuations will remain in poor 
countries sucking them into the poverty trap. Furthermore, local communities do not 
have the logistical and financial capacity to regulate markets. For these reasons, the 
practical level for action is national governments or groups of governments. However 
some supports of the international community are needed. It will be addressed in the 
fourth section. 
At present, national governments are largely deprived of power because of the multiple 
international agreements in force. In particular, the WTO ban on most technical 
measures to stabilize domestic markets is a serious impediment in this regard. The WTO 
agreements should therefore be revised to allow governments to define the agricultural 
policies necessary to improve food security. In this respect, one must emphasize the fact 
that, according to jurists, the Marrakech treaty provides almost all the necessary 
provisions to allow government intervention if it is deemed necessary, so that a formal 
renegotiation of the treaty would probably not be necessary. Only a strong reversal in 
how it is enforced should be envisaged.   
2.2 Is Price Stabilization Feasible? 
 
While direct public intervention in agricultural markets seems necessary under certain 
circumstances, the success of such intervention is, however, dependent on political and 
institutional conditions. Inadequate or untimely public interventions discourage private 
activities in commercialization (eviction effect) and generally decrease efficiency. 
Sometimes, they even increase uncertainty (Jayne et al., 2006). It has been  
demonstrated that, in a context of price jumps, public intervention aimed at containing 
the leap could indeed worsen it, because of a lack of predictability (Chapoto and Jayne, 
2009; Nijhoff et al., 2002; Mwanaumo et al., 2005). The private sector cannot operate in 
an environment where governments intervene in a discretionary and unpredictable way 
making prices even less stable (Byerlee et al., 2006). State intervention is in this case 
seen as lowering efficiency by limiting local competition and private sector 
development. State interventions also generate rent-seeking behaviors and are the 
sources of maneuvers expected to serve the interests of specific actors. Thus, political 
economy consideration of existing contradictory interests  and institutional contexts is 
necessary to understand food price policy designs and implementation as well as the 
difficulty of reforming agricultural markets (Jayne et al., 2002).  
 
These analyses, applied to price stabilization policies, are consistent with more general 
analyses of the forms of governance that prevail in policy elaboration and 
implementation. They insist on the capacity of diverse stakeholders (governments, lobby 
groups, etc.) to meet their objectives. At the World Bank, Kaufman considers that 
society engagement and state performance form the two pillars of good governance 
(Kaufman et al., 2005; World Bank, 2005). His works led to the definition of six 
governance indicators that measure “government capacity to formulate and implement 
policies in an efficient way” and the ”respect of citizens and [the] state for the 
institutions that govern their social and economical interactions.”  
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Somewhat summarized, these works suggest that the processes through which food 
price stabilization policies are elaborated and implemented can count as much that the 
content of these policies (how things are done counts as much, and maybe even more, 
that which things are done), and that, as a result, we have to analyze the forms of 
governance that drive policy elaboration and implementation. How is food price 
stabilization elaborated? What are the specific interests served by these policies? Which 
stakeholders participate (or not) in policy elaboration processes? How are food price 
stabilization policies implemented? Are these policies predictable enough? Are they 
effectively enforced by the State and respected by private actors? Among the many 
institutional factors that influence the ability of policies to smooth price volatility, three 
can be distinguished: policy effectiveness, policy predictability, and policy 




Policy effectiveness is related both to the financial capacity of States to implement 
policies and to States’ capacity to control policy enforcement and compliance 




Policy predictability is linked to the State’s capacity to elaborate and implement policies 
in a transparent way, so that private actors can correctly anticipate government actions 
and position themselves on food markets.  
 
Policy Appropriateness to a Plurality of Interests  
 
Policy appropriateness to a plurality of interests is related both to the capacity of private 
actors to define and represent their interests and to the capacity of the State to take 
into account these interests (pluralist system of interest representation, control of 
corruption and rent-seeking behaviors, arenas for discussion and negotiation, 
enhancement of capacity-building programs among different stakeholders, etc.).  
In short, state interventions should be based on collaboration between public and 
private actions. They should be rules-based and relatively predictable, as well as 
credible, which implies sure and flexible access to financial resources and expertise. To 
be legitimate, intervention has to be the result of actors’ discussions and negotiations, 
which in turn means that institution-building for organizations such as farmers’ 
organization may be a necessary prerequisite. Rent-seeking behavior should be avoided 
as much as possible through transparency, the existence of press/media freedom, and 
exemplary punishment of adverse behaviors. 
 
These institutional factors are likely to express themselves differently according to the 
level in question, given that prevailing stakeholders are different. In the next section, we 
will illustrate how these factors influence policies’ ability to reduce food price volatility 
at the national level. At the regional and international levels, the prevailing stakeholders 
are different from those that are most influent at the national level. As a result, 
governance issues tend to differ a lot.  
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If we want to analyze the processes of elaborating and implementing food price 
stabilization, we need to consider a wide variety of stakeholders. For example, at the 
international level, States, traders, experts and non-governmental organizations 
influence these processes and should be taken into account. Considering States, we 
need to consider a great variety of stakeholders as well. In broad outline, we can 
distinguish between: (i)“high income states” that tend to support agricultural revenues 
(employment and farm problem, producer-side) and “low income states” that are more 
likely to defend food security (urban food problem, consumer-side); (ii) between 
“importing” and “exporting” states; (iii) between “small” and “large” states related to 
international trade, etc.  
 
Policy effectiveness, predictability and appropriateness to a plurality of interests have 
much to do with the forms of coordination that prevail on the international level. Crucial 
governance issues arise. If one decides to regulate food prices at the international level 
through policies, should forms of coordination rely exclusively on intergovernmental 
agreements? How can one ensure policies’ long term financing, enforcement, 
transparency, and capacity to serve the general interest? Nowadays, there is no relevant 
international organization to ensure these four conditions (they are not covered by the 
mandates of either the World Trade Organization or the Food Agriculture Organization). 
Proposals have been made on setting up a new organization, the International Food 
Safety Agency, but many questions remain as to how to ensure this new organization’s 
effectiveness. 
 
Theoretical Aspects: A Few Concluding Remarks 
 
Finally, a consensus exists as to the difficulties and costs associated with state 
interventions in agricultural markets. The subject of controversy is the consequences of 
these difficulties and costs, and the way forward. For some experts, all of these 
considerations, added to the facts that high transaction costs hamper market operation 
and that public budgets are scarce, point to the argument that it will be more useful to 
invest in public infrastructures (roads, health, education) and in agricultural research 
and extension than in food price stabilization (Cumming et al., 2006). While some agree 
that direct public interventions may be useful because of the harmful effects of price 
instability, they argue that direct public intervention is associated with so many adverse 
effects that the cure is worse than the disease. 
 
For others, coordination failures justify intervention, especially in LDC countries because 
of the dynamic gains to be expected in economies stuck in the poverty trap. Building a 
conducive environment for private activities is necessary but unlikely to be enough. In 
this case, direct public intervention in market is required.  
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Chapter 3 – Lessons from National Price Stabilization 
Experiences 
 
F. Gérard, A. Alpha, E. Maitre d’Hotel, R. Beaujeu, L. Levard  
 
 
One of the main reasons for State withdrawal from agricultural markets in the mid-
1980s was the poor efficiency and high cost of public intervention. As a result, it is useful 
to consider past and current experiences with price stabilization policies and derive 
lessons from them. A precise analysis of past experiences may indeed help define public 
interventions that maximize positive impacts and minimize adverse effects. This is the 
main objective of this section. 
 
Fourteen case studies on price stabilization policies4 in a wide range of (geographical, 
socio-economic, and political) contexts and periods have been analyzed in order to 
identify key factors of success and the reasons for failures. Then, some 
recommendations are formulated for the proper implementation of price stabilization 
policies and for further research on new possible areas for public policy. 
3.1. A Wide Variety of Contexts and Objectives but Few Combinations of Policy 
Measures 
 
Over the past decades, price stabilization policies have been implemented in numerous 
countries and in widely different national contexts and periods. However, developing 
countries generally experienced the same historical trend in public policies: (i) strong 
public interventions until the mid-1980s, (ii) state withdrawal and priority given to the 
market until the end of the 1990s, and finally (iii) a return to public intervention in 
recent years. This evolution is in line with recommendations by international 
institutions, at least for the two first periods. It therefore underlines the importance of 
the official positions of these institutions. 
 
The direct objectives pursued by interventions are diverse and highly dependent on the 
economic and social profile of each country. Low Income Countries tend to fight against 
the “poverty trap” and/or to protect consumers from soaring prices (i.e. Madagascar, 
Mali, Zambia, Kenya, and Malawi). Most Middle Income Countries seek to maintain low 
consumer prices in order to fight against urban poverty and promote the 
industrialization process, taking advantage of the improvement in competitiveness 
allowed by low wages (e.g. Thailand, or Indonesia). They also try to encourage 
agricultural production and a higher level of food independence through the incentive of 
relatively high producer prices (India and Indonesia). The objective can also be to 
protect the most vulnerable and malnourished people while specifically supporting 
                                                      
4
 See the list of countries, products and periods under analysis in Appendix 1. 
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smallholder farming (e.g. Brazil). Finally, High Income Countries seek to protect their 
agriculture from external shocks in global markets in order to maintain their food 
independence, protect employment (e.g. the United States, the European Union, and 
Canada) and more generally aim to promote multi-functional farming (i.e. the European 
Union).  
 
Domestic food price volatility in these countries can have different causes. Climatic 
factors affecting national production (for example, periods of drought in African 
countries can lead to large drops in national cereal production) tend to call for public 
interventions aiming at improving the operation of the domestic market (e.g. 
information systems, rural infrastructures, standardization, etc.), and opening borders 
for a better markets integration. Endogenous instability due to anticipation errors by 
players may call for other policies aiming at directly acting on marketed volumes in 
relation to demand and thus controlling boarders and using public stocks. International 
food price volatility may also lead countries to implement trade regulation measures, 
when small “price taker” countries are affected by price variations in international 
markets. In the fourteen cases studies we led, it is difficult to determine the relative 
weight of these different sources of domestic food price volatility: it is most likely that 
they both played a role. This partly explains why different kinds of interventions have 
been implemented.   
 
Beyond the diversity of national experiences, broad characteristics in the content of 
implemented policies can be underlined.  
 
Policies combine various instruments. This means that instruments are never 
implemented in isolation, but are always part of a package5 (policy mix). The table in 
Appendix 2 presents the wide range of instruments implemented and how they are 
combined in most of the fourteen cases studies. Following the typology of the ECART 
study (see Box 1 and Galtier et al., 2009), they consist primarily of “C” instruments (that 
is, instruments aiming at minimizing price instability through public intervention). 
 
In particular, two main policy mixes are used in most of the cases under analysis: 
 
- (I) trade regulation through quantitative restrictions + production support (input 
subsidies, farm credit, agricultural extension, etc.) + buffer stock used to define 
a price band (India, Indonesia, Malawi, Thailand, and Zambia); and 
- (II) trade regulation (through tariffs or quantitative restrictions) + production 
support (Mali, Guinea). 
 
These two kinds of combinations of instruments aim at balancing supply and demand. 
When prices are considered to be too high, an increase in supply on the domestic 
                                                      
5 See Appendix 1 for information on the combination of instruments used in each country under analysis. 
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market is obtained by encouraging production or imports and limiting exports, as well as 
by releasing public stocks if available. When prices are considered to be too low, supply 
reductions can be achieved by (i) limiting imports and production through set asides or 
price level adjustments relative to inputs costs; and (ii) limiting producers’ deliveries to 
the market (facilitating storage by producers). 
 
Decreases in supply can be combined with increases in demand (public stocking, 
facilitating private stocking of products). In this case, “C” instruments are generally 
combined with “A” instruments (that is, instruments aiming to stabilize prices through 
private interventions), leading to a combination of public and private actions. In such a 
context, buffer stocks enable the government to directly increase or decrease the 
quantities available on the domestic market. Countries that do not use buffer stocks are 
generally engaged in structural adjustment programs (e.g. Mali in recent years) or have 
weak institutional and administrative capacities (e.g. Guinea).  
 
Some countries use also “D” instruments to act on the demand side, particularly in case 
of food crises. This is the case of India where consumption subsidies directly focused on 
the target population in order to resolve the potential conflict between consumers’ and 
producers’ interests. 
 
In Brazil, programs benefiting both specific groups of producers and specific groups of 
consumers (Agriculture’s Food Acquisition Program, PAA) have been implemented. 
Some products from smallholder farms are purchased at a subsidized price and 
distributed to vulnerable groups of consumers.  
 
Burkina-Faso mainly used “A” instrument through its “fonds de lissage”, a  risk 
mitigation fund combined with “C” instrument (input subsidies). 




Box 5 : Diversity in Price Stabilization Policy Design and Implementation 
Indonesia sets a price band associated with external trade restrictions through the Bulog. The 
producer price and the input price/producer price ratio are used to monitor the production 
trend and mitigate the problem of excessive producer incentives and accompanying costs. The 
width of the price band was also seen as a key parameter. It was progressively widened with the 
development of private trading activities, in order to avoid eviction effects. Bulog procurement 
generally concerned only a small volume (around 10%) of marketed rice production. Rice prices 
were maintained near the level of international prices during the period 1970-1997. 
Government intervention proved to be highly reactive to the changing context during that 
period. Strong efforts have been made to significantly strengthen the logistical capacity and 
managerial procedures of the Bulog. Extensive analytical studies on key parameters (size of 
margins between floor and ceiling prices, size of buffer stocks needed, etc.) have been 
conducted. 
By contrast, after the economic crisis in 1997-1999, producer prices were kept 30% higher than 
international prices in spite of the negative effects on the poorest and the absence of additional 
reserves of productivity.   
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In Burkina Faso, since 2006, the guaranteed producer price in the cotton commodity chain has 
been connected to the international price. However, with rising fertilizer costs, food inflation, 
and dropping international cotton prices, the real floor price for producers is not high enough to 
ensure sufficient earnings and encourage production, in spite of producer price smoothing. 
Consequently, producers are replacing cotton with maize in crop systems. 
 
In Guinea, the “Fédération des Paysans du Fouta Djallon” (the Fouta Djallon farmers’ 
federation) organizes the negotiation of the producer floor price between producers’ groups 
and traders at the start of each agricultural campaign. Technical elements are considered during 
the negotiations such as production costs and inflation. The floor producer price varies from 
one year to the next, but all producers know the price in advance (predictability). This policy 
leads to a dramatic increase in potatoe production from 150 to 16000 tons over the last twenty 
years. 
 
In Zambia, guaranteed producer prices through public purchases are higher than the current 
prices on wholesale markets, providing strong incentives for producers.  
 
In Thailand and India, because of lobbying pressure, the guaranteed producer price is too high, 
disconnected from the international price, and generates excess supply. In India, the growth 
rate in maize production was lower during the liberalization phase (1991-2004) than during the 
periods of heavy government intervention in 1964-1990 and 2005-2010. Real prices for 
consumers tend to have fluctuated more during the liberalization periods than the do 
nowadays. 
 
On the contrary, in Malawi, due to escalating costs (massive stocks accumulated in state 
warehouses or exported at a loss) and financial constraints in the 1980s, the Agricultural 
Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC) was often unable to defend the minimum 
support price for maize (as well as the ceiling price in the 2001-2002 crisis). The price band was 
annually revised and moved closer to international parity prices. Support producer prices were 
reduced or withdrawn in many areas, and this lead to development of parallel and illegal 
markets. Such a process also occurred in the 1970s in Madagascar and Mali, leading to a 
stagnation of production levels and an increase in imports. 
 
In India in the 1970s, there was no difference between the guaranteed producer price for food 
sale operations to vulnerable groups through public storage (tool targeting consumers) and the 
support price for production (tool targeting producers). With the continuously rising support 
price (disconnected from international trends) and excessive public purchases, such confusion 
in targeting the population and pricing policies had negative effects on the food inflation rate.  
 
 
3.2. Factors of Success or Failure 
 
Case studies show a number of successes in terms of production levels, price 
stabilization, yields, consumer protection, and independency from the world market. 
Indonesia, for instance, shifted from the world largest importer of rice in the 1970s to a 
self-sufficient country in the mid 1980s. 
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A virtuous circle sometimes appears in poor countries stuck in the poverty trap, where 
the risks involved in production activities result in a strong supply response (see Box 6). 
Labor productivity and agricultural incomes tend to improve, provided that there are 
productivity reserves. Reserves of productivity may come from technological 
innovations such as the green revolution (improved seeds, high yield varieties) or from 
an increase in capital (public capital, like irrigation facilities or private capital bought by 
farmers through investment). While more capital often implies that less labor is used, 
the rising incomes associated to this increase in capital implies higher demand for non-
agricultural goods and services as well, which offers employment opportunities in non-
agricultural sectors. When the product under stabilization is an important part of 
consumers’ diets, the price of food tends to fall, but producers’ incomes do not drop 
because larger amounts of products are sold. The food policy dilemma is thus solved. 
 
Box 6 : The Key Impacts of Productivity Improvement 
In countries such as Indonesia, India, Zambia, Kenya and Malawi, the green revolution made 
new gains in productivity possible: improved seeds and high yield varieties of wheat, rice and 
maize. In Indonesia, new technology was available to allow labor productivity growth, and the 
stabilization of rice prices was one component of rice modernization. The other components 
were: a technical package (distribution of high yield varieties, provision of fertilizers and 
pesticides at a highly subsidized price), rural infrastructures (irrigation systems, roads, schools, 
market places, communication systems, electrification, public health facilities), extension 
services, education, etc. In Malawi, positive trends in maize production and yields in the 1983-
1993 period can be explained by the implementation of a package of public policies including 
breeding programs, investment in agronomic research, extension, seed distribution systems, 
rural infrastructures, ADMARC’s interventions, and fertilizer and credit delivery. Since 2005, the 
dramatic increase in maize production is also partly due to the dissemination of a technical 
package through the Agricultural Input Subsidy Program (vouchers for buying inputs at a 
subsidized price). 
 
In a context of state withdrawal such as in Guinea, support production actions combined with 
seasonal prohibitions on potatoes imports have been implemented by farmers themselves, 
organized within the Fédération des Paysans du Fouta Djallon. The Federation has developed 
numerous services for its members: providing certified seeds and fertilizers at acceptable 
interest rates, extension, management advice, hydro-agricultural infrastructures, storage 
capacities, rural roads, etc. 
  
It must be stressed that implementing these “green revolution” techniques requires large 
quantities of capital (improved seeds, fertilizers, and waterworks). It would not have been 
possible for peasants to get access to such inputs without credit, and access to credit would not 
have been possible without a minimum of output price stability. One might notice, however, 
that repeated access to credit also depends on harvest risks and input costs. Producer price 
policies have to take into account input costs if they want to maintain producers’ revenues and 





However, a large number of factors are at stake, and instruments are combined, which 
means that the observed positive social and economic changes cannot be attributed to 
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price stabilization policies alone. Moreover, some measures have had negative 
unintended consequences that call into question the sustainability of the policies 
involved: increasing costs, inefficiency of state activities, eviction effects on private 
operators, large-scale corruption (see Box 8). 
 
 
Several types of factors of success or failure for price stabilization policies can be 
identified and classified in two broad categories: (i) technical-economic factors, and (ii) 
political-institutional factors: policy effectiveness and predictability, consultation and 
negotiation among actors, problems related to rent seeking and corruption. They will 
each be addressed in turn. 
 
3.2.1 Technical and Economic Factors 
 
The appropriate choice and calibration of instruments are critical in the success or 
failure of market regulation. This appears to be a very complex task that requires precise 
technical expertise. Case studies reveal four key points: (i) the level of the floor and 
ceiling prices, (ii) the impacts of initial endowment in factors, (iii) storage and financial 
capacities, and (iv) costs and management of over-supply.  
 
 
Floor and Ceiling Price Levels 
 
The level of the floor price (in relation to input costs) will encourage or discourage 
production. It has to be adjusted according to the context of the country. Poor importing 
countries will encourage production, especially if the product is a staple food. In theory, 
the band has to follow international trends (see Box 5) but, in the case of low 
international prices and very poor countries where most of the population is engaged in 
agriculture, it would be worth considering initially maintaining prices at a higher level. 
For many agricultural producers who are net buyers in developing countries, the issue is 
to both keep food prices low for consumers and maintain food prices at an encouraging 
level for producers (adjusted to production costs). In these situations, fertilizer subsidies 
could be an interesting option: they can make it possible to maintain an encouraging 
price for producers without raising prices for consumers.  
 
Exporting countries should take care of their impacts on the international market and of 
rising costs related to increasing production (see Box 12). In order to reduce the risks 
associated with agricultural activities (see chapter 2), the floor price has to be publicly 
announced at least before the crop year starts.  
 
The price band has to be wide enough so as not to discourage private operators. The gap 
is highly dependent on transport and storage costs in the country. A gap of 50% 




Another question relates to the use of pan-territorial or differentiated regional prices: 
the former may be easier to implement but the induced effects on remote areas, which 
are in this way advantaged, must be taken into account; the latter make it possible to 
take into account transport costs and have less negative impacts on traders. The Malawi 
case study illustrates a situation where, because of high transportation costs, pan-
territorial food prices tend to maintain production in some areas where it would not be 
profitable without pan-territorial prices.  
 
Impacts of Initial Endowment in Factors 
 
It is worth noticing that price stabilization policies may have detrimental effects when 
the initial distribution of productive resource is very unequal (see Box 7). This kind of 
policy will benefit producers who are well endowed in land and capital more than 
others. Those who have the largest farms and the best links to the market are in a 
position to increase their marketable surpluses. In contrast, the price stabilization policy 
will not have any effect on farmers not trading on markets at all because their access to 
land is so limited that they do not produce enough to sell. For this specific population, 
other measures, such as free input distribution or income diversification support, have 
to be implemented. The question is slightly different for net buyers who sell their 
harvest and have to buy products at a higher price during the year. For them, price 
stabilization policies would improve their situation and maybe allow them to become 
net sellers. This underlines that pricing policies should not be addressed independently 
from other policies. Policy coherence needs to be sought in order to be sure that the 
pricing policy is pro-poor. The issue of inequalities in the distribution of production 
resources must be addressed in a serious way. In some cases, policies targeting specific 
sectors of the population may be an appropriate solution even if this involves complex 
institutional matters, as will be seen below. 
 
Box 7 : The Importance of the Initial Distribution of Productive Resources 
In Zambia, Kenya and Malawi, a large proportion of producers are net buyers. 
 
In Zambia, a large share of producers do not have produce enough to sell surpluses. What is 
more, they never sell and therefore cannot benefit from a price stabilization policy. Since land 
distribution is very unequal, only the larger producers benefit from the policy at the expense of 
the smaller ones. Cereal consumption indicators show there has been little—or no–progress in 
food security and the increase in production is mainly exported while 40% of the population is 
affected by malnutrition. 
 
In Malawi, agriculture generally consists of small-scale farmers. A critical issue is the very 
smallness of cultivated tracts of land (less than 0.5 ha per farmer). In this case, free input 
distribution programs seem to be very successful in terms of increasing maize production. These 
programs enable intensification, even for farmers who are not linked to markets but who will 
depend on the development of extra-farm activities to see an increase in their incomes. 
 
In Kenya, agriculture is characterized by a dual structure: the top 10% of farms account for 85% 
of all domestically marketed maize, while 62% of rural smallholders are net maize buyers. Given 
this structure, the National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB) policies designed to increase the 
domestic price of maize in 1995-2004 had the effect of transferring income from three million 
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urban consumers and almost sixteen million small-scale farm households (net maize buyers) to 
five million small-scale farmers in a high potential area for maize and a few thousand large-scale 
maize farmers (net maize sellers). 
 
In Brazil, since 2002, in the context of very unequal distribution of production factors and 
incomes and a high percentage of the population in a situation of poverty, Agriculture’s Food 
Acquisition Program (PAA) has been targeting specific population groups:  
• small-scale family farmers, with a clear objective of strengthening smallholder farming 
(productivity and product quality) by purchasing products at a fair and stable price; and 
• vulnerable consumers (through school restaurants, hospitals, associations, etc.) with a 
clear objective of improving access to food for the poorest, both in terms of quantity and quality 
(in particular, the distribution of milk for children).   
 
However, such targeting requires strong administrative capacities (definition of criteria, 
registering, controls, etc.) that generally do not exist in LDCs. 
 
 
Storage and Financial Capacities 
 
The size of public storage capacity and the access to flexible resources are fundamental 
parameters because the state has to be able to buy enough products to maintain the 
advertised floor price. As will be argued below, the credibility of the policy is of utmost 
importance. This implies that the state does what it has promised to do and therefore 
that it has access to sufficient financial resources and storage facilities. Storage could be 
the result of a public-private partnership where the state contracts with private actors 
for a given amount of storage. Such arrangements get private actors involved in the 
policy process and reduce the costs associated with public activities (generally higher 
than private actors’ costs). 
 
 
Costs and Management of Over-Supply  
 
When reserves of productivity exist, production may rise very rapidly and result in 
surpluses. This makes storage more expensive and the export of surpluses more difficult. 
It might generate adverse effects on the world market. Because many countries were 
not able to properly manage costs, they had to withdraw from market regulation. When 
a country shifts from importer to exporter position and when domestic prices are higher 
than international market prices, the issue of how to deal with surpluses takes on the 
utmost importance. In the past, this has often been managed through export subsidies 
at very high cost (European Union) or through international food aid (United States). 
Such policies create unfair competition and may damage the local production of trading 
partners (see Box 8). Policy adjustments are therefore crucial to avoiding excessive 
costs. This could be done by decreasing the level of floor prices (but at the cost of 
bankruptcies if farmers had to go into debt), quantitative limits on production or 
measures such as contract farming (see below), which provide a guaranteed floor price 
for only a predetermined quantity of production.  
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While food price stabilization policies’ costs such as public storage are high, they have to 
be compared to food price instability costs (social costs derived from food price 
instability for producers and/or consumers). These later costs are difficult to estimate 
and further research is needed to carry out cost-benefits analyses of food price 
stabilization policies that consider the welfare of tax payers, producers and consumers 
alike. 
 
It also seems inefficient to maintain high prices to support an agricultural production for 
which a country does not have any competitive advantage (and that would not be 
competitive without the price support system if subsidizing exports is not considered). 
However, we have to consider the case of countries that do not currently have any 
competitive advantages and the expected side effects of allowing agricultural 
development through sound agricultural policy. 
 
Surpluses are not necessarily a problem and quantitative limitations on production are 
not necessarily relevant when surpluses are considered from a regional perspective for 
instance. Intra-regional trade therefore requires political consensus among countries as 
to which country has comparative advantages for a given production and could supply 
the region, which is not an easy task (see below). 
 
Box 8 : The Crucial Question of Cost Management 
The difficult transition from importer to exporter is illustrated by the cases of Indonesia, 
Zambia, Malawi, and the EU. 
 
In Indonesia, Bulog has experienced a dramatic increase in its costs, especially when it has to 
manage surpluses ($30 million US per year in 1969-1974, $80 million in 1970-1984, then $90 
million in 1993-1994, and even $200 million when export subsidies are included), which has 
almost lead it to bankruptcy. However, Bulog had access to financial reserves partly because of 
the increase in the price of oil. Moreover, rising costs (due to large stocks, subsidized exports 
when there were surpluses and subsidized imports when there were production deficits) led to 
reforms and adaptations by Bulog: reconsideration of the floor price, removal of fertilizer 
subsidies and the ceiling price announcements. In Indonesia, the policy option was to act on the 
relative prices of inputs and production. 
 
In Malawi, it seems that because adjustments were not made in time, stocks accumulated, 
surpluses were exported at a loss, and the costs involved with the storage policy increased, 
putting the state in the position of not being able to provide price support in some remote 
areas. 
 
Zambia benefited from revenues generated by copper. 
 
In the EU, for some products surpluses were exported at subsidized prices that created unfair 
competition with producers based in importing countries. For sugar and milk, quantitative 
restrictions were combined with the price stabilization policy allowing supply management. 
 





In Guinea, potato surpluses can be exported to neighboring countries. In this case, exports tend 
to enhance a regional integration process, and can partially replace imported potatoes from 
other regions. 
 
In Brazil, it seems that the program purchasing products from smallholder farms avoids the 
adverse effects of over production by limiting the amount of direct support per farmer and per 
year. 
 
The question of cost management is also critical in situations other than surplus management. 
In Mali, for instance, the Office in charge of managing the intervention stock has had difficulties 
accessing financing. Two public buffer stocks exist in Mali, but none of them has proper financial 
capital: stocks managers have to search for credit before buying cereals. In a situation of rising 
prices, this implies both delays and a smaller scale of intervention, which ultimately undermines 
stocks’ capacity to overcome price raises. This occurred in Mali during both the 2005 crisis and 
the 2008 crisis, when only 28,000 T and 53,000 T were able to be destocked, which was 
insufficient to really influence price levels. 
 
This in-depth analysis of countries’ experiences allows for the following 
recommendations to be formulated. 
The ability to properly design policies and set a number of technical parameters is a key 
factor in ensuring the effective functioning of price stabilization policies. Their adequacy 
to the specific economic, social and institutional context of each country and each 
government’s objectives, and the ability to foresee and adapt to changing contexts are 
key factors for success. This therefore requires high technical capacities and access to a 
large range of information and analyses. It is important to evaluate in advance the 
impacts of policies on the various types of households and possibly which sub-
population to target. 
 
Clear differentiation between long-term and short-term objectives and good 
understanding of substitution effects between products (which depend on the 
nutritional features of the products as well as food habits) are necessary.  Pricing 
policies should be part of a coherent set of policies involving several instruments. 
Policies should accompany, but not replace, private operators. States should have the 
means to implement their policies, in particular sufficient financial resources and 
expertise to shape, implement and adjust actions. 
 
3.2.2 Political and Institutional Factors  
 
Considering the processes by which policies are defined and implemented, different 
factors play a decisive role in the policies’ ability to smooth food price volatility. The case 
studies led in different national contexts reveal that perverse effects can occur when 
policies:  
- are not very effective, 
- are not very predictable, and 
- do not reflect a plurality of interests. 
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The low effectiveness of policies is a factor that can undermine policies results, 
particularly in low income countries characterized by weak state capacity and/or 
legitimacy. In these contexts, announced price policies tend not to be effectively 
implemented or to be by-passed by private actors (who are not punished for by-passing 
them). Indeed, the low effectiveness of policies can be attributed to either low financial 
capacities or low enforcement control. Financial capacities are a crucial determinant of 
policies’ successes in the case of stock regulation, as seen above, and production 
enhancement measures, while enforcement control is a crucial determinant of policies’ 
successes in the case of trade control. Drawing from the Malian case, Box 9 gives an 
illustration of the importance these factors can have in policies’ results. The Mali 
example can be extended to other low income countries that either lack financial 
capacity and autonomy (dependency upon foreign aid) or can barely enforce the 
compliance with policies (corruption and by-passed policies). These situations call for 
recommendations in terms of State capacity building, and are consistent with the 
recommendations made by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and by the World Bank in “fragile states”.  
 
Box 9 : Policy Effectiveness: Financial Capacities and Enforcement 
The Malian government implemented food price policies through trade control measures 
(export restrictions, import tariff wavers) and marketing measures (input subsidies, food 
security stocks). However, these measures did not always have the expected effects because of 
poor public financial capacities (see Box 8) and reduced enforcement.  
 
During the 2005 and 2008 crises, exports were banned in Mali, but this decision was not 
respected by private operators who decided to export illegally across unsupervised borders or 
through informal agreements with customs officers. Due to a low capacity for enforcement and 
punishment, the government could not end these illegal exports and act upon price levels.  
 
Other countries that do have proper and consequential financial capacities can, on the contrary, 
better ensure their policies’ enforcement and control. This is the case, for example, in Zambia 
and Indonesia where the high public cost of regulating prices is respectively covered by 
revenues from the copper and petroleum industries. In Brazil, the implementation of a complex 
program such as the PAA was possible thanks to the State’s strong administrative capacities and 
because the State devoted significant financial and human resources to the program. 
 
 
The low predictability of policies is a second institutional factor that can undermine 
policies’ ability to smooth food price volatility. This refers to the degree of transparency 
in the information the state provides on what policies have been decided. When this 
information is transparent, private actors can correctly anticipate state actions and take 
them into account in their own actions. However, when the information is not very 
transparent, private actors can hardly anticipate what the State’s actions will be and 
may prefer to act as if policies were simply absent. This eviction effect is particularly 
strong in the case of trade control policies. Drawing from the cases of different East 
African countries, Box 10 illustrates the importance of policy predictability in 
determining policy results. These situations call for the encouragement of transparency 
in policy processes.  
 
 41 
Box 10 : Policy Predictability 
Studies conducted in Zambia, Kenya and Malawi show that the volatility of maize prices was 
exacerbated by discretionary policies. The unpredictability of trade policies led to diminished 
interest by private actors in marketing and trade functions, and resulted in situations where 
prices fluctuated more than necessary. In Zambia, in 2001 and 2005, drought led to price 
fluctuations that were exacerbated by government interventions: the government advertized 
maize imports to contain rising prices, but publicly supported imports were arranged too late 
and uncertainties about the level and pricing of these imports limited private imports, resulting 
in very large increases. The story is similar in Malawi and Kenya. In Malawi, for example, exports 
were banned in 2006 and 2007, despite above average harvests, worsening maize prices 
situation for net maize sellers. In Kenya, in 2008, delays in government imports pushed maize 
prices higher and maize prices stayed at very high levels in late 2008 despite the tumbling of 
world prices (a state of emergency was declared in January 2009 and the import duty was finally 
lifted).  
 
On the contrary, when policies are relatively transparent, private actors can anticipate public 
actions and position themselves in markets efficiently. Madagascar, with the running of the Rice 




The fact that policies may not reflect a plurality of interests is the third factor identified 
through the case studies that may undermine policies’ results. In some countries, 
policies can be assimilated to the attribution of rents to a limited number of actors 
(Zambia for example, see Box 11), while in other countries policies seem to be more 
legitimate and are the result of dialogue and/or negotiation processes where different 
actors have the capacity to represent and defend their interests (Madagascar for 
example, see Box 11). These examples call for greater attention to the influence that 
private actors do indeed have in policy making processes. Recommendations should 
focus on the enhancement of transparent and pluralist systems of interest 
representation but they must take into account the capacity of actors to effectively 
represent and defend their interests in dialogue and negotiation arenas as well. In some 
cases, capacity building programs are needed to ensure actors participate in these policy 
making processes. 
 
Box 11 : Policy Appropriateness for a Plurality of Interests: Dialogue Processes as the 
Key ? 
In Zambia, maize trade and marketing policies tend to benefit a small number of actors, and as 
a result their redistributive effect can be questioned. Pan-territorial prices benefit net seller 
producers only (and not to the smallest producers who are net buyers), and are strongly 
influenced by the Zambian National Producers Union. Import licenses are attributed selectively 
to industrial millers and traders, who tend to maintain close relationships with government 
officials. There are no official dialogue and negotiation arenas, and marketing and trade policies 
are defined in a way that is not transparent.  
 
In Madagascar, rice marketing and trade policies have been discussed since 2005 within a 
“dialogue platform” where the different actors of rice sector are represented, and where 
market information is analyzed. Since then, domestic markets have stayed relatively calm in 
comparison with international markets. Guinea provides another positive example of when 
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discussions between actors led to the implementation of private measures that regulated the 
operation of potato markets.  
 
In Brazil, the proactive participation of different stakeholders (farmers’ cooperatives, 
enterprises, social control councils and committees, etc.) has been one of the reasons for the 
success of the Agriculture’s Food Acquisition Program (PAA). 
 
While the implementation of mutual information processes seems to be a promising innovation, 
accompanying policies aimed at strengthening actors’ capacities have to be encouraged as well 
in order to help actors better define (expertise) and defend (negotiation) their interests.  
 
Effectiveness, predictability, and appropriateness for a plurality of interests: these three 
factors influence policies’ ability to lower food price volatility. The case studies led at 
national level highlight their influence, which depends on the political instruments 
considered (see the Table in Appendix 3).  
 
At the regional scale, the experience in West Africa tends to demonstrate that these 
political and institutional factors are particularly critical for attaining the positive results 
expected from regional integration (see Box 12). 
 
Box 12 : Advantages and Limits of Regional Integration for Addressing Food Price 
Volatility 
Today, regional integration processes, which are seen as a powerful driver for development, 
tend to be growing stronger, particularly in Africa. 
 
In theory, many advantages are expected from regional integration (De Melo, 1993; Hugon, 
2005), which could be favorable for price volatility reduction compared to actions at the 
national and international levels. Here, one can mention a wider and more competitive market, 
economies of scale and better allocation of resources, a more stable and predictable 
institutional environment (national policies are “locked” within common policies, national 
lobbies are limited), standardization and “commoditization” of regionally exchanged products, 
reduction in transaction costs (due to geographical, socio-economical, and cultural proximity) 
compared to the international market, etc. 
 
In West Africa, ECOWAS is currently reflecting on how to address food price volatility in the 
framework of its Common Agricultural Policy (ECOWAP). Reflection focuses on both common 
trade instruments (which is a fundamental part of regional integration and quite advanced), and 
regional cooperation to manage food security stocks and social transfers. Indeed, the regional 
dimension of food crises in West Africa, as illustrated in 2005, encourages countries to start 
building a regional approach to the management of food price peaks. 
 
However, the economic heterogeneity of West African countries, the different sensitivity to 
imports (less for landlocked countries or the CFA franc zone), the divergent interests, differing 
points of view on trade, and the relative newness of the integration process make it difficult to 
see the advantages of regional integration. For instance, the Free Trade Liberalization Scheme 
adopted in 2004 is far from being effective (there are still many obstacles to trade within the 





The Desirability and Feasibility of Public Intervention at the National Level: Some 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The analysis of past and current experiences with market regulation reveals some 
encouraging successes and allows one to highlight some common features in these 
experiences. Management of agricultural price instability has to be part of a larger 
agricultural policy designed according to the specific context and objectives of the 
country in question. A wide range of instruments exists and combining these 
instruments in policy mixes is recommended. To avoid the excessive costs often linked 
to public intervention, instruments can be implemented by private operators under 
public supervision rather than exclusively by public actors.   
 
All the problems faced by rural areas today will not be solved by market regulation. 
Other measures will be necessary, but reducing risk appears to be a condition for 
increasing labor productivity and incomes in poor areas. Measures aiming at improving 
market operation (information, discussion, standardization, etc.) as well as measures 
mitigating the negative effects of price volatility (such as social transfers) are 
complementary to market regulation. They will not be enough. 
 
Some of the desired features of market regulation can be drawn from national/regional 
experiences. The desirability of price stabilization is highly dependent upon the general 
situation of each country, and policy design must be context-specific. If one seeks to 
replicate experiences, then many factors have to be considered, including the country’s 
level of development, the proportion of the population in the agricultural sector, the 
external trade balance, the location of production areas, land distribution, 
transportation facilities, and the institutional and political contexts. Regulation has to be 
flexible, part of a broader agricultural policy that is constantly adapted to changing 
conditions in world markets and domestic production. This implies having a team of 
experts to analyze the situation and a wide range of information available. 
 
Policy success in poor countries is highly dependant on the existence of productivity 
reserves. These reserves may come from technological innovation or better access to 
capital. The later can be obtained through the provision of public goods such as 
irrigation facilities or inputs subsidies. The problem is generally the cost of this kind of 
policy when public funds are scarce. In order to keep flexibility in the system, the policy 
should not aim at maintaining a completely fixed price. Rather, it should allow for a 
relatively wide and flexible band between floor and a ceiling prices in which the private 
sector can operate. This band has to be adapted over time in function of domestic and 
international conditions, which supposes extensive expert analyses. State interventions 
should be rules-based and relatively predictable; the stabilization agency should have 
flexible and sure access to financial resources. To be legitimate, the policy must consider 
the opposite interests of the actors involved, and has to be the result of discussions and 
negotiations among actors.  
 
Collaboration between public and private actions seems very relevant. In particular, 
physical handling of commodities could be left to private firms, even if the latter receive 
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a State price guarantee. Private-public partnership could also be considered for storage: 
public actors (central states) would act as “project owner” and decide whether to buy or 
release stocks while private actors (banks, producers’ organizations) would act as 
“project supervisors” and sell or buy food and cover the financial cost of holding stock 
according to public decisions (contract between the State and private actors). This 
makes it possible to simultaneously solve two problems associated with public 
intervention: excessive commercialization costs and the eviction effect. 
 
Price stabilization mechanisms (based on a price band defended through storage and 
imports under public supervision) or public contract farming (which guarantees prices 
for predetermined quantities attributed to peasants’ organizations) are efficient ways to 
stabilize prices. With the first option (price stabilization based on a price band), it is 
necessary to control external trade unless the price band is always included in the band 
defined by transfer costs from or to the international market. In this case, speculative 
attacks by the regulation agency are also avoided. If large fluctuations in international 
prices move the domestic band out of the band defined by transfer costs, trade 
regulations are necessary. This could be done by quantitative restrictions such as import 
licensing or variable tariffs, adjusted to maintain the domestic band within the larger 
band defined by transfer costs between the domestic and international markets.  
 
With the second option (contract farming), controlling external trade is not necessary 
because the guaranteed price concerns only predetermined quantities of products. 
Another advantage of this solution is that it allows one to target specific categories of 
farmers.  
 
However, the problem associated with quantitative measures is that they are often 
associated with bribery and rent-seeking behaviors. As stated above, some paths 
forward exist: rules-based, transparent public interventions combined with clear and 
prompt action against corruption, and capacity building ensuring that the different kind 
of actors are able to defend their interests may make it possible to define institutions 
and mechanisms to minimize these adverse effects.  
 
It has to be noticed that the compatibility of such measures with WTO rules is not 
guaranteed. Price stabilization instruments such as buffer stocks or guaranteed prices 
should generally be lowered (they are included in the “amber box” of trade-distorting 
subsidies). Public stocks can only be maintained as part of a food security policy, and if 
they do not aim to support production through producer prices that are higher than 
international prices (see the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), Appendix 2). 
Structural stabilization instruments on import prices such as variable levies are strictly 
forbidden (AoA, Article 4:2), and import price bands have been challenged in the Dispute 
Settlement Body (the Argentina-Chile dispute). Only punctual measures such as the 
AoA’s Safeguard Clause (SGS) allow for the increasing of tariffs beyond bound rates. 
Moreover, since many developing countries under structural adjustment did not notify 
price stabilization and non ad-valorem protection instruments (e.g. specific customs 
duties, tariff-rate quotas, etc.), they are no longer allowed to introduce these 
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instruments. Many developing countries are also not allowed to use the SGS because 
they used ceiling tariff rates. 
 
However, some flexibility exists for developing countries in the WTO arena, especially 
the least-developed countries. Customs duties can be modified since they remain below 
the bound level (this is very relevant for countries that have relatively high bound tariffs 
and are not subject to structural adjustment constraints). In addition, WTO rules are not 
fixed and the current negotiations, while they do not call into question the liberalization 
trend, offer an opening to get more policy space for the use of some instruments. Some 
(“small”) developing countries have used or still use non–WTO compatible instruments 
with nearly no risk of complaints. Finally, regions such as West Africa—if ECOWAS 
becomes a WTO member—are also little exposed to WTO complaints.  
 
More market-friendly measures, such as the warehouse system or insurance, have the 
advantage of being clearly WTO compatible. However, they induce costs for farmers 
without significantly decreasing risks, and therefore do not seem to be as efficient as 
price stabilization mechanisms or contract farming. 
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Obviously, managing domestic price instability is the government’s responsibility. 
However, various considerations tend to indicate that some support from the 
international community may be needed: 
1. The governments of many developing countries lack reliable information on 
international markets. 
2. Many developing country governments’ resources are too limited to fund price 
stabilization policies or policies aiming to mitigate the effects of price instability (safety 
nets and other related D-instruments). 
3. Rising international food prices can reduce the currency reserves of importing 
countries (Sarris, 2010). For some countries, this may imply rationing food imports. For 
others, it can generate a deficit in the balance of payments and a decrease in the 
exchange rate, inflation, and a loss of purchasing power for consumers. This problem 
affects only countries with low currency reserves and/or countries for whom food 
imports account for a large share of the balance of payments.  
4. The policies developed at the national level to reduce the transmission of 
international instability to domestic markets (e. g. variable levies on imports, export 
restrictions) are not always effective because of their budgetary cost and the difficulty 
some states have in effectively controlling their borders. Moreover, their use is bound 
by WTO rules. In addition, these policies can increase international price instability. In 
the case of crisis, restricting exports can cause shortages such as the one some 
importing countries experienced during the 2008 crisis. Policies that aim at insulating 
the domestic market narrow the international market and, as a consequence, make it 
more vulnerable to climate shocks. This can increase international instability and 
thereby increase countries’ incentive to insulate their domestic markets (Keynes, 1942). 
This phenomenon has been seen since 2008 with the strong development self-
sufficiency policies and land grabbing. Hence, there is a need for international rules to 
arbitrate between countries’ need to protect themselves from international instability 
and the need to lessen the destabilizing effects generated by these policies.  
These considerations lead to the conclusion that some actions at the international level 
must be considered to complement the actions at the national and regional levels. We 
will first present a brief historical analysis of how the problem of price instability has 
been addressed at the international level. Then, we will discuss what support the 
international community could provide in the coming years. We will distinguish between 
different types of support: the provision of public goods, transfers to the governments 
of some developing countries, and the setting up of international rules. 
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4.1. Historical Analysis of Price Volatility 
 
International food price volatility has a history. Its characteristics (magnitude), its 
causes, and the solutions imagined to deal with it have changed over time. Food 
markets have undergone structural transformations that have changed the way 
international prices are determined and the role they play in balancing world production 
and consumption.  
Since WWII, several attempts to regulate international food markets have been made by 
international cooperation structures. Initially, food markets were characterized by:  
- widespread overproduction and/or production factor surpluses; 
- a disconnect between domestic prices and international prices organized by 
agricultural policies; and 
- a shared objective of national self-sufficiency (except, of course, for tropical 
products) that implied limited involvement in international trade. 
Two radically different approaches followed one another. 
The 1960s and 1970s were the golden age of international commodity agreements. The 
aim was to stabilize (actually support) international prices based on international stocks 
and/or export quotas. At this time, international cooperation was seen as a matter of 
dealing with how nation-state oligopolies coordinated the collective management of 
production surpluses. This was the very purpose of international commodity 
agreements.  
From the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s, overproduction was still the problem, but the 
proposed solution was instead to organize a general and coordinated dismantlement of 
agricultural policies that isolated domestic markets from international markets. WTO 
negotiations were organized with this aim. Because of the increasing involvement in 
international trade (as exporters or importers), the disconnect between domestic and 
international prices was becoming increasingly costly for national budgets. Of course, 
international price stabilization (and price support even less) was not an explicit 
objective of the WTO negotiations. Yet, the liberalization process was expected to 
eliminate overproduction and thereby raise prices (one can recall the meticulous 
estimate of the impact of the WTO negotiations on international markets!). Moreover, 
an open world market was supposed to absorb production shocks easily. 
More than twenty years later, the resulting situation is very different from what had 
been expected. First, the dismantlement of isolating agricultural policies is clearly 
incomplete. Some countries did it (the EU, the USA) but other—bigger and bigger—
countries (China, India) did not. Second, overproduction did vanish, as illustrated by the 
low level of world stocks. But the current world supply and demand situation rises two 
questions:  
- Is the current period still characterized by structural overproduction as it was during 
most of the decades following WWII? Are agricultural frontiers not nearing their end? Is 
the age of cheap energy not coming to a close? Are the booming Asian economies that 
generated an increase in food demand radically new? 
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- Is it really possible to ensure some international price stability without a degree of 
overproduction? Is overproduction necessary to have a volume of stocks that is big 
enough to “absorb” productions shock? 
It is still too early to elaborate a full interpretation of this renewed volatility. Two 
different and opposite interpretations can be adopted: 
- The 2007/08 crisis can be seen mostly as a transition crisis signaling the strains 
generated by the incompleteness of the liberalization process. In some countries 
domestic prices are still too disconnected from international prices. Public agencies are 
still too active in food storage to allow private actors to invest in the business. 
Accordingly, liberalization must be pushed further.  
- Alternately, the 2007/08 crisis can be interpreted as evidence that the liberalization 
process is not viable. No government can accept exposing its population to “foreign” 
instability, and international markets are intrinsically unstable. Accordingly, the crisis 
confirms that China’s and India’s refusal to link their domestic prices to international 
prices is relevant.  
It would be very useful to discuss these two perspectives and reach a consensus on how 
to interpret the 2008 crisis in order to design policies to manage price instability. But 
building such a consensus will take time. We can assume that after a period of surpluses, 
we are entering a period of scarcity or, at least, of greater tension in international 
markets (booming demand from emerging countries, rising oil prices, etc.). The IPCC’s 
4th report assumes that climate change will affect agricultural production, not only 
changing land use in each region of the planet, but also increasing instability. “It is very 
likely that hot extremes, heat waves and heavy precipitation events will become more 
frequent.” (IPCC, 2007.) In any case, 2008 was not an isolated incident, and international 
markets seem to have durably become more unstable. In such a context, what are the 
possible strategies and available or possible instruments to manage this instability at the 
international level? 
 




 century, wheat prices tended to converge and stabilize in the Atlantic economy. This is 
clearly illustrated by Tables 1, 2 & 3 that show current monthly wheat prices (in dollar per quintal) in New York 
and Liverpool. Table 1 shows the overall trend from 1800 to 1913, and Tables 2 and 3 show “enlargements” of 
Liverpool prices at the beginning and the end of the long 19
th
 century.  
Prices in New York and Liverpool show an obvious convergence. At the beginning of the century, prices in 
Liverpool were frequently double New York prices. Then, they tended to converge and become synchronized. 
O’Rourke and Williamson (O'Rourke and Williamson, 1999) have demonstrated that this price convergence 
could be seen in all of the Atlantic economy.  
Moreover, price stabilization is remarkable. The phenomenon is particularly pronounced in Liverpool (see 
Tables 2 & 3). At the beginning of the 19
th
 century wheat prices could double or be halved in a few months. By 
WWI, price volatility had been markedly reduced—to less than 25%. An astonishing stability could be seen 
between 1897 and 1907. 
How can this degree of price stabilization be explained? The enlargement of the market can be mentioned, but 
it is certainly not the only factor. Various institutional innovations contributed. Cereal standardization, starting 
in Chicago in the 1850s (Cronon, 1991) helped to reduce substitution costs between origins and then helped to 
increase the number of suppliers. The creation of futures markets, which followed the creation of standards, 




English wheat importers—like African rice importers at the end of the 20
th 
century—may have adopted a price 
stability strategy to promote the consumption of imported food. Whatever the explanation, price stability 
prevailed in a time of victorious free trade when, at least in the United Kingdom, no public policy influenced 
price formation.  
 
Table 1 : Monthly Wheat Price on the Liverpool and 
New York Markets 1800-1913 
 
Table 2 : Monthly Wheat Price on the Liverpool 
Market 1800- 1820 
 









































































































Source : The data used in this box come from David Jacks who produced  an amazing compilation of wheat prices in the 
19
th
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 Box 14 : International Food Price Volatility since WWII 
From WWII to the 1980s, food markets were characterized by the omnipresence of governments and a policy 
norm of domestic-centered food markets. Using different kinds of instruments (caisse de stabilisation, 
variable levies, export or import quotas, public purchases, food aid, etc.), governments organized an almost 
complete disconnect between domestic and international prices. Domestic price stability was adopted as an 
objective worldwide. Foreign trade was subordinated to attaining it. Exports and imports were synonymous 
with surpluses and deficits that needed to be eliminated to guarantee domestic market equilibrium. From this 
standpoint, domestic stability was guaranteed by transferring domestic instability to the international market. 
During this period, international markets operated like canal locks between national markets. They handled 
the transfer of products without calling into question the level and stability of prices in domestic markets 
Despite the residual nature of trade (and despite the teachings of economic analysis), the international prices 
of most food products displayed marked stability from the end of the 1950s to 1972 (Tables 4 & 5). This is 
explained by the structuring of the international markets as hierarchic and/or co-operative oligopolies. 
Indeed, management overseen and centralized at the national foreign trade level gave the country (or nation-
state) the status of basic unit on international food product markets. Furthermore, the mastery of foreign 
trade was accompanied by states’ taking control of stocks, that is to say shifting market power from firms to 
states. In this context, practically all the international markets took on the structure of nation-state 
oligopolies 
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Source : IMF 
Then, a number of cooperation features emerged in these oligopolies during the decade following the Korean 
War: the FAO Consultative Sub-Committee on Surplus Disposal, international agreements on wheat and 
coffee, the Food Aid Convention, the GATT regulation on dairy products, and so on. These institutions were 
usually based on a solidly established hierarchy between countries and the presence of an uncontested 
leader. The cooperation in product institutions was amply completed by the residual supplier strategies used 
by this/these dominant country/countries: USA-Canada wheat duopoly, USA for maize, soybean and rice, New 
Zealand on the milk market, Brazil for coffee, etc. To guarantee international price stability, these countries 
acted as residual suppliers and adjusted their exports to their competitors’ exports and took on the world 
storage burden. 
The early 1970s featured the start of a period of marked price instability on food product markets. This 
instability first took the form of a series of price leaps affecting all commodities markets one by one. Crises in 
demand (the oil producing countries, the USSR and China) have often been highlighted to explain this period 
of price tension. However, the exhaustion of the market leader countries’ stabilization capacities does more 
to explain the large price hikes than sudden import demands. As was shown by subsequent events—in 
































































































































increasing scarcity of global resources but by changes in the policies of the leader countries. The main reason 
for the low level of world agricultural product stocks at the start of the 1970s was the reversal in the (storage 
and production) policies of the leader countries that, from the end of the 1960s onwards, refused to cover the 
entire cost of stabilizing international markets. 
The change in the markets in 1982 (the date of the start of the recession in the United States and the 
international financial slump) from a situation of shortage to one of surplus—resulting from the fall in import 
demand—abruptly revealed this lack of a stabilizing mechanism and the disappearance of the safety net that 
had been provided by the storage policies of the leader countries. At this stage, the oligopolistic structure of 
the markets was not called into question, but most of the oligopolies were destabilized, whether they 
concerned tropical or temperate products. The start of the 1980s marked the beginning of fierce competition 
when new exporters (the European Union and the “New Agricultural Countries” such as Brazil, China, 
Thailand, etc.) joined the list of suppliers. International prices reflected this new situation immediately. Even 
though the surpluses were not as substantial as those of the 1960s, prices fell sharply on a scale unequalled 
since the depression in the 1930s. The fall in international prices came with a fragmentation of international 
food markets provoked by the differentiation of the price conditions offered by exporting countries. This 
differentiation obscured the very low level of the prices actually used in the transactions. For commodities 
such as wheat and coffee, actual prices varied by a factor of between one and two according to the 
destination. 
In developing countries with no financial reserves, the fall in international prices caused the bankruptcy of 
numerous state marketing boards and triggered the wane of post-WWII state interventionism. For developed 
countries and their domestic agricultural market systems, the fall automatically resulted in a skyrocketing of 
the cost of support and revealed the mismatch between the “domestic-centered” model and the excessive 
involvement in foreign trade.  
The opening of the Uruguay Round negotiations in 1985 marked OECD countries’ awareness of the 
impossibility of continuing with the domestic-centered model. Even though the Uruguay Round negotiations 
did not come close to achieving the total dismantling of the agricultural support mechanisms in developed 
countries, the tariffication principle has clearly called into question the disconnect between domestic markets 
and the international market: while domestic prices remained distinctly higher than international prices, they 
were now supposed to vary in line with world prices. This revision of agricultural policies negotiated in a 
multilateral framework took place at the same time as a more rapid, sudden withdrawal in the developing 
countries that had “adopted” structural adjustment policies. The reduction of import barriers and the closing 
of state marketing boards were much faster and more radical within this framework. Thus, a clear 
reunification of the world market (or part of the world market as we shall see) was accomplished from the 
mid-1980’s to the mid-1990’s. 
Then, a short period of international price stability began that could be associated with the end of the trade 
war brought about by the Marrakech agreement. But this stability (Fig. 6), particularly visible in the rice 
market (Fig. 7), was short-lived. From 2005 on, prices on most of commodities markets started to creep up; 
they then began to skyrocket in 2007, doubling or trebling within the space of a few months. The price 
explosion was immediately followed, in mid-2008, by a dramatic fall though they remained higher than they 
had been before the spike. 
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Source : IMF 
 
In addition to its impressive scale, the current international food price volatility has two specificities : 
- It is part of a general destabilization of commodities markets, which is frequently illustrated by the oil 
market but that many other commodities—like cooper (Fig. 8)—are also experiencing. 
- As a result of liberalization policies, it was transmitted to many countries where farmers had for 
decades been sheltered from international price volatility. Thus, it was felt by many more actors than 
the previous periods of volatility. France is a very good illustration of such a country (Fig. 9). It should 
be noted that some countries, and not just the smallest (China and India for example, Fig. 10 & 11), 
have kept the disconnect from their domestic markets intact. 
 
Table 8: International Cooper Prices 1980-2010 
 
 
Source : IMF 
Table 9 : Wheat Prices on the International Market 
and France's Domestic Market 2006-2010 
 
Source : IMF 
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Table 10 : Wheat Prices on the International Market 
and China's domestic market 2005-2008 
 
Source : OECD 
Table 11 : Wheat Prices on the International Market 
and India’s domestic market 2006-2008 
 
Source : OECD 
 
4.2. What Can the International Community Do? 
 
In order to discuss an agenda for the international community, it may be useful to 
distinguish between  the three main functions of public action: 
• the provision of public goods like information in order to improve coordination and 
decision-making; 
• financial aid or transfers (from one country to another); and  
• setting, monitoring and enforcing common rules for national policies.  
 
a) The Provision of Public Goods 
As far as price instability is concerned, the role of public goods is to allow for better 
operation of international markets by making them more transparent and by improving 
the quality of price expectations. Transparency can reduce endogenous instability 
(speculation, panics, cobweb effects, etc.). Hence, the public good that should be 
provided by the international community is information to make the (physical and 
derivative) markets more transparent. Speculative bubbles and panic dynamics are 
fueled by the lack of market transparency. As far as derivatives markets are concerned, 
the problem mainly affects OTC products. One solution could be to develop OTC 
standards and widely disseminate aggregated information on OTC activities. Regarding 
physical markets, some data are already disseminated widely for free by the USDA, the 
FAO, and the International Grain Council. However, the analyses of these data (provided 
by private companies) are often expensive. As a result, there is a lack of knowledge on 
the future evolution of market fundamentals (production forecasts, evolution of the 
agricultural and commercial policies of the main exporting and importing countries, and 
other prospective information). This information should be comprehensive enough to 
allow poor countries to estimate the evolution of import and export parity prices (this 
means that international prices should be included as well as exchange rates and freight 
costs). This information could be produced and disseminated by the International Grain 
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Council (for cereals) and/or by the FAO’s Global Information and Early Warning System 
(both do so partially already). Moreover, many private and public operators, especially 
in developing countries, do not have a capacity for market intelligence, either because 
information on international markets is expensive or because they do not have experts 
able to analyze it. Technical support for national and regional Market Information 
Systems (MISs) is required in developing countries. MISs will improve private and public 
stakeholders’ expectations and, by so doing, reduce speculation and panic behaviors on 
both derivative and physical markets (including government behaviors such as export 
bans). 
 
b) Transfers  
Transfers could solve the problems induced by the effect of international price spikes on 
the currency reserves of some importing countries (rationing of food imports, decrease 
in the exchange rate). It could also offset the lack of public funds necessary to manage 
domestic price instability. 
Food aid. Food aid is a way to mitigate the effects of price spikes on low-income 
countries and vulnerable households. This tool refers to food aid in general with its 
different modalities: distribution of free food rations, cash transfers, targeted subsidies, 
vouchers, food for work, cash for work, etc. The objective is to allow low-income 
countries to maintain their import levels and allow poor and vulnerable households to 
maintain their food consumption levels despite price increases. This tool is, of course, 
necessary. But, since the Niger crisis of 2005, we know that this tool has proven itself to 
be insufficient to protect poor households from food insecurity (Michiels & Egg, 2008; 
Michiels et al., 2008; Blein & Egg, 2009). Moreover, it can cause market distortions in 
developing countries (food price drops that affect poor farmers).  
Technical and financial support to the governments of developing countries to help 
them to use derivatives markets. The idea is to help the governments of developing 
countries hedge against price spikes on international markets. This has been proposed 
many times by experts (Faruqee et al., 1997; Dana et al., 2006; Sarris et al., 2010). 
Theoretically, it should work. But this tool has serious limitations. First, for some 
products (like rice), there are no relevant futures markets for hedging. Second, for other 
products, price hikes remain a basis risk in line with the fact that the price of imported 
food products is only partially correlated to futures prices (because of differences in 
quality). In practice, there is only one experience with such an anti-risk policy. In 2005, 
the government of Malawi bought a call option on maize from a South African bank 
(indirectly, this option was related to the SAFEX). The experience was presented as a 
success story: it allowed Malawi to import maize at a relatively low price compared to 
Zambia. However, in spite of its “success,” this experience has never been implemented 
again by either Malawi or any other country. This experience also showed that strong 
public sector support is a necessary condition to allow governments to use derivatives 
markets: the government of Malawi received strong technical support from the World 
Bank and the cost of the call option was covered by DFID (Galtier et al., 2009, pg. 124).  
Credit facilities. Credit from private stakeholders is not relevant in this case: countries 
are in deep trouble and need to receive credit very quickly. So, some public sector 
support is necessary. The IMF proposes two types of facilities: the Compensatory 
Financing Facility (CFF) and the Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF). The first one (CFF) has 
 55 
not been used since 2000 because of the very strict conditions for its use. The second 
one was used by a few countries in 2008 to mitigate the effects of international price 
spikes on oil and food products: Ethiopia, Kenya, Kirghizstan, Malawi, Mozambique and 
Senegal (FAO, 2010). According to some experts, these facilities are not sufficient and 
other credit facilities are necessary. For instance, Sarris (2009) proposed developing a 
Food Import Financing Facility (FIFF). 
A public mechanism to stabilize the food import bills of specific developing countries 
(STABIMP). The idea is to offset the rise in food bills due to international price spikes. 
The STABEX negotiated by the EU and ACP countries could be its model. This tool (which 
could be called STABIMP) should target low-income and/or countries highly dependant 
on food imports.  
An international fund to finance national or regional price stabilization policies in 
developing countries. To apply to this fund, the countries should comply with some 
governance requirements (a code of practices to guarantee the transparency and 
predictability of interventions). 
Further research is needed to compare the performance of these tools. To a certain 
extent, they are complementary. Given the reluctance to use and the difficulty of using 
hedging tools, it is better not to rely on them alone. Moreover, an instrument that can 
help countries ex post (in the case of a price spike on the international market that 
generates a balance of payment problem) is needed. Therefore, there is a need for 
credit facilities or a STABIMP. These tools can be complementary if the countries that 
can apply to each of them are different. An international fund also seems necessary to 
allow poor developing countries to develop stabilization policies. 
Whatever the tool, strong public sector support is needed, even for private tools. 
Hedging tools are B-instruments (theoretically private). But, as shown by the Malawian 
experience, strong public sector support (both technical and financial) is necessary to 
stimulate its use. Credit facilities are also B-instruments, but for countries in a difficult 
situation with regard to their balance of payments, the tools should be managed by a 
public institution (such as the IMF).  
 
c) Setting, Monitoring and Enforcing Common Rules 
The role of common rules is to reduce instability on international markets (i) by 
restricting destabilizing behaviors by states and private operators and/or (ii) by 
developing specific collective interventions to stabilize prices.  
In the first category, we have: 
Derivatives Market Regulation. Many measures can be implemented, the main ones 
being to establish position limits for non-commercial operators and tax derivatives 
transactions (a Tobin type tax). The first measure may seem better as it would not affect 
commercial operators (those who are in situation to use derivatives to hedge price risks) 
directly. It has also already been implemented (by the Chicago Board of Trade from the 
1930s to the 1990s) and has proved to be effective to contain over-speculation and 
reduce the probability of bubbles. Other measures (linked more to the organization of 
derivatives markets) are also needed. For instance, it may be necessary to set up a 
market authority (when one does not exist) and harmonize sanctions for market abuses.  
Regulations on the use of food products to produce biofuels (flexible biofuel 
mandates). Theoretically, the development of biofuels could have a stabilizing effect on 
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cereals prices. Indeed, it could make the demand for cereals more elastic (more 
sensitive to changes in cereal prices). At the same time, however, energy price spikes 
(fuel, oil, etc.) can generate cereal price spikes. According to some experts, this is what 
happened in 2007-2008 (Christiaensen, 2009). In practice, the biofuel cereal supply is 
not flexible but bound by “biofuel mandates”. Fixed mandates eliminate the stabilizing 
effect of biofuels in the case of a price shock on the cereal market. But the mandates 
can act as a buffer on the transmission of price spikes from the energy market to the 
cereal market (Wright, 2009). For this to happen, the mandates must be adjusted to 
reduce the flow of cereals used for biofuels when cereal prices rise. This is already 
partially the case in Brazil. In the USA, a 2008 law makes it possible to modify the 
mandates. Generally speaking, since the biofuel industry is subsidized, it is possible for 
governments to control it. The technical feasibility of variable biofuels mandates should 
be investigated because an unstable supply could endanger the sustainability of the 
biofuel industry.  
Creating an international clearing house (International Grain Clearing Arrangement or 
IGCA). The idea is to secure the enforcement of contracts on the physical market 
(between exporters and importers). The idea is as follows (Sarris, 2009): at the 
international level, there is no legal body with the jurisdiction to guarantee that 
contracts will be enforced. The only sources of confidence between sellers and buyers 
are (i) their desire to maintain their reputations, and (ii) the clearing houses of 
commodity exchanges. These clearing houses have two limitations. First, there is a basis 
risk if the product needed by an operator is only partially correlated to the exchange’s 
prices (because of transport costs and/or because of differences in quality). Second, the 
clearing houses only guarantee financial compensation, not the physical delivery of the 
product. The goal of the IGCA would precisely be to overcome these limits. The IGCA 
would proceed by developing links between existing commodity exchanges and their 
respective clearing houses. In order to guarantee that physical supplies at various 
exchanges are available to execute international contracts, some of the financial 
reserves of the clearing houses that would be members of the IGCA could be 
transformed into physical stocks, for instance by holding warehouse receipts. According 
to Sarris (2009), the required level of stock at any given time would not be more than 1 
million tons of grain equivalent, which means that the amount of money managed 
would not exceed US$200 million. This tool aims to reduce private speculation on the 
physical market. However, three limits may reduce the scope of the IGCA. First, if the 
governments of the countries where the warehouse receipts systems are based 
implement export bans, this could make the physical release of stocks impossible. This 
problem can be managed by specifying that export bans on staple food products cannot 
apply to the IGCA’s holdings. Second, appropriate exchanges must exist in different 
regions of the world. Third, most food commodity importers would need to hedge their 
purchases in these exchanges. 
Regulations on exports restrictions. Currently, countries exporting food products have 
the right to restrict their exports as much as they want, including banning exports 
completely as many did during the 2007-2008 crisis. This is unacceptable because this 
type of behavior pushes up international prices. Some experts have proposed forbidding 
export bans and other measures aiming to restrict exports (Lin, 2008). But this solution 
is not acceptable to exporting countries as the international high-level summit held at 
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the FAO in Rome in June 2008 showed. Indeed, they need to protect their populations 
from food price spikes on the international market. The solution seems to be to allow 
countries restrict to their imports but only in order to maintain sufficient availability to 
feed their populations. This means forbidding export bans at the WTO but allowing 
export quotas with the amount of the quota indexed on the needs of the population 
(consumption – production – stocks). This type of measure could take advantage of the 
experience of how food aid amounts are decided in the countries subject to climate 
crises. Based on a calculation of the estimated food balance that determines a country’s 
degree of food deficit, the volume of imported food aid is estimated. Following the same 
logic, the minimum volume that should remain available in the country can be 
estimated. Of course, the excess should not be banned from export. 
Regulations on land grabbling. Following the 2008 crisis, many private stakeholders and 
states purchased or rented land in other countries to secure their own supplies. This 
kind of behavior can generate food security problems in the countries where the land is 
located. It can also narrow the international market considerably and, as a result, more 
it more unstable. Some international rules on these practices are required.   
Generally speaking, these rules will reduce some sources of price instability. One 
alternative option (but not the only option) is to develop collective interventions to fight 
against these sources. In this second category, we have: 
International public grain stocks. Empirically, cereal price spikes on the international 
market have always occurred when world stocks were very low (Tables 10 to 12). This is 
consistent with the idea that physical stocks are a solution for all sources of instability. 
They can buffer the effects of bad harvests, mitigate the cobweb effect, and discourage 
speculative bubbles and panic movements. This means that maintaining sufficient level 
of stocks is a good way to prevent price spikes on international markets.  
The problem is that private stocks are sub-optimal because storage is a risky activity. In 
order to show that private storage is optimal, Williams & Wright (1991) had to 
hypothesize that farmers and traders were risk neutral. This hypothesis may be realistic 
for US economic agents because they have the opportunity to hedge price-risk on 
futures markets, but it is not realistic for many developing countries. This means that 
some kind of public storage is necessary to attain stock levels that are high enough to 
prevent price spikes.  
 

























However, governments may lack sufficient incentive to develop public stocks. Most of 
the time, countries that maintained high level of public stocks did so to attain the 
objectives of their internal agricultural policies, not to stabilize international markets. 
Yet, many countries (especially the USA, the UE and China) have been changing their 
agricultural policies for the last 20 years in ways that imply much lower stock levels 
(Mitchell & Le Vallée, 2005).  
As a result, an international agreement is necessary to share the burden of storage (Lin, 
2008). Otherwise, each country would be encouraged to act as a free rider, trying to 
benefit from the storage of other countries without contributing itself. There are two 
ways of organizing such burden sharing. The “hard version” is to develop international 
public stocks for cereals (and maybe other food products). This can be done using 
national storage facilities. In this case, part of the national public stock is managed by an 
international organization. The “soft version” is an agreement in which each country 
commits itself to maintaining at least a level of stock sufficient to cover x months of its 
own consumption. Part of this stock should be held by public agents (since private 
stakeholders may have an incentive to amplify price spikes through speculative 
activities). 
This type of measure is subject to two criticisms. The first criticism relates to the high 
cost of stocks. Indeed, immobilizing large quantities of food products has high technical 
and financial costs. Nevertheless, if doing so makes it possible to avoid price spikes on 
the international market, the benefits probably outweigh the costs. The second criticism 
deals with the difficulties involved in organizing the governance of international stocks. 
This difficulty is said to have been illustrated by International Commodity Agreements or 
ICAs (Gilbert 1996). These ICAs are said to have encountered all sorts of problems, with 
the main problem being the development of plethoric stocks (cocoa) and the breaking 
of agreements following disagreements between exporter and importer countries 
(coffee). It is important, however, to discuss the relevance of these criticisms. Indeed, 
the ICAs aim first to maintain the prices rather than stabilize them, and most of the 
problems they encountered come from this. The ICA experience does not conclusively 
prove that it would be impossible to manage an international public stock whose aim 





purchases and sales would need to be updated regularly in order to follow long-term 
trends in international prices. 
International land reserves. Sarris proposed the constitution of land reserves managed 
by the international community. These land reserves would be cultivated only in case of 
international price spikes. If it is less expensive to manage fallow land than deal with 
physical stocks, this is a way of lowering the cost of price stabilization. However, there 
are two inconveniences. First, beginning cultivation takes a certain amount of time and 
cannot offset a climate accident. Second, this measure may generate a cobweb effect: 
high prices may encourage cultivation of the reserves, leading to production excesses 
the following year pushing down prices. In this case, international land reserves could 
increase international price instability. 
An international virtual stock. The idea is to be able to counter-speculate on derivatives 
markets in the case of speculative bubbles (Von Braun & Torero, 2008). This proposal 
has been highly criticized. Indeed, it is difficult to implement. There is two reasons for 
this. First, it is difficult (or even impossible) to estimate the price band that separates 
“normal” prices from bubbles. Second, this virtual stock may be subject to speculative 
attacks. Accordingly, the stock should be large enough to prevent such speculative 
attacks. This implies very expensive stocks. Even with very large stocks, this instrument 
is still very risky: the probability of losing a large amount of money is high. This makes it 
difficult to mobilize the international community. Last but not least, the same result 
(reducing speculative bubbles) can be attained in a more effective, less costly and less 
risky way by regulating derivatives markets.  
To summarize, two categories of tools should be implemented. The first category 
consists of ex ante tools. Their aim is to reduce some sources of price instability by 
restricting destabilizing behaviors on the part of states and private operators. The tools 
in the second category are ex post tools. They are ways of lessening the destabilizing 
effects of the different sources. Both categories complement each other. 
Moreover it should be noticed that some tools are generic: they can have a stabilizing 
effect on many sources of instability. This is especially the case of international public 
tools (physical stocks) that are a way of fighting climate shocks, cobweb effects, 
speculation and so on. Other tools are more specific to some sources of instability, or 
can even reduce some sources of instability while increasing other sources (for instance, 
international land reserves may amplify the cobweb dynamic). Hence, we have two 
approaches: developing a wide range of specific tools (to cover most of the sources of 
instability), and developing international public stocks (or, at least, an agreement on 
sharing the burden of storage among countries). These two approaches can be 
complementary. 
Last but not least, it should be noted that national and international initiatives to 
manage international price instability are complementary but may also be contradictory. 
Indeed, reducing international price instability may sometimes be achieved to the 
detriment of countries’ capacity to protect themselves from it (and vice-versa). 
Both strategies are necessary, however. International price instability needs to be 
lowered in order to avoid the development of widespread protectionism (self-sufficiency 
strategies) that would lead to inefficient resource allocation and drive up the average 
price of food. Moreover, such protectionism would narrow the international market 
and, by so doing, make it more vulnerable to climate shocks (that increase price 
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instability). This phenomenon has been noted since 2008 with the strong rise in 
international land grabbing. It is also necessary to reduce the shortsighted strategies 
developed by countries to protect themselves from international instability. Because 
these strategies (especially export bans) increase international instability, their scope 
should be reduced.  
At the same time, there is also a need to allow the countries to control their import and 
export flows. Indeed, stabilizing international prices is not enough to stabilize the price 
of imported food products as these prices also depend on exchange rates and freight 
costs. Moreover, controlling imports and exports can also be useful in solving domestic 
instability due to internal causes (such as bad harvests). It is a much less costly 
alternative to using large national public stocks.   
4.3. Elements to Take into Account when Designing an International Governance 
System to Manage Price Instability  
All the available or possible instruments to manage price instability require international 
governance. Many institutions already exist but they do not always have a mandate to 
take charge of these instruments. 
In order to design international governance, it can be useful to distinguish between the 
three main functions of this governance: 
• The first function is to provide public goods like information and knowledge in order 
improve coordination and decision. HLPE has been commissioned by CFS to provide 
a conceptual framework to manage price instability and assess different strategies 
and instruments. This will be done in 2011 but will not become a permanent analysis 
capacity like the intelligence unit proposed by Von Braun & Torero. Permanent 
information flows and updated diagnoses are needed and could be provided by 
International Commodities Bodies.  
• The second function is to manage financial aid or transfers from one country to 
another. This means determining which countries would provide, which countries 
would receive, what amounts would be involved, and what implementation 
conditions would be required. The OECD is an example of the type of institution that 
could fulfill this function. 
• The third function is to set, monitor and enforce common rules for national policies. 
These rules could apply to international trade, the regulation of derivatives markets, 
land grabbling, and the use of food products to produce biofuels. Ad hoc 
mechanisms could be designed to enforce these various rules. Another option would 
be to rely on the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (as Von Braun and Torero have 
proposed for the enforcement of an international virtual stock, for instance).  
Finally, in any international institution, countries are organized into geographic or 
economic groups. These groups are not always relevant to how international markets 
affect their food security. One solution could be to organize country groups based on 
shared interests from this standpoint (for example: food insecure countries that are 
highly dependent of international markets; large food-exporter countries, etc.). These 
groups, and particularly of the group made up of the more vulnerable countries, could 




Agricultural price volatility is problematic. 
 
Price volatility refers to erratic fluctuations, variations of such magnitude and frequency 
that instead of sending signals to agents as market fluctuations do, they exceed 
producers’ and consumers’ capacity to adapt (OECD, 1982).  
Excessive fluctuations in agricultural prices harms:  
vulnerable consumers because they threaten consumers’ food security (in the case 
of price hikes); 
farmers because they make the profitability of investments extremely variable, 
limiting incentives to intensify production and causing bankruptcies (when prices 
collapse); and 
national economies, because they threaten their fragile equilibriums. Indeed, for the 
poorest nations, agriculture’s preponderant role as a source of income and the 
proportion of household spending devoted to agricultural products generate a risk 
likely to spread to the entire economy (systemic risk). 
Agricultural price variations are not harmful in and of themselves: the problem is 
volatility. Indeed, price variations are, in principle, signals that enable actors to adapt 
their behaviors to the state of market fundamentals. In the case of erratic fluctuations 
(see the definition of volatility above), these signals are obscured, which causes agents 
to allocate their resources sub-optimally, and sometimes even causes panics that 
amplify the initial imbalances. Volatility must be viewed over different lapses of time 
depending on the actors concerned.  
The problem of price volatility cannot be resolved by treating its symptoms alone; 
its causes must also be cured.  
 
Until now, the recommended approach for tackling excessive price volatility has sought 
to limit its negative effects:  
by promoting private mechanisms allowing different economic operators 
(producers, traders, para-state offices, etc.) to protect themselves from price risks 
(futures contracts, insurance); 
by providing government support for vulnerable households (safety nets: 
consumption subsidies, food grants, monetary transfers); and 




This approach aiming to cure only the symptoms has, however, shown its limitations. 
Private risk management instruments are not very widespread, notably in developing 
countries, and safety nets, in addition to being potentially very costly, have generally not 
been able to offset food security problems when prices skyrocket.  
The insufficient and inoperative nature of measures aiming only to limit the negative 
effects of price volatility calls for the joint implementation of mechanisms aiming to limit 
price volatility by acting directly on its causes.   
The causes of price volatility are multiple and intertwined. 
 
There are numerous causes of agricultural price volatility. For agricultural price volatility 
on the domestic level, one can distinguish between:  
exogenous causes, mostly natural in origin (climate events, pests), that have a 
strong impact on agricultural production levels (notably in developing countries 
where intensification is low), and over which agricultural market actors have little 
influence; 
endogenous causes, that is to say causes within agricultural markets themselves, 
which are linked to (i) the behaviors of actors—producers, intermediaries, 
consumers, governments—who are in a situation of uncertainty, (ii) to the specific 
characteristics of these products (production times, cobweb effects, land rents, 
storage and transport costs) on the supply side as well as (iii) the characteristics of 
the demand (not very reactive because the product is a staple good, subject to 
export restrictions so as to ensure domestic supply);  
causes imported from other contexts (international price volatility) or other sectors 
over which agricultural market actors have little to no influence (exchange rate 
variations, changes in oil prices, the shift of investments from classic financial 
markets to agricultural markets, etc.). 
The causes of agricultural price volatility, described here for domestic markets, also have 
an effect on international agricultural commodities markets. Thus, while international 
price volatility is a cause of imported volatility from the standpoint of countries or 
regions, it too has endogenous and exogenous causes.  
These causes are intertwined and mutually reinforce each other during feverish periods. 
While some causes, notably exogenous causes, may be the source of a price hike, other 
causes can amplify this hike. For example, the sharp price hike in 2008 on the physical 
and financial markets of many countries seems to have been the result of a combination 
of several factors listed above (increased demand, natural hazards and a temporary 
supply deficit, a low level of stocks, an oil price spike, export restrictions, financialization 
on agricultural commodities derivatives markets, rising uncertainties). 
The causes of price volatility are likely to have a stronger effect in the future. 
 
The interplay of the fundamentals of the agricultural supply and the agrifood demand 
makes it so that agricultural price volatility is likely to be greater in the future. Indeed, 
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food markets will remain tense because of rapid growth in demand (population growth, 
urbanization, the growth of agrofuel) and slower growth in the agricultural supply 
(productivity reserves to exploit under the constraints of more costly fossil energy and 
respect for the environment). In short, the multiple causes mentioned above are likely 
to accentuate agricultural price volatility in the future.  
Exogenous causes. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), climate change will very probably lead to the multiplication and aggravation 
of natural weather hazards. 
Endogenous causes (within the market). It is possible that the reduction in public 
stocks, added to the growing financialization of futures markets for foodstuffs will 
make price forecasts more difficult for the actors in these markets and, ultimately, 
lead to greater price volatility.  
Imported causes. Heightened trade interdependency (country accessibility, smaller 
transfer costs) could lead to greater sensitivity of domestic prices to the volatility of 
international prices. International price volatility could itself be increased by the fact 
that the countries that are influential in international trade are becoming 
increasingly sensitive to climate risks (overlapping of exogenous and imported 
causes).  
Causes imported from other sectors. The stronger link between the prices of food 
and energy products has increased the risk that instability in the oil and natural gas 
markets will be transferred to food products. Similarly, there is the risk that the 
growing financialization of agricultural markets and the fluctuations in exchange 
rates may exacerbate agricultural price volatility.  
Treating the causes of price volatility implies public intervention in conjunction 
with private mechanisms (the market alone is not enough). 
 
To contain agricultural price volatility, the choice of instruments should be made in 
function of the causes of volatility.  
For instance, in theory, the market can be used to limit price volatility in the case of 
natural instability. The development of commercial trade is justified by the possibility of 
relying on the “law of large numbers” since deficits from one zone can be offset by 
surpluses in another zone. In this case, economic operators can use insurance-type 
instruments to cover their risks. Public intervention will nevertheless be necessary to 
compensate for market operation difficulties. 
In the case of endogenous instability, however, only public regulatory intervention is an 
effective way to lessen uncertainty and its unwanted effects (control of foreign trade, 
stock management). Taking care of sufficient and stable volume supplies and stock is as 
important as price stability. 
In practice, however, it is impossible to distinguish exactly what proportion of price 
volatility comes from natural, endogenous or imported causes. Public intervention 
aiming directly to limit agricultural price volatility is therefore necessary.  
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In all cases, to limit agricultural price volatility, it would be good to seek to improve 
agricultural market operations through public investments (infrastructures, information 
systems) and through recourse to private mechanisms enabling better matching of 
supply to demand over space and time (private storage, warrantage, etc.). 
Acting on the international scale is necessary but insufficient (one must also 
intervene in domestic and regional markets). 
 
Several points argue strongly in favor of envisaging intervention on the international 
scale even though price instability is far from limited to this scale. Action can be taken 
on both its effects and causes. 
Although the majority of the population in developing countries feed themselves with 
local products, rising prices on international markets have a serious effect on urban 
populations in heavily importing countries. In addition, although the relative stability of 
agricultural prices on international markets prior to 2007 did not have a stabilizing effect 
on the price of local products in domestic markets, the 2008 crisis showed that a sharp 
price spike could destabilize domestic markets. Some instruments, such as special 
safeguard mechanisms or the removal of import taxes, are used by vulnerable countries 
to protect themselves. They are, however, relatively constrained by the international 
trade rules established at the WTO, notably as regards tariff instruments. Even though 
LDCs are rarely brought before the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), these rules 
should be relaxed for them. Systems for insuring against strong price hikes for importing 
countries are being studied, but the margin for action provided by these instruments 
drops with repeated shocks.  
It therefore seems necessary to find the means to act on the causes of excessive price 
instability in these markets rather than merely attempt to offset their effects after the 
fact. 
Several possibilities can be studied: 
Improve transparency of and access to market information, both in regard to stock 
levels and the various operators’ positions equally. 
Foster the creation of public and/or private stocks in order to maintain a stock-to-
consumption ratio that would reassure markets, and coordinate international 
actions in this area. These questions must be analyzed in greater detail.  
Supervise export restrictions. Export restrictions are legitimate tools for exporting 
countries that want to protect their populations from sharp price hikes. However, in 
a tense market, they help destabilize the market and accentuate price hikes. 
International coordination and the setting of rules on these measures are desirable; 
their implementation conditions require in-depth analysis. 
Harmonize and regulate commodity derivatives markets so that they best reflect 
physical fundamentals. The role and scope of excessive speculation in agricultural 
price volatility are highly controversial, especially since these markets have become 
very complex and opaque. Nevertheless, it seems that a consensus is emerging on 
the greater correlation between commodities derivatives following market 
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financialization and on the need for some degree of regulation in derivatives 
markets. The regulation movements underway in the United States and the 
European Union raise the question of global harmonization of regulations for these 
markets. 
Once again, intervening in international markets will not be enough given the challenge 
of stabilizing the price of local products on domestic markets. 
Intervening in domestic and regional markets implies mobilizing a combination of 
instruments.  
 
The analysis of various national experiments revealed a certain number of cases in which 
intervention lowered price volatility and made decisive progress in the fight against 
poverty and food insecurity. In these cases, two price regulation instruments were used 
to keep prices within a dynamic band:  
buffer stock management (smoothing over time), and 
control of one’s foreign trade (smoothing over space).  
These instruments to regulate the operation of agricultural markets directly must not be 
envisaged in isolation, but as integral parts of an overall institutional environment, in 
addition to measures setting an ambitious overall policy for rural areas, and in 
collaboration with the private sphere. In all cases: 
The provision of public goods (infrastructures, transportation, communications) is 
necessary to facilitate market operations and create an environment that is 
conducive to the development of private activities. 
By lowering uncertainty and creating a conducive economic environment, direct 
public action on markets should facilitate the operation and development of private 
risk-coverage instruments. 
 “Safety net” mechanisms aiming to ensure direct transfers to the most vulnerable 
households are necessary. 
Thus, a combination of instruments is necessary. The instruments must notably act on 
both the causes and effects of agricultural price volatility, mobilize both public and 
private actors, and intervene on the national and international levels.  
 
The implementation conditions of market regulation instruments are crucial. 
 
The case studies conducted showed that certain conditions are crucial to the capacity of 
the instruments set up to limit agricultural price volatility effectively.  
Policy decisions must be based on solid expertise: in successful experiences, the 
intervention relied on a dynamic price band system based on international prices. It 
is necessary to adapt intervention levels constantly and avoid over-production. 
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Managing intervention costs (and possible excess costs in the case of strong 
incentive measures) is a crucial consideration.  
Price stabilization policy implementation conditions are decisive for these policies’ 
capacity to limit price instability. Indeed, the case studies revealed situations in which 
policies aiming to limit price volatility turned out to be ineffective (no reduction in price 
volatility) or harmful (increased volatility).  
Comparative analysis of the case studies showed that, in order to avoid these harmful 
effects, the government must:  
have sufficient access to the financial resources necessary to implement the 
announced policies; 
be able to monitor compliance with the policies set up by minimizing avoidance 
strategies; and 
be able to ensure the that the policies set up are predictable so as to avoid 
crowding-out effects.  
These three conditions (financial capacity, enforcement capacity, and predictability) 
depend on the capacity of the government (or, when appropriate, the public authorities 
of regional unions) to set up policies effectively and transparently.  
One way to improve policy effectiveness and predictability is to create structures to 
foster consultation and negotiation between public and private actors. This must be 
accompanied by capacity-building programs so as to ensure that each type of actor has 
the ability to defend their interests (asymmetry problems). 
Some potential lines of action deserve further study. 
 
Analysis of national experience with lowering agricultural price volatility revealed a 
range of points that require further analysis.  
Reflection—unique to each nation and based on consultation among actors—on 
what constitutes “excessive” agricultural price volatility is necessary. When should 
price volatility be seen as abnormal, as socially unacceptable? This will make it 
possible to determine intervention levels.  
 
The cost of agricultural price regulation instruments is often put forth as an 
argument in favor of no intervention, notably when it comes to public stocks. 
However, few studies provide information on the benefits linked to the existence of 
these stocks: cost-benefit analysis must be developed for the various possible 
instruments. Consideration of all the inter-related factors in the economy calls 
strongly for the production of detailed analyses, and modeling would then make it 
possible to clarify the assumptions as to how the economy operates and synthesize 
the results. 
Analysis has revealed the importance of public and private partnerships in regulating 
agricultural prices. The analysis of these partnerships must be continued, notably in 
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line with information dissemination (improving access to information so as to limit 
anticipation errors) and stock management (designing contractual frameworks to 
work with private operators to minimize the cost of public storage and crowding-out 
effects). 
Analysis has shown that, when prices skyrocket, the countries used a combination of 
border measures and buffer stock management. It is necessary to adjust WTO rules 
to encourage countries—particularly the poorest countries—to implement 
ambitious agricultural policies to fight food insecurity and poverty (policy space). 
The regulatory framework for financial markets—especially agricultural commodity 
derivatives markets—must be studied so as to define mechanisms that help limit 
speculative bubbles.  
International coordination and the setting of rules are desirable so as to improve 
transparency and available information, particularly on stocks, ensure the 
preservation of a stock-to-consumption ratio able to reassure markets, and provide 
guidance for export restriction measures. Their implementation conditions require 
in-depth analysis. 
It would be good to re-examine the complex question of the feasibility of levying 
extremely low taxes on transactions to both discourage excessive speculation and 
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Appendix 2. Pursued policies  
  Thailand India Indonesia Guinea Burkina Madagascar Mali Kenya Zambia Malawi USA Canada EU Brazil 
Import control   X X  X X X X X     
Frontiers 
measures 
Export control X X    X X   X X X  X   
Buffer stock X X X     X X X X  X   
Input subsidies X X X X X X X  X X X X  X   
Harvest credit X     X         
risk mitigation 
fund 
    X          





 X   X X   X  X  X  X  
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Appendix 3. Importance of identified factors according to pursued policies 
 
  Trade control Stocks management Production support 
Expertise capacity Crucial Crucial  
Tecnico-economical factors 
Cost management  Crucial Important 
Policy effectiveness 
Important                 (frontiers 
control) 
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1. Managing Food Price Volatility : Workshop 
Minutes  
 




The aim of this workshop was to present the study “Managing Food Price Volatility for 
Food Security and Development”, produced by GREMA with the support of the Ministry 
of Foreign and European Affairs, the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fishing, the 
Ministry of the Economy, Industry and Employment, and the Agence Française de 
Développement, and to discuss this report with experts from different backgrounds 
(researchers, international organizations, farmers’ organizations, etc.). The workshop 
was attended by approximately one hundred participants. 
 
 
Morning Session  
 
 
Opening: In his speech, Mr. Thiébaud from the MAEE reminded the audience that this 
study was produced in the context of the French presidency of the G20, and that 
fighting price volatility was one of the priorities of the French presidency. 
 
 
• Presentation of the Study, by Françoise Gérard, CIRAD 
 
The presentation of the study made it possible to go over its context, objectives and 
main conclusions. With the 2008 crisis, operators were suddenly reminded of price 
instability, which is inherent in agricultural product markets; and current market 
tensions have sharpened the feeling that instability will only increase in the years to 
come. Experts now agree that there is a conjunction between two types of instability in 
agricultural markets, and that these instabilities are of different natures and, 
accordingly, respond to different remedies: 
 
- Some price instability is caused by the dependency of yields on natural 
conditions, a characteristic of agricultural production. These fluctuations are 
attenuated in a global market that is self-regulated by trade, particularly when 
transfer costs between markets are low. This reasoning is the basis for the 
negotiations on trade liberalization (WTO). 
 
- However, a second source of price volatility is also at work. It is linked to 
projection errors by farmers, traders and speculators, which are much more 
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frequent than for any other type of production precisely because of the multiple 
hazards affecting production levels and giving considerable importance to 
information enabling projections in price formation. Habitually, a price rise 
indicates increased demand and is a signal to producers, who have every 
interest in investing. However, in the case of agricultural products, a price rise 
can come solely from a poor harvest. In this case, the increase in production by 
farmers causes prices to drop, destabilizing the market. The phenomenon is the 
same with traders and speculators who manage the transfer of goods in time 
and space. It is found on markets at all levels (local, national, regional, 
international), and is a characteristic shared with financial and commodities 
markets. Unlike the first type of fluctuations, they are not attenuated by the size 
of the market: because of the statistical characteristics of this series (scale 
invariance), shocks are not diluted, they are cumulative and synchronize 
themselves! 
 
This second type of instability, generated by projection errors, is responsible for a large 
proportion of price instability. It is a market failure because the market is no longer able 
to coordinate individual decisions based on the transmission of an adequate price signal 
to agents. It justifies direct market intervention. Intervention is, however, not issue-free, 
and it is important to remember that the liberalization undertaken for a quarter century 
has been justified by the avoidance of the costs and unwanted effects of public 
intervention, after a quarter century of intervention with mixed results despite 
considerable resources.  
 
This is why, beyond theoretical analysis, this study emphasized a precise study of 
experiments undertaken in different contexts (historical, economic, geographic, 
institutional) and on different scales (local, national, regional, international) so as to 
determine the invariances necessary for effective recommendations. 
 
The following principles can be deduced from the study: a combination of instruments 
must be set up; and the policy followed must be legitimate (and therefore negotiated) 
and credible (which implies access to considerable expertise and financial resources as 
well as to institutional capabilities that make it possible to ensure contracts are 
followed, avoid harmful rent-seeking behaviors, and fight corruption). It is necessary to 
ensure that each type of actor has the capacity to defend their interests and represent 
themselves in each consultation body. Undeniably, the process is costly in the short-
term, but price stabilization—when it is well done and avoids in particular the rut 
related to over-production—allows for remarkable progress in the area of food security 
and poverty alleviation. This progress is, however, progressive and cannot be clearly felt 
in the short term, which intensifies the difficulties associated with these policies. 
 
When it comes to international bodies, the most important thing is to encourage the 
poorest countries to set up ambitious agricultural policies that target poverty 
alleviation. Historical analysis can clarify the decisive role played by large international 
organizations’ public positions in the local definition of economic policy. A shift in 
 77 
discourse that draws the lessons from the past is necessary. This shift must be 
accompanied by resources and innovative financing methods. 
 
• Presentation of the Outcome of the November 29-30 Workshop, by Peter Timmer, 
Harvard  
 
 The speaker, a professor emeritus from Harvard, is probably one of the best-known 
experts in the world on this subject. He first emphasized the quality of the analysis by 
the team and the summary paper, as well as the richness of the discussions during the 
workshop. 
 
He then underscored the destructive nature of price instability for food security. Price 
hikes are particularly disadvantageous for consumers while price drops affect producers, 
making price instability a true hindrance for investment and thus modernization. Above 
all, it is a major roadblock on the path to growth and poverty alleviation. 
 
To fight price instability, it is important to determine which level of instability is the 
problem and what type of actors are concerned by it. Another key point is the type of 
product concerned, its role in consumption, the country’s position as importer or 
exporter, and its unique characteristics. Border instruments, buffer stocks and the 
regulation of international financial markets are the primary tools available to countries 
to manage the problem. Setting up these policies is complex and costly in the short 
term, whereas the benefits appear only over the long term; they must be based on 
exemplary technical analysis that is continuously updated to reflect changes in the 
context. On the international level, all negotiations that make it possible to improve 
market operation and information are useful.  
 
In short, fighting instability requires different forms of action in function of the context, 
and is a difficult task but countries must be encouraged to fight instability rather than 
discouraged from doing so. It is also useful to distinguish between the general goal of 
price stabilization and combating emergency situations. The ultimate goal of the first is 
to minimize the occurrence of the second and lessen the cost of such situations.  
 
 
Panel of Four Experts from the Academic Sphere:  
 
What are the main sources of price instability? What are the primary reasons for the 
success or failure of public interventions? What can be done on the international level? 
 
• Philip Abbott is a Professor at Purdue University (USA); he has recently written a 
comprehensive report on volatility and national stabilization initiatives for the OECD.  
 
During his speech, 
 
- he addressed the causes and consequences of the sharp rise in international 
commodity prices, notably specifying that the current peak period was longer 
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than peaks had been in the past, and that it may have been generated by new as 
well as old factors. He emphasized the importance of stocks in price changes, 
observing that perisitent biofules demand means that expected carry-out stocks 
remain low even after several excellent years of agricultural production, leaving 
markets vulnerable as current weather events occur. If there is a role for 
speculation it is that positions taken reflect inflationary expectations, for which 
public market intervention in grain markets are not very relevant; and 
 
- he insisted that national price stabilization initiatives generate instability on the 
international level, which calls for caution when intervening. Reliance on 
international trade to stabilize domestic markets, even partially, will require that 
major exporters as well as large but self-sufficient markets (e.g. China and India) 
do not close their borders. The isoaltionist policies not only of exporters but also 
of importers were an important underlying cause of the price spikes realized in 
2008, and are likley to be reinstituted now. 
 
• Andrew Dorward is a Professor at The School of Oriental and African Studies, 
(University of London) and a specialist on these issues. He addressed several points: 
 
- The causes and consequences of price instability and the question of the 
magnitude of the 2008 crisis compared to the 1974 crisis, which depends heavily 
on the deflators used and the markets examined (period/country/products). 
 
- The issue of the problems raised by price instability must be placed in a wider 
context that makes it possible to take into account the current challenges in the 
area of natural and fossil resource management in response to population 
growth. Demand-side actions must not be neglected: reducing waste, changes in 
food habits in regard to meat consumption. 
 
- The emphasis is too frequently placed on managing the effects of instability but 
not enough on preventing this instability. To manage the problem, it is necessary 
to view it as a whole, and to focus more on promoting long-term processes 
increasing both volumes and stability of supplies and stocks  in order to reduce 
the need for generally more problematic management of price stability.  
 
- It is important to take into account the specific situations of different types of 
farmers, and in particular the differentiated effects of policies on net buyers. The 
institutional dimension and the way that policies are implemented are of crucial 
importance. 
 
- Stable, low food prices are important for food security and social peace. Today, 
however, with the growth of the population and incomes, natural resources are 
becoming restrained, which implies high prices, in particular for energy and 




• Maximo Torero (IFPRI) is the author of a proposal on managing price volatility when 
it is excessive. He presented the online platform set up by the IFPRI on this subject, 
which provides public information that can be used in making decisions.  
 
- He discussed the existing consensus on the negative impacts of “excessive 
volatility” for farmers and consumers. That said, the challenge is to define what 
is meant by excessive volatility. 
 
- He insisted on the fact that his analysis was international in scope, and that 
other approaches were necessary on the national level. 
 
- Stabilization at the national level must nevertheless take into account the 
dependency between markets and avoid exporting domestic instability to 
foreign markets. 
 
- The importance of the non-distorsive nature of the instruments used. The costs 
involved with the use of each instrument must be carefully assessed along with 
their impact on excessive volatility. In regard to physical stocks, for example, the 
definition of the optimal stock size and the need for a transparent trigger 
mechanism are key points. It is necessary to clearly distinguish between 
regulatory stocks and strategic emergency reserves. 
 
- The importance of information on stock levels. This is a major challenge, even on 
the national level, but it is crucial that this challenge be overcome. 
 
• Kako Nubukpo is a Professor at the University of Togo, and Division Chief at the 
Office of the Presidency of WAEMU. He had decided to address the subject of price 
instability and public intervention from the standpoint of cotton, on which he is an 
acknowledged specialist. In particular, he discussed: 
 
- The (very high) volatility of cotton prices, which justifies applying price 
stabilization measures, and its causes (production cost variations cannot explain 
the high level of volatility), the role of developing countries’ subsidies in price 
formation, and the links between cotton cropping and cotton growers’ food 
security. 
 
- The importance of exchange rates in international competitiveness and the 
over-valuation of the CFA franc that constitutes a major handicap for agriculture; 
American subsidies are therefore the only issue behind the problem of African 
cotton’s competitiveness. 
 
- The importance of the budget constraints associated with HIPC initiatives, which 





Points Raised During the Discussion with the Audience: 
 
- The importance of tackling unregulated markets to limit the impact of the 
financialization of markets on price volatility, while also avoiding “over-
regulation.” 
 
- The issue of exporting instability when one country stabilizes its own market. 
 
- The current lack of successful experiments in the area of insurance in the 
framework of the World Bank program on price risk management. 
 
- The interesting case of the rice market, for which there is no futures market and 
that has not been financialized. This forces one to look at other determining 
factors in the recent price spike and volatility. 
 
Afternoon Session  
 
Producers’ Point of View: Case study on the Union des Groupements pour la 
Commercialisation des Produits Agricoles de la Boucle du Mouhoun (UGCPA, Burkina 
Faso) 
 
Mr. Dioma Soumabéré (UGCPA, Burkina Faso) discussed the importance of price 
stability for small farmers and shared the results of a local initiative in which organizing 
farmers and involving them in marketing is making it possible to obtain much more 
stable and higher prices. Indeed, farmers’ organizations have often had to fill in for the 
State in setting up market regulation instruments. He raised the issue of the balance 
between the State and private actors in this regulation (some functions remain the sole 
responsibility of the State, such as all regulatory matters). He specified that the UGCPA 
is currently participating in the constitution of the country’s food security stock and its 
intervention stock.  
 
Round Table: The Viewpoint of the Political World 
 
Is it necessary to act on agricultural price volatility? Why? How? On what level (national, 
regional, international)? 
 
• Mr. Jonathan Brooks (OECD) stated that price instability requires both instruments 
acting on the long term and poverty and measures aiming to avoid the most harmful 
short-term impacts of sharp price hikes. However, price stabilization is not an 
objective in its own right (the goal is, rather, to protect vulnerable populations’ 
purchasing power), and we know that it is associated with multiple problems—
costs, inefficiency, government failures. Despite these difficulties, market 
stabilization has a role to play because of the existence of market failures and poorly 
developed safety nets. Direct intervention is thus necessary to correct market 
failures, for example by improving information, actors’ capacity to manage risks and 
safety nets. The international level has a key role in the transmission of imbalances 
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on national markets and its impact on national policies, in function of whether or 
not international markets are able to manage local hazards. In the rare—but 
nevertheless plausible—case that international markets experience a rapid price 
hike, it is necessary to finance poor countries so they can withstand this growth in 
their food bill. 
 
• Mr. Hafez Ghanem (FAO) discussed the problems involved in measuring price 
volatility (according to him, the right measurement is the difference between real 
and expected prices). Volatility must be expected to rise in the coming years for 
several reasons: growing market integration, rising cereal exports from ex-USSR 
countries (with much more variable productivity than elsewhere), the increasingly 
close link between oil markets and maize, the financial deregulation in the mid-
1990s, and changes in storage policies (smaller emergency stocks). Among his 
recommendations, he identified various areas for potential action: the constitution 
of minimum emergency stocks (as experiments in regulation stocks have been 
negative overall), market transparency, the definition of a regulatory framework for 
futures markets (without falling into the trap of over-regulation because they are 
important for cash flows and risk coverage), the development of insurance systems 
(with the support of investment banks), the establishment of safety nets for the 
most vulnerable populations, and the definition of new global governance, notably 
to prevent the (legitimate) decisions of some countries to restrict exports from 
being costly for the rest of the world. 
 
• Mr. Ousmane Djibo (NEPAD) insisted on the importance of the regional level when 
setting up economic policy measures. He presented the African Union’s agricultural 
program, which aims to improve food security through increased investment in the 
agricultural sector and the associated gains in productivity. 
 
• Mr. Moses Shaha (ESAFF, Kenya) discussed the harmful nature of price instability for 
small farmers in Kenya and the difficulties associated with State intervention and 
how this intervention can increase uncertainty if it is not properly conducted. The 
experiment conducted by the ESAFF, based on farmers’ groups, shows that success 
is possible on the local scale. 
  
• Mrs. Lourdes Adriano (ADB) discussed the dramatic impacts of the 2008 price hike in 
the Asia-Pacific region, and insisted on the urgency of setting up measures aiming to 
lessen the negative short-term impacts on poor consumers without neglecting the 
medium and long term. New solutions on the international, regional and national 
level must be found based on renewed forms of public-private partnerships. Buffer 
stocks or reserves, managed in a transparent and predictable manner, must be set 
up on the national and regional levels, trade agreements must discourage 
protectionism, safety nets must be improved, and investments must be made in 
commodity chains. Market operations (information), agricultural research, and 
north-south and south-south cooperation are also necessary.  
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Conclusion: The Day’s Lessons by Mr Frédéric Bontems, Director of strategic 
management and prospective, Agence Française de Développement 
 
The devastating impacts of the volatility of agricultural product prices on producers and 
consumers, particularly the poorest, have placed this issue at the heart of the G20’s 
concerns. The goal of the day was to contribute to reflections on the possibilities and 
techniques for public intervention in this area. Three essential points must be drawn 
from the study: 
 
- the policy dimension—price volatility has direct consequences on countries’ 
social peace; 
 
- the multi-scale nature of the phenomenon—price instability is present in 
international markets as it is in local markets, and there are complex 
relationships between these scales; and 
 
- the presence of two sources of instability, one linked to natural conditions 
(exogenous) and the other linked to projection errors (endogenous). 
 
Seven lessons can be learned from the day: 
 
- One must be precise and attentive to the words used; regulation must be 
defined as all mechanisms in which private actors and public authorities interact 
to ensure that foodstuffs markets operate efficiently and benefit food security. 
 
- Regulations are needed on the national/regional level as well as on the 
international level to stabilize food prices. 
 
- Lowering volatility is a necessary factor in agricultural development, but it is not 
sufficient. 
 
- A panoply of instruments must be used, depending on the context 
(country/products) and whether it is an emergency situation or not.  
 
- The transparency and predictability of national and regional public policies are 
crucial for success. 
 
- On the international level, market regulation must make it possible to avoid 
bubbles and protect the poorest countries in the case of sharp food price 
increases. 
 
- In this way, one can say that price stabilization is desirable, but that its feasibility 
relies on tricky conditions, depends on the context, and must continuously be 
adapted to the context. Furthermore, it is necessary to differentiate between 
short-term effects and long-term effects, and take into account these different 
timelines when defining policies. 
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2. Managing Food Price Volatility : results of a two 
days workshop 
 
Discussions among about fifty experts with contrasted positions 
 




I am grateful to have an opportunity to offer my observations on the two days of 
discussions we just completed at CIRAD, on the draft paper prepared by GREMA that 
Francoise has just summarized so effectively.  “Managing food price volatility” is “my” 
topic. It has been my intellectual passion for over 40 years as an academic researcher, a 
teacher, and an advisor in the field, especially in Indonesia, China and Vietnam. We had 
rich and vigorous discussions on Monday and Tuesday and I hope to capture some of 
that flavor today 
What does price instability have to do with food security? We all agreed that (in 
general), 
1) Price spikes hurt poor consumers; 
2) Price collapses hurt farmers; and 
3) Price risks reduce investments, including by smallholder farmers for 
agricultural modernization. 
But my own work suggests that food price instability also has a deeper and more 
insidious impact: it slows down economic growth and the structural transformation that 
is the pathway out of rural poverty. Thus food price instability really hurts the poor in 
both the short run and the long run. 
Consider a very simple model of food security that focuses on the short run versus the 
long run, and on the macro level (of policymakers) versus the micro level (of household 
decision makers). When the food economy is reasonably stable (and this is only possible 
when the financial system is reasonably stable as well), macro policymakers can focus on 
long-run investments and policies for inclusive economic growth, and households can 
focus on building their skills, human capital and savings. The goal is to get to the “lower 
right” box where households have sustainable access to food in the long run.  That is, 
they are food secure. 
But, if the food economy is highly unstable, constantly in crisis, policymakers spend all of 
their time and budget resources in the “upper left” box, trying to stabilize food prices 
and provide safety nets for the poor. During food crises, vulnerable households often 
deplete their human and financial capital just to stay alive. This is the world of poverty 
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traps and enduring food insecurity. We are also trapped in short-run, macro and 
humanitarian crisis management. 
How do we break out of these traps? Franck Galtier and his colleagues have designed a 
simple framework to think about managing food price instability. It builds on two critical 
distinctions: between preventing food price instability and coping with the 
consequences of unstable food prices; and between the role of the private sector in 
each domain and the public sector. 
Thus there is a 2x2 matrix with 4 cells (just like my food security matrix), which he labels 
A, B, C and D. 
 
 Prevent Cope 
Private 
“A” 
storage & transportation 
“B”  
insurance 
hedging & futures markets 
Public 
“C”      
bufferstocks 
import/export  controls 
“D” 
 safety nets 
 
With the rise of market fundamentalism since the mid-1980s, most donor efforts have 
concentrated on A and B measures, and on D measures when food crises still erupted 
(“ABD” has a special meaning in US academia—“all but dissertation”—which means the 
student is “smart but not complete”). In view of the lack of success with the ABD 
approach, the issue at the workshop was whether approaches to “C” might work. Are 
there public interventions that could stabilize food prices? 
We did not reach any specific conclusions, but we clarified the issues considerably. I will 
use a simple framework to explain our discussions: 
There are four levels of action: Local, national, regional and international. Although the 
background paper focuses mainly on the distinction between national and international 
actions, our discussions included significant examples where farmer organizations at the 
local level and regional bodies such as ASEAN+3 have engaged in price stabilization 
initiatives. 
Within these four levels of action, we discussed five main issues, and they were often 
specific to one of the levels of action just presented. 
 
Where is price instability a problem?  
 
At the local level, highly unstable farm gate prices are a significant burden to small 
farmers seeking to invest in modern agricultural techniques and raise their productivity. 
Consuming households (and many smallholder farm households are net consumers) are 
obviously the locus of burdens from high food prices and especially from price spikes. 
At the national level, the concern is for price stability in major urban markets and is 
often the focus of action by macro policymakers. 
At the international level, the concern is for the level and stability of food prices from 
the major exporters, and the possibility that export barriers might prevent access to 
food by importing countries in times of rising prices. 
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Which commodities need more stable prices? 
 
Our discussion focused on three categories of agricultural commodities: food staples, 
cash crops and perennial tree crops. Prices of cash crops are a real concern to farmers 
but have relatively little impact on consumers. Similarly, perennial tree crops present 
special financing problems because of the long time horizon for the investment to start 
to pay off, and there is such a sharp distinction between short-run marginal costs and 
long-run average costs, but price variability has little impact on consumers. 
Accordingly, most of our discussion was on price stabilization techniques for the major 
staple food grains, especially rice, wheat and maize. Although these commodities have 
much in common because they often form a large share of energy input among the 
poor, there was a clear recognition that the world rice market behaves very differently 
from the world markets for wheat and maize. There are other food grain markets with 
their own unusual trading regimes: cassava, millet and white maize, for example, often 
behave more like “non-tradable” commodities than the tradable commodities with 
large, liquid international markets. Any efforts to stabilize food grain prices will need to 
recognize the special characteristics of individual commodities. 
 
What instruments are available to stabilize food prices? 
 
We discussed three main categories of stabilization instruments: border (trade) controls, 
buffer (reserve) stocks, and regulation of financial markets involving agricultural 
commodities. 
Border controls are a national issue because nations are defined by their borders. 
Economists do not like political borders very much because they impede the free flow of 
goods and services (and hence reduce the “gains to trade”), but the nation state is the 
main modern actor in many areas of economic, political and diplomatic initiatives. 
Borders, and border controls over trade, are a reality. The WTO seeks to impose 
disciplines on what border controls are legitimate, and agriculture has been included in 
those disciplines since the Uruguay Round, but the food crisis in 2007/08 revealed a 
serious asymmetry in how the WTO approaches border controls for food grains. Virtually 
all of the trade disciplines, and all of the current negotiations under the Doha Round, 
refer to import barriers rather than export controls. There was wide agreement at our 
workshop that export controls on food grains have been a significant source of price 
instability. The asymmetry of trade discussions should be rectified, but it is difficult to 
imagine grain exporting countries agreeing to significant restrictions on their ability to 
control exports as a means of stabilizing their domestic food prices.  Food security is 
simply too important as a political mandate for national leaders to forgo this policy 
instrument. 
Large reserves of grain, at whatever level, have the obvious advantage that they can be 
drawn on when harvests are damaged or there are surges in demand. Large reserves 
tend to hold price levels down as well, although there is a clear endogenous 
relationship, explained by the theory of supply of storage, between expectations of price 
changes and levels of stocks held by the private sector. The issue is whether the public 
sector should be holding reserve stocks of grain above and beyond the willingness of the 
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private sector to hold stocks (and the subsequent willingness of the private sector to 
hold these stocks in the presence of public stocks). 
Holding public reserve stocks faces three key issues: their costs (and who should pay), 
monitoring the level and quality of stocks (and who should manage them), and 
enforcement of agreements to buy and release stocks according to some transparent 
rules. Each of these issues has been difficult to resolve even in the case of national 
stocks. There is virtually no experience at the international level of procuring, managing 
and releasing reserve stocks on behalf of an agreed protocol to stabilize grain prices. The 
experience of using Japanese “WTO” rice stocks in 2008 as an external supply source to 
prick the rapidly rising spike in world rice prices was clearly a unique episode (and even 
then the stocks were never actually released). Very serious doubts were expressed at 
the workshop that any internationally viable scheme of holding reserve stocks of grain 
for stabilization purposes could be agreed and implemented. 
Regulation of financial markets for agricultural commodities was vigorously discussed, 
with attention focused on two possibilities: re-imposition of position limits on 
speculative positions for important food commodities traded on futures markets (such 
as existed before the financial deregulations in the 1990s), and a “Tobin-tax” on each 
financial transaction to slow the emergence of speculative bubbles. The difficulties with 
either approach were clear—many of the financial transactions in commodity markets 
do not actually take place on organized exchanges were regulators can see what is 
happening, no single market could initiate such regulations unless others around the 
world did as well, and there is no experience with taxing financial transactions of this 
sort. Still, it was recognized that the “financialization of food commodities” is a relatively 
recent and rapidly growing phenomenon and urgently needs more research and 
understanding. 
 
How can stabilization interventions be governed? 
 
The issue is important at three different levels (four, if the regional level is somehow 
distinct from the international level because of greater commonality of interests). 
At the local level, especially for farm or community organizations, governance would 
seem to depend on active participation and “voice.” The great advantage of local 
initiatives, of course, is precisely their ability to be responsive to local conditions and 
aspirations. General guidelines on how to manage them are probably not very useful. 
At the national level, democratic processes are widely thought to be the basis of good 
governance generally, and should provide appropriate feedback to national leaders on 
how well they are doing in managing the country’s food security. Still, it is important for 
outside analysts, donors and the private sector to realize that food security is inherently 
a political issue subject to political decision making. It is certainly desirable that good 
technical analysis, especially economic analysis, be brought to bear on these decisions, 
but history has shown how difficult it is to make such analyses relevant and 
implemented. 
At the international (and regional) level, negotiations informed by transparent technical 
rules would seem to be the best way forward. But there was deep skepticism at the 
workshop that such negotiations could be successful. 
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How do we evaluate success or failure in stabilizing food prices? 
 
At the local level, the basic issue is whether sustained gains are seen in agricultural 
productivity on small holder farms. Of course, many other ingredients are needed for 
“getting agriculture moving,” but a major rationale for stabilizing commodity prices at 
the farm gate is to enhance the profitability of these other investments. The feedback 
from success at this level is also critical: nothing would improve the outlook for food 
security more effectively than rapid increases in farm productivity, especially for staple 
food crops grown by small holders. 
At the national level, success in stabilizing food prices is likely to be seen primarily in 
greater political support for the government that gets credit, and ultimately in a more 
stable investment climate that should stimulate economic growth. Although the political 
payoff is likely to be primarily in the short run, the contribution to economic growth will 
only be apparent to economic historians, and to the country’s consumers as they 
gradually escape from poverty. 
At the international level, if a price stabilization accord can be agreed and implemented, 
success will almost certainly have to be measured using technically sophisticated but 
transparent methodologies that are part of the initial framework. Cost-benefit analysis is 
a powerful tool when stakeholders agree on the result. 
Our conclusion? Reducing food price volatility is likely to be a highly specific process—
depending on commodity, country, and global market conditions—but we should 
encourage countries in this process, NOT discourage them. 
Some final thoughts, after the questions: There are some broad lessons, even when 
viewed through my “rice lens.” Rice has not been “financialized,” but there are still 
speculative hoarding episodes driven by widespread expectations of scarcity and 
surplus. At the country level, prices WILL be stabilized (or at least serious efforts will be 
made to do so). The issue going forward is whether these country efforts can be done in 
a way that has less impact on world prices. The most promising avenue in this regard is 
regional agreements on rice reserves (ASEAN+3), but these need a price stabilization 
objective as well as an “emergency” objective. 
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3. The impact of agricultural price volatility on 
supply chain stakeholders in Burkina Faso 
 
Summary report based on interviews conducted with actors in 
agricultural sectors and their trade associations in Burkina Faso 
 
Inter-Réseaux Développement rural 
 
Affects of price volatility on agricultural actors in Burkina Faso 
Producers 
Intra-annual volatility 
Although most farmers are aware of the advantages of stocking production, they are 
often forced to sell at harvest time when prices are lowest. Two phenomena can be 
observed. (i) Over-commercialization in relation to household needs, due to liquidity 
constraints at harvest time and lack of storage capacity: during the lean season, when 
cereal availability decreases and prices are high, households with a food deficit have no 
choice but to buy the same products they sell on the local market at much higher prices. 
(ii) Undervaluation of produce: this occurs when farmers in surplus areas sell low during 
harvest season, rather than waiting for the lean season, when profits are higher. This 
can be explained by the absence of commercialization credit and inadequate individual 
and collective storage facilities.  
Inter-annual volatility 
Producers struggle to generate high returns and thus stabilize market supply due to lack 
of long-term support to agricultural production. Production support such as input 
subsidies, access to credit, improved extension, and farm management advisory services 
can help farmers improve profitability and secure their production systems. Lack of 
security induces highly variable returns that exacerbate volatility. Combined with 
uncertain market opportunities and unpredictable prices, insecurity pushes farmers to 
adopt risk minimization strategies that discourage investment in intensification.  
As a result, farmers struggle to plan their economic activities, as price volatility makes 
it difficult to obtain a lucrative price every year. Farmers invest without knowing 
whether even their production costs will be covered. The result is increasing 
indebtedness, which further limits their ability to access credit and make investments. 
The instability means that prices cannot serve as signals for farmers to make decisions 
on what to plant and when.  
 "Price instability destabilizes the producer, who is unable to organize operations in a 
way that helps him develop. The farmer does not know at what price his products will 
sell. He makes loans and buys fertilizer on credit, without knowing the sale price. If 
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commodity prices fall, he cannot honor his commitments and will spend the next season 
in debt, and the one after that trying to bounce back." (source: UGCPA) 
Farmers' organizations 
Farmers’ organizations (FOs) often have difficulty planning. Indeed, FOs that provide 
marketing support to their members through "pre-payment" (or advance payment) 
systems, for instance, grapple with managing price risk: it is difficult to set the purchase 
price for members when the market price is unknown. For FOs that market produce 
collectively, choosing when to release stocks is also a challenge: at what point are 
market prices high enough? When should the FO hold on to stocks, in hopes that prices 
continue to rise? These difficult decisions are exacerbated by the fact that FOs often 
have little flexibility in terms of their treasury, and practically no room to take risks or 
deal with market downturns.  
Price volatility can also undermine collective dynamics, particularly when it comes to 
marketing produce. For example, when production is stored to be sold later, if prices do 
not increase enough, the operation will fail and the FO will not be able to cover the cost 
of collecting, storing and packaging the produce. 
Spikes and/or unanticipated price changes can also lead members and/or purchasers to 
default on commitments or contracts. Thus, during low production years, farmers do not 
always respect commitments to deliver produce to the FO, opting instead to sell to the 
highest bidder. This phenomenon is amplified by the complexity of social relations 
between producers and traders.  
Processors 
"The first consequence is a lower profit margin for processing firms; it is rarely possible 
to pass on the totality of commodity price increases to the finished products, as this 
would scare off customers." (source: Afrique verte) 
The steady rise in commodity prices in recent years has significantly reduced margins of 
small processing units and companies, threatening their survival.  
 "There have always been price fluctuations, but they stayed within reason. Since the 
price hikes of 2008 (32%), cereal prices have become unbearable and we hope that the 
good harvest in the 2009/2010 season will bring them down." (source: Société Faso 
Riibo)  
These financial constraints make it difficult for companies to access credit, therefore 
reducing their ability to purchase raw materials in large quantities when prices are low. 
Intra-annual price variations combined with lack of storage facilities (either unavailable 
or too costly to acquire) force these processing companies to buy part of their raw 
materials at high prices during the lean period. 
Price volatility sometimes pushes producers to default on contracts with processors in 
order to sell to the highest bidder.  
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Rural and urban consumers 
Rural households: A majority of consumers are also producers. We can distinguish three 
categories of households: (i) non-producing households, which are entirely dependent 
on market prices in the same way urban households are; (ii) households producing a net 
deficit, i.e., production does not cover family food needs. They are strongly affected by 
price volatility, especially increases during the lean period, which affect their food 
security; (iii) households producing a net surplus, i.e., production covers food needs 
throughout the year. These households are affected by price volatility the same way 
producers are: falling prices at the time of sale affect the household's disposable 
income.  
Urban households: Urban households make consumption choices based on the prices of 
imported and local products. The most vulnerable modify their eating habits to cover 
food staples, and when the situation worsens, they resort to debt and eat fewer meals a 
day. Dairy products, meat and vegetables are reduced under this strategy, which 
strongly impacts the nutritional situation, particularly of young children. When the crisis 
worsens, food riots are likely to break out in the cities.  
The role of traders in the functioning of markets and their impact on price volatility: an 
ongoing debate 
The interviews conducted for this study showed a genuine difference of opinion on 
traders’ impact on price volatility. Some actors criticize their speculative tendency to 
hold on to stocks when prices are high and commodities scarce. Interviewees mentioned 
traders’ practice of drastically reducing purchase prices in order to take advantage of 
producers’ weak negotiating capacity and high liquidity needs, thus driving them to sell 
off their products, which are sold at high prices in deficit or remote areas.  
However, others stressed the importance of traders, especially during deficit years, 
when they supply the market with purchases from neighboring countries. Traders have 
the ability to relieve isolated areas by marketing their products and/or providing access 
to products.  
"In 2004/2005, at the peak of the food crisis in Burkina Faso, the cereal deficit was such 
that citizens and the government accused retailers of hiding stocks. An emergency 
meeting was convened at the Chamber of Commerce to ask merchants to bring out the 
cereals! We, the traders, proposed to wait 20 days, while we went to buy cereal in 
Ghana. The 18th day, we brought 20 trucks of cereal to the Ouagadougou market.," 
(source: member of the cereal industry trade association in Burkina Faso)  
Although traders play off the volatility of prices to recoup this type of activity, interviews 
reveal that some traders face the same lack of investment capacity for long-term 
storage (borrowing in order to store large quantities). Moreover, they are subject to 
price risk during atypical years when abnormal market behavior results in small price 
fluctuations between harvest and the lean season. Many traders rotate their inventory 
several times a year (buying and selling fast) and therefore generate only very small 
margins on each rotation. Their expenditures are proportional to their ability to open up 
remote areas. The lack of organization of these actors and the emergence of 
"opportunistic traders" due to soaring prices raises the issue of regulating these actors.  
 91 
In sum, the impact of price volatility on actors in the agricultural industry is mostly 
negative. However, it is important to keep in mind that some actors benefit from the 
increased intra-annual food prices to recoup costs of their operations. This is the case 
for intermediaries, but also producers who store produce and market it as a group 
(collective marketing, warrantage), thanks to a marketing loan that allows them to delay 
the release of produce on the market. "Typical" intra-annual volatility (low prices at 
harvest, high prices during the lean period) is, in this case, beneficial to producers who 
have storage capacity. The situation is problematic in the following cases: (i) for 
producers who cannot store, (ii) a market shift prior to or during the lean period for 
various reasons: massive imports, food aid or subsidized prices. There are also cases 
where price increases of imported cereals (and manufactured products like pasta) 
improve the competitiveness of local cereals (and local agro-food products), which can 
have a positive impact on producers.  
strategies to cope with price volatility 
Farmer organizations’ strategies 
To limit the impact of volatile commodity prices on their members, provide them market 
channels and a lucrative price, farmers' organizations implement different strategies and 
instruments. The following table provides an overview6. 
 
Type of instrument/strategy UGCPA UDPNS7 FepaB Mogtedo CISV
8
 FEPPASI FNGN 
Collective storage and 
marketing  
X X X     
Warrantage     X   
Contracts with public and 
private actors 
X X X     
Contract farming   X     
Agricultural stock exchanges   X     
Contractual relationship with 
processors 
   X    
Establishment of regional 
cooperatives 
     X  
Production support: input 
credits and training (IT, CEF) 
X X X X   X 
Guarantee fund  X       
Price control  X   X    
Volume control X   X    
Buffer stock        X 
Security fund  X       
Quantitative restrictions on 
market access 
   X    
                                                      
6 This overview is not exhaustive. 
7 Departmental unions of cowpea producers in the province Sanmatenga. 
8 CISV is an Italian NGO that supports a farmers’ cooperative in southwestern Burkina Faso. 
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First and foremost, storage  
Some FOs offer collective storage facilities, for marketing purposes or not: UGCPA 
collects and stores members' cereal surplus to sell during the marketing year. CISV 
supports a cooperative that practices warrantage by allowing its members to store 
produce so they can sell it during the lean period and obtain warehouse credit to 
develop other income generating activities.  
Access to finance and production support 
Some FOs also implement strategies to improve access to credit for both the 
organization and its members, such as the use of warehouse receipts, or a guarantee 
fund (sometimes backed by financial partners or members' contributions, as in the case 
of FepaB). These tools facilitate access to credit lines from microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) and commercial banks to (i) finance inputs for members, and sometimes, (ii) 
provide cash advances on members’ standing crops (the case of UGCPA).  
Strategies to hedge price risk 
FOs use several types of strategies to hedge price risk. (i) They spread payments over the 
crop year by making advance payments prior to harvest (November). Prices are then 
revised at the beginning of the marketing year (January), at which time rebates or 
additional payments are made. (ii) Similarly, in the case of warehouse receipts, credit is 
calculated by applying a discount to the crop value, to protect members from prices that 
are not high enough to recoup their costs. (iii) FOs strive to gather as much information 
as possible on external factors influencing prices, so as to calculate a fair price at each 
stage. (iv) FOs consult with other sector actors to fix prices. In Mogtedo, producers and 
parboilers negotiate the price of paddy and impose a floor price on all traders who buy 
on this market, which is controlled by the FO. (v) To protect themselves against potential 
years of instability, some FOs implement a guarantee fund to cover deficits if the fixed 
price is higher than the selling price, so as to avoid indebting farmers (the case of 
UGCPA, which takes 2 FCFA per kilogram of rice stored, to finance the fund). 
Strategies to ensure marketing channels and the matching of supply to demand 
The concentration of supply in one FO is an asset for buyers who want to simplify 
transactions by limiting the number of points of purchases. The interviews revealed 
different forms of contractual relationships: post-harvest contracts with institutional 
buyers (e.g., PAM/P4P, SONAGESS), which use a bidding process to supply their retail 
distribution network based on strict quality criteria (FepaB, UGCPA); post-harvest 
contracts with traders and processors (the case of most FOs), which require good 
negotiation skills; specific contracts between actors from the same supply chain (as in 
Mogtedo); and finally, contract farming, as established by FepaB via production 
contracts between the FO and its members, used to honor its commitments with WFP 
(P4P) and the Burkinabe Brakina brewery. 
 
Participation in cereal stock exchanges is another way to find market opportunities for 
producers and FO members by connecting sellers and buyers in the national or sub-
regional area.  
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Volume control 
Interviews revealed the case of one FO that sets quantitative thresholds for products 
going to market. This is the case of the cooperative in Mogtedo, which promotes the 
flow of its members' products to the market before opening it up to products from non-
members. This same cooperative has a buffer stock (constituted through repayment in 
kind of input credit) for when market volumes are low, thus allowing it to regulate prices 
at the local level.  
Member loyalty and reinforcement of the cooperative spirit 
One of the challenges for FOs that market their members' produce is to guarantee 
volumes needed to ensure profitability. This requires members to meet their delivery 
commitments and repay credit in kind. To address this problem, FOs use different 
strategies to ensure member loyalty including (i) provision of services: access to credit 
inputs, training, technical advice based on incentive systems that rank producers in 
different categories depending on their ability to honor commitments, the highest 
ranking providing more advantageous services (eg., UGCPA) and (ii) the payment of 
dividends on profits generated by product sales. 
Joint strategies to drive local regulation 
To address the problem of poorly organized markets (especially in border regions, as the 
FEPPASI experience demonstrates), some FOs rely on cooperation/partnership 
strategies with decentralized services of the State, local and sometimes municipal 
governments. The goal is to create favorable conditions so that everyone can play their 
role in the market.  
Other findings on the choice and level of implementation of FOs' strategies: 
 
Strategies that differ in scale: The majority of strategies implemented by FOs are limited 
in scope. Either very localized (e.g., the self-managed Mogtedo market), or limited to 
local, occasionally departmental, or regional levels (e.g., UGCPA, which contributes 5% 
to SONAGESS stocks), these initiatives do not influence the market in terms of 
quantities. 
 
Strategies that differ depending on prices: When prices fall, it is in the interest of FOs to 
sell as a group, to benefit from greater negotiating power with traders. Conversely, 
when prices rise, FO members can make a profit by storing and selling later, provided 
they have the technical and financial capacity. In this case, the strategy becomes more 
individual than collective. 
Strategies that differ depending on surplus areas and areas of chronic deficit  
In surplus areas (such as the southwest), FOs focus on marketing the surplus of their 
members, while in deficit areas (such as the northwest, an area that faces food 
insecurity), FOs help members develop off-season crops like vegetables and other 
income-generating activities to mitigate cereal production deficits. The challenge is to 
secure incomes so that households can buy cereal. This is the case of the Fédération 
nationale des groupements Naam (FNGN), which combines the promotion of off-season 
crops with food granaries and training in soil fertility renewal techniques. Furthermore, 
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to better match supply to demand and supply deficit areas with products from surplus 
areas, FepaB has implemented a strategy to sell production from union affiliates that 
produce a surplus to affiliates that face deficits. FNGN pursues a similar strategy. The 
initiatives of Afrique Verte/Aprossa are along the same lines.  
Processors' strategies 
Despite price volatility and lack of government and international aid, which affects the 
capacity of processors to secure their incomes, some strategies have nevertheless been 
put in place. 
The federation of agro-food industries in Burkina Faso (FIAB) wants to strengthen its 
members' capacity (small agro-food processing units) to contract and negotiate with 
FOs: two key factors to the process of stabilizing raw materials prices. 
Processors choose not to increase prices of processed products despite fluctuations in 
the cost of raw materials, so as not to destabilize consumers and lose a clientele that is 
difficult to keep loyal.  
 "We set an average price which is the balance point between the low prices of raw 
materials at harvest time and the high prices during the lean season. The goal is to keep 
a fixed price throughout the year." (source: Société Faso Riibo) 
Another strategy is to maintain the selling price by reducing the volume per bag.  
"This year, our company was highly threatened by the sharp rise in sugar prices (which 
have more than doubled). This increase is the result of a government policy that requires 
sugar importers to first purchase supplies from the national sugar companies, before 
importing the remainder. The result is that prices have soared, because local sugar 
supply does not cover demand. We do not want to increase the selling prices of our 
products, so we have chosen to reduce the volume per bag, otherwise, we would already 
be bankrupt." (source: Société Faso Riibo) 
Food security strategies of producer households and rural consumers  
At the local level: implementation of village cereal banks to store food in preparation for 
the lean period. Families may also have their own granaries.  
Trade associations strategies 
Lobbying the government is one of the main strategies of agricultural sector trade 
associations: negotiating agricultural finance, renewed involvement in national 
agricultural production, protection of local markets vis-à-vis imports and better market 
regulation. 
The Comité Interprofessionnel des Céréales du Burkina (CICB), for example, is working to 
develop cereal marketing cooperatives at the local level, in collaboration with local 
elected officials. The idea is to identify a number of markets in Burkina Faso to create 
the first cereal cooperatives.  
"Local elected officials will identify a rural municipality to sell cereal on market day. A 
market study will be carried out in the vicinity of the town the day before the market to 
fix a guaranteed minimum price the next day. On market day, the producer brings his 
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cereals to the market, the Comité will monitor the buyers and sellers entering the market 
and make note of quantities. The next day, the producer comes to receive payment for 
sale. The trader no longer has to intercept farmers on the way to the market to buy at 
lower prices. We have identified three markets where we will implement these cereal 
marketing cooperatives by early 2011." 
Some trade associations and FOs work to secure markets for local products. In the case 
of the trade association Comité interprofessionnel du riz du Burkina Faso (CIRB), this 
involves promoting local rice, as a way to ensure more stable opportunities for 
producers through improved product visibility. To cope with rising prices of local rice 
compared to imported rice, CIRB set up flagship stores with illuminated signs indicating 
that "this seller is licensed by the trade association - high quality local rice sold here": 
"CRIB, sellers of local rice". The strategy is to publicize, including through radio and TV, 
the licensed shops that sell good quality rice at an acceptable price. The idea is to 
improve the visibility of local rice as well as fight against fraud (resellers who sell 
imported rice packaged as local rice).  
Government intervention in the regulation of markets in Burkina Faso: initiatives, 
perspectives and recommendations of stakeholder 
Regulatory instruments used in agricultural markets in Burkina Faso 
Price stabilization instruments  
Production support policies based on subsidizing agricultural inputs and setting a floor 
price: since the 2008 crisis, a government "rice" operation has subsidized fertilizer and 
seeds, which have been distributed to farmers on credit with repayment in kind at 
delivery (amount based on the floor price set by the government); 
Market Information Systems (MIS): dissemination of price information to avoid local 
speculation (TV, radios);  
Stocks in SONAGESS: SONAGESS has 2 stocks:  
- The National Security Stock is designed to address food security, and has no 
impact on price volatility due to small volumes (approximately 30,000 tons); 
- The intervention stock, which involves a few tens of thousands of tons more, is 
also inadequate and unable to play a regulating role. 
The government also sets up on an ad hoc basis border control instruments: for 
example, restrictions on import tariffs and/or border closings in the event of price 
spikes. These measures go against Community trade control regulation (liberalized 
regional domestic markets and Community trade policy at the borders).  
 
Instruments to reduce the effects of price volatility retroactively  
These measures fall under the strategy of prevention and management of food crises, 
and generally target vulnerable populations: 
Subsidized prices in deficit regions: the objective is to limit price hikes in deficit areas 
where food insecurity is high.  
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Distribution of food vouchers (Ouagadougou and Bubo Dioulasso), via a licensed 
distribution network.  
Free distribution of seed and fertilizer.  
Food and cash for work initiatives, promotion of income generating activities, etc.  
 
Perspectives of agricultural sector stakeholders on government intervention in market 
regulation: challenges and recommendations 
Marketing: support collective marketing in surplus areas and regulate the activities of 
traders 
If FOs market their production collectively, traders will be able to buy in large quantities 
at lower prices and pass on this savings to consumers. 
Today in Burkina Faso, there is no licensing system for traders; the result is that anyone 
can get involved. Government regulation is recommended to improve the transparency 
and functioning of markets heavily influenced by this group of actors.  
Improve transparency and market information 
Interviews revealed a lack of transparency in the very markets that need information to 
operate effectively. It is the trade associations’ role to encourage information-sharing 
between supply chain actors, but they need support in the form of government 
regulation to do so. 
Moreover, many FOs stressed the lack of knowledge and information on the flow of 
cereals within the country and with neighboring countries. Here, too, the government 
could play a regulatory role by requiring actors to communicate on their levels of stocks, 
location, business operations, etc. This would make it easier to identify surplus and 
deficit areas.  
 
Mobilization of buffer stocks and the establishment of social safety nets 
The SONAGESS stock is no longer decentralized. There is a need to move towards a 
decentralization of food security stocks. In addition, these national stocks are not big 
enough to truly affect markets. The volume of the national security stock has not been 
revised since the early 1980s, while production has tripled and the population more 
than doubled.  
Better coordination between public and private actors, particularly FOs 
Private actors, especially FOs, are sometimes destabilized when faced with unexpected 
and inopportune government interventions such as subsidized prices, food aid 
operations, and input subsidies, which can disrupt the market and create distortion. 
There is a need to improve dialogue between public and private actors to enhance the 
effectiveness of interventions and market predictability.  
Agricultural policies  
The government only reacts once a crisis is underway, when it really should intervene 
beforehand, especially to support production. Pre-crisis interventions include training 
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farmers, providing them adequate equipment, and supplying quality inputs. There is a 
need to implement policies that encourage production, storage and marketing. 
Government support to processors is insufficient. Consultative frameworks are in place 
(CICB, CIRB, etc.), but overall, the productive phases of the agricultural supply chain 
receive more support than the processing and upgrading phases.  
It is hoped that the government will implement a genuine strategy for financing 
agriculture and the various links in the supply chain. For example, one way to increase 
competition among traders and reduce speculation or unfair agreements, is to create 
and/or strengthen the business skills of traders (through credit).  
There is a need to focus on sectors that are key to food security—namely maize and 
rice—rather than trying to promote all products (the current strategy of the Ministry of 
Agriculture).  
Conclusion and recommendations: Striking a balance between public and private 
sectors in the regulation of agricultural markets in Burkina Faso  
The volatility of agricultural prices in Burkina Faso is a structural phenomenon that has 
been around for several decades. Its consequences affect agricultural industry actors, 
especially farmers and their organizations, in diverse ways. Different actors have 
different interests when it comes to market functioning: traders, processors and farmer 
organizations who stock to sell surplus would like to benefit from increased intra-annual 
prices, but also hedge the risks of inter-annual variations. FOs in deficit areas have 
developed strategies to support income diversification and promote village food security 
stocks. While "typical" intra-annual volatility is easy to manage, these actors must face 
the challenge of atypical market downturns, when price risk is high.  
Market unpredictability is the major constraint facing agricultural actors today. In light 
of the structural adjustment programs (SAPs) of the 1990s and reduced government 
involvement in the regulation of agricultural markets, actors have developed 
instruments (see table above) that are private-sector based but also designed to 
substitute government failures.  
Today, the government plays only a very small role in regulating markets. Agricultural 
actors criticize the lack of market regulation (especially the lack of organization of 
traders); the ineffectiveness of national security and intervention stocks to regulate 
markets; the absence of support for production, processing, and upgrading local 
products; as well as uncoordinated, unexpected measures that can be 
counterproductive.  
For their part, FOs are developing interesting strategies that combine private and 
public-type instruments, but these initiatives are being implemented on a very small 
scale—regional, at best. These FOs are largely supported by donors and technical 
assistance providers, without whom their activities would be seriously compromised. 
Moreover, despite the government's lack of support to FOs, it plays a key role in their 
operations, often serving as the major trading partner their products (e.g., UGCPA and 
FepaB). The current challenge is to find a middle ground between total reliance on 
private sector operators and the highly interventionist policies of the 1970s: a joint 
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public-private partnership approach to market regulation. This could involve (i) the 
introduction of a combination of instruments that aim to anticipate market behavior, (ii) 
a consultative decision-making approach that brings together supply chain stakeholders 
and government actors, (iii) price negotiations (price ranges) between public and private 
players.  
FOs may be taking care of the production support needs of their members, but the 
government still has a role to play in facilitating access to agricultural finance. Similarly, 
even though FOs have taken it upon themselves to test new contractual forms to market 
their products, the government still needs to regulate traders' activities and takes steps 
to create a secure environment (by registering contracts, offering possibilities to take 
legal recourse, etc.). And while FOs can develop regulatory tools to control volumes on 
highly restricted markets, the government needs to more fully appropriate the country's 
production, to increase its capacity to stock food in case of crisis or price volatility.  
Trade organizations offer an adequate framework for negotiations and to improve 
dialogue between the private and public sectors. They exist in several industries, 
including cereal and rice (the legislative process is underway), and their main role is 
currently to lobby and promote local products. It would be useful for them to develop 
their potential (i) to oversee contracts between sector actors and (ii) negotiate with 
government authorities.  
Finally, we must not forget that Burkina Faso is part of a fast-changing sub-regional 
economic community. Regional integration, the free movement of goods within the 
sub-region, and the implementation of a regional agricultural policy should be 
considered as driving forces for domestic agricultural production. Discussions on 
regulation of domestic markets must be integrated into a more comprehensive 
approach to regulation within the regional economic community: (i) management of 
complementarities between major production and consumption areas, (ii) selection and 
coordination of regulatory instruments at different scales, and (iii) establishment of 
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Full texts of Notes are available at the following address : http://www.inter-
reseaux.org/ressources-thematiques/article/etude-grema-sur-les-instruments-de- 
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1. Agricultural Market Regulation: Lessons from 





The question of agricultural market regulation has been viewed differently depending on 
the era, state of economic thinking, and circumstances.  Reflecting the fact that 
economic thinking has always been stimulated by events, here we shall focus on:  
a) the issue of food security from ancient times to the 18th century,  
b) the issue of international trade during the 19th century, and 
c) the issue of market instability in the 20th century, particularly during the Great 
Depression.  
I – Antiquity and the Middle Ages: From the Search for Food Security to the 
Emergence of the Modern State 
 
The history of societies until the Middle Ages shows us that they have always sought to 
ensure their food security by relying on collective institutions not driven by the search 
for profit but rather by the individual interests of family groups or groups of traders. 
 
For instance, in primitive village societies where the market was absent, the village 
leader or feudal lord was responsible for stocks.  
 
With the appearance of the division of labor between agriculture and cottage industries, 
the production of individual agricultural surpluses and the market, food security was no 
longer ensured by the village leader or feudal lord, but rather by hierarchical forms of 
coordination. In ancient times, the authorities thus implemented public storage policies 
(Egypt) and agricultural market regulation policies (Athens, Rome). In the Middle Ages, 
monarchs sought to have sufficient stocks and clean up urban markets. In the 16th 
century, Thomas More recommended that public stocks correspond to two years of 
consumption and surplus production, with the surplus exported at low cost. 
 
However, until then, approaches were exclusively pragmatic in nature and aimed to 
resolve a concrete problem at a given moment in time. It was during the 18th century 
that the need to understand what was happening and justify public action (or inaction) 
by an in-depth analysis of the causes behind the phenomena emerged. It was also 
during this period that “liberalism” emerged—the idea that the selfish pursuit of 







 Century and the Birth of Liberalism  
 
The idea of liberalism found its roots in the English philosophers of “natural law.” 
Relayed by the “Physiocrats,” it was then taken up in a very diluted form by Adam Smith.   
 
In regard to the central question of agricultural and food products, the Physiocrats, and 
notably François Quesnay, recommended eliminating the numerous public storage 
measures, transport control and diverse regulations, emphasizing their inconveniences 
but forgetting their advantages. They therefore counted on the well-understood 
interests of speculators (buy in periods of abundance, sell in periods of shortage) to 
ensure the inter-annual offsetting of good and bad harvests, as well as on the interests 
of traders for the geographical offsetting of provinces that had surpluses with those that 
had shortfalls.  
 
These ideas were fought by a few authors. For instance, Ferdinand Galiani explained the 
difficulty of developing trade for a product such as wheat, a crucial product that was the 
same everywhere and produced almost everywhere. Because of production and 
transportation times, the wheat trade imposed risks that only bankers holding a 
monopoly could support. Supply and demand could therefore not be regulated by the 
market alone. 
 
Galiani was not heard. At the end of Louis XV’s reign and during the start of Louis XVI’s 
reign, France undertook liberalization several times, but backtracked many times 
because of the negative consequences of liberalization, notably the Paris uprising of 
1775. After the revolutionary period and the first Empire marked by state 
interventionism, the question re-emerged during the Restoration when the emigrant 
aristocrats again defended Quesnay’s ideas. Cautious, Louis XVIII opted for domestic 
liberalism but set up a system of variable customs duties at the borders, the “sliding 




 Century: The Canonic Form of Liberal Theories and the Difficulties 
Applying Them 
 
Although the 18th century ended with a posthumous victory for Galiani’s analyses, 
based on the observation of what would later be called “market failings,” the question 
of liberalism returned at the start of the 19th century in England in a different light. The 
justification was much more rigorous than that given by the Physiocrats and, above all, 
the question was a new one: should Europe continue to produce all its food or would it 
not be better to count on more fertile distant lands (notably America) to ensure more 
efficient production.  
 
In England, Adam Smith, David Ricardo (the beneficial nature of national specialization) 
and John Stuart Mill (single equilibrium theory) helped build a true economic science. 
However, their analyses, which led to advocating liberalization, were static; they ignored 
the phenomena tied to the accumulation of capital, projection errors, and income 
distribution. What is more, they relied on more or less arbitrary assumptions and 
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assumed that the market operated properly, which is debatable for agriculture which 
these authors did not think to treat differently from other economic activities. These 
authors’ influence can be seen in the suppression of the Corn Laws in 1846. 
 
In Germany in the 1840s, Friedrich List defended the need to protect emerging 
industries from imports, but did not apply this same reasoning to agriculture. The United 
States did this in the 19th century.  
 
In Europe, generally speaking, the 19th century alternated between periods of liberalism 
and periods of protectionism, with the proponents of liberalism relying on Ricardo’s 
theories and the proponents of protectionism on pragmatic common sense but, unlike 
Galiani, without any mention of agriculture’s particularities and without challenging the 
idea that price fluctuations came only from harvest levels and the weather.  
 
Liberalism dominated until the 1870s, but it then became apparent that cheap 
agricultural imports lead to poverty in the countrysides that were, in this way, no longer 
able to provide outlets for industry (deflationary spiral). European countries then 
adopted protectionist agricultural policies (in France, the Méline tariff of 1892). 
 
In regard to sugar, initially produced in the colonies, its production grew in Europe in the 
19th century, eventually leading to surpluses and a trade war between countries (export 
subsidies). This trade war was ended with the first “product agreement” signed in 1901 
(a new agreement based on quotas was signed in 1931). 
 
World War I led to an increase in state-controlled economy, but liberalism returned in 
force during the post-war period. 
 
The 1929 Crash and its Consequences 
 
The causes of the 1929 Crash were numerous, and the agricultural sector was not 
uninvolved (bank seizures of land impossible to resell). 
 
In the  United States, Franklin Roosevelt implemented a supply incentive policy that led 
to the post-World War II surpluses. This policy was guided by a degree of pragmatism 
because there was not in reality any new economic theory and the reasons why the 
market did not work remained a mystery until the elaboration of the cobweb theory by 
Mordecai Ezekiel. 
 
The “cobweb” is an economic model showing the existence of “endogenous” causes of 
price fluctuations. It is based on the lapse of time between producers’ decisions and the 
consequences of these decisions (production volumes). The model generates price and 
quantity measurements that fluctuate, alternating “highs” and “lows.” The system can 
be “convergent” (the oscillations get smaller over time), “periodic” (the oscillations stay 
the same), or “divergent” (the oscillations get larger). The ratio of slopes to straight lines 
(hypothesis of “linear” supply and demand curves) determines which of these regimes 
will apply. For any given supply, a demand that is more “elastic” than the supply will 
produce a convergent cobweb. It will be periodic if demand is as elastic as supply. When 
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demand is less elastic than supply, the cobweb will be divergent. This is the case with 
food products. In reality, various factors prevent the attainment of such results, but the 
crucial lesson is that, on agricultural markets, the market equilibrium point is 
dynamically unstable and the equilibrium can never be maintained sustainably. In 
addition, this phenomenon extends to the entire economy. 
 
While he had little influence on general economists, Ezekiel has long been described as 
the man that justified the agricultural exception because of the rigidity of demand and 
its consequences for market stability.   
 
State-Control of Agriculture After World War II and its Contestation 
 
The post-war period was marked by a revival of interventionist agricultural policies. The 
theory of public policy assessment and “cost/benefit analysis” developed and spread.  
 
The cost of price fluctuations for the various actors and for society as a whole was 
analyzed. Their high social cost justified policies aiming to eliminate them.   
 
In regard to ways to lower these fluctuations, one can distinguish between: 
• The international market, where the problem comes from producers’ poor 
information and their anticipation errors. It is therefore appropriate to set up 
some degree of “planning”: product agreements grew out of this analysis, but 
they failed because some countries did not play by the rules. 
• On the national level, agricultural policies. The levers to regularize domestic 
prices are legion (input subsidies, storage, export subsidies). Little costly in the 
case of shortages, these policies become costly when surpluses emerge because 
of stable prices. 
Several elements then led to the domination of liberal ideas: 
• The theory of “lobbies”: farmers, highly organized, managed to extort 
extravagant advantages from society. To end this, the market should be allowed 
to balance supply and demand, giving farmers only set compensation linked to 
the rights that they had historically acquired. This is the intellectual foundation 
for decoupled payments.  
• Studies based on “calculable models of general equilibrium” showing that 
exploiting comparative advantages would be likely to increase global incomes 
significantly.  
• The observation that many countries have not developed at the expected pace. 
The “structural adjustment” policies followed. 
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Faced with the risk that liberalism would in return lead to price fluctuations, the authors 
counted on futures markets, various financial products, and harvest insurance systems 
to guarantee farmers’ revenues. 
 
The Return of Liberalism After 1980, Contested by “Chaos” Theorists   
 
Liberal ideology had a considerable influence on European and American agricultural 
policies from the 1980s to 2007, and on the inclusion of agriculture in the Uruguay 
Round.  
 
The problem linked to price fluctuations was ignored, partially because we had forgotten 
that agricultural prices fluctuated and partially because we believed that liberalization 
(and therefore the substitution of a global market for a “narrow” international market 
acting as an outlet for surpluses) would resolve this fluctuation due to the “law of large 
numbers.” 
 
The outcome of these liberalization efforts is currently mixed, with the degree of 
liberalization much higher in Europe and the United States. 
 
The recent progress in economic theory when it comes to the chaos dynamic could be 
the starting point for a new approach to the problem of agricultural price fluctuations.  
 
In fact, despite liberalization, international prices currently continue to fluctuate with 
the same magnitude as before.  
 
From this standpoint, it should be noted that the theory that fluctuations would be 
lessened by expanding the market depends on a crucial assumption: that supply 
fluctuations depend on phenomena beyond farmers’ control, such as weather incidents 
or epidemics (“exogenous” causes). However, some research based on mathematical 
“chaos” theories shows that, while the causes are “endogenous” (that is to say linked to 
anticipation errors and production times), the fluctuations can be highly irregular, with 
the absence of any periods. The practical conclusions from the analysis underlying these 
models go against the grain of those that recommend liberalization: by merging two 
markets, one obtains synchronous fluctuations that are as devastating as those that 
originally existed in the two separate markets. Similarly, while with fluctuations of 
exogenous origin, the liberalization of a production quota system makes it possible to 
attenuate fluctuations on the external market, in the case of endogenous fluctuations, 
such a system stabilizes the external market.  
 
In Conclusion  
 
Despite infinitely more sophisticated research instruments supplied with more reliable 
and more complete statistical sources, the heart of the debate has not evolved much 
since the time of the controversy between Turgot, a brilliant theoretician whose 
theories relied on fragile axioms, and the pragmatic Galiani who attempted to measure 
theory against the yardstick of reality and examine specific cases. In the alternation 
between phases of liberalism and interventionism, the rapidity with which the political 
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leaders forget the conditions under which the previous episode happened and their 
incapacity to learn the lessons from them is surprising. 
 
Galiani’s pragmatic viewpoint seems better suited to real conditions than the theory of 
global general equilibrium. The interest of the general equilibrium theory as the basis of 
comparison and as an ideal is not up for discussion: in economics, this theory plays 
somewhat the same role as the notion of lack of friction plays in rational mechanics. But 
in the real world and on the Earth’s surface, friction always plays a major role, and all 
applications of mechanics take it into account. It should be the same in economics.   
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2. Forecasting and Models 
 
 




Forecasting consists of determining the levels of key variables at different future times 
over varied geographic spaces. The aim is to anticipate future events to facilitate 
adaptations (policy, behaviors, etc.) and lower certain negative impacts. Unlike 
predictions focusing on a single future that one seeks to know with precision, 
forecasting examines the consequences of more or less probable scenarios. 
 
 
Forecasting as Applied to the Economy and the Difficulties Involved 
 
Forecasts are based: 
• either on the collection of experts’ opinions, using more or less formal methods, 
so as to compare and harmonize them, but without any assurances as to the 
overall coherence of the scenarios envisaged; 
• or on quantitative models. In this case, the model’s equations provide this 
coherence. 
 
A typology of the multiple econometric models elaborated over the past twenty years 
can be proposed based on the question examined, the scale of analysis and the methods 
employed. For forecasts of world agricultural trade, the questions focus on the system’s 
capacity to meet solvent demand and future changes in this demand, the environmental 
consequences, probable prices, and the major export and import zones for each 
product. One can distinguish between sectoral (e.g. agriculture) and general (i.e. the 
economy as a whole) equilibrium models and accounting models based on “physical” 
equilibrium and containing no (or few) economic behavior equations. The models 
propose analysis at varied scales (global, regional, national). They are based on 
determining and formulating in equation form the primary relations at work and 
estimating, based on past data or experts’ opinions, function parameters; and on 
extrapolating future trends by modifying some of the entry parameters, or assuming the 
continuation of trends, or even adapting the system to a supposedly driving variable 
such as rising demand. 
 
This type of work has multiplied thanks to the advances in computer calculation 
capacities and the awareness that current decisions influence the future and 
considerable time may be needed for certain modifications because of the inertia of the 




As the 2006-2008 food crisis illustrates, which few experts had predicted, models do not 
generally make it possible to provide scenarios that turn out to be true or even clarify 
the future. Indeed: 
 
a) The questions asked and relations chosen are the subject of choices that are rarely 
explicit and even less often discussed. And yet, when the question is well posed and the 
principal relations are well identified, models provide relatively relevant results and are 
useful because they make it possible to synthesize the multiple effects linked to the 
relations between variables. 
 
b) Most models favor the perpetuation of past trends, whereas crises are breaks with 
trends. Dynamic simulation models could determine the probability of crisis but they are 
chaotic and because of this difficult to elaborate and utilize (high degree of sensitivity to 
initial conditions). They are little appreciated by experts because they yield a wide range 
of possible impacts that depend on parameters that we cannot calculate with sufficient 
precision. The search for consensus does not favor innovative analyses. 
 
c) Numerous elements that are not easily quantifiable are missing in models even 
though they play a major role in the evolution of economic variables: social phenomena, 
cultural phenomena, institutional phenomena, balances of power, etc. 
 
d) The goal of “global coverage” of phenomena leads to the simplification of local 
specificities so as to limit the number of variables. The “heavy” trends revealed do not 
allow these specificities to be depicted.  
 
 
Useful Tools for Reflection... whose Assumptions Must Be Made Explicit 
 
Forecasting obliges one to simplify things considerably, and differences with reality are 
explained by the multiple elements seen as “exogenous” (weather events, the state of 
social relations, technical advances, etc.). Economic forecasting tools then become quite 
unverifiable. This is the major stumbling block that stands in the way of the discipline’s 
progress and makes it vulnerable to exploitation. 
 
In this way, the results of models cannot be seen as depicting an overall reality. Choices 
are made on the primary relations to take into account. Some aspects are pushed aside 
to limit the number of variables to analyze and stick to easily quantifiable phenomena. It 
is therefore necessary to make explicit which relations were chosen as essential and 
which were left out because of their negligible nature.  Faced with complex phenomena, 
models are nevertheless useful to depict the relations between variables and synthesize 
their impacts for the various types of actors. By revealing unsupportable outcomes if 
current trends continue, they can suggest necessary reforms and, by emphasizing 
possible blockages, suggest appropriate strategies.  
 
They must not, however, be confused with reality. To improve models and their use and 
avoid their exploitation for ideological purposes, the results must systematically be 
 108 
accompanied by a notice specifying the main assumptions, key relations used or 
excluded, and the probable consequences of these choices...   
 
 
Trade Liberalization and Global Models 
 
Let us look at the example of the research on trade liberalization that has been at the 
forefront for thirty years in regard to development policies. Trade liberalization is 
justified on the basis of quantified assessments drawn from general equilibrium models 
(often based on the same data: the GTAP database) or partial equilibrium models. These 
models, cast from the “same mold” based on the Walrasian theory of a certain future, 
are all in favor of trade liberalization and the disappearance of agricultural policies. 
Indeed, by construction, they believe that: 
* markets exploit all comparative advantages and are balanced at all times, because 
economic agents know prices in advance and can therefore effectively and with 
certainty predict production, regardless of the necessary lapse of time; 
* prices are consequently established at a level such that supply harmoniously equals 
demand; and 
* free markets are therefore the most efficient means to allocate rare resources 
(automatic regulation by the market) and economic policies are always constraints that 
lower the efficiency of actors’ behaviors.  
  
In addition, the arguments for trade liberalization insist on the potential gains for 
developing countries due to: 
• price stabilization thanks to the dilution of shocks over a wider market, 
• the dissemination of technical innovations and improvements, thanks to the 
intensification of trade, and 
• a dynamic of growth and formal and informal job creation in rural areas, 
benefiting all of the population and notably the poorest.  
This discourse is given excessive media coverage but ignores the real content of studies 
(produced, for example, by the World Bank) that indicate the complexity of the 
phenomena and the difficulties portraying them, or even the recommendations of the 
models’ authors, who emphasize the caution that should be taken when using their 
results. 
 
Despite their complexity, global models seem extremely simplified in relation to the 
global economic system. This is notably the case when modeling producers’ and 
consumers’ behaviors: 
• capital markets are assumed to be perfect, and all profitable activities are 
therefore financed without delay, and 
• prices allow for the immediate equalization of supply and demand, with agents 
having all the information necessary for their decisions, without any uncertainty.  
In fact, these models do not evolve in “real time” even when they are dynamic. Finally, 
only inappropriate government intervention opposes agents’ optimal decisions. What is 
more, the government’s role is limited to redistributing income and consumption. This 
omits the economy’s role in public goods and currency, as it does the role of monopolies 
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or the power of certain actors in markets (the assumption of “pure and perfect” 
competition). 
 
Furthermore, despite being cast from the same mold, the results vary considerably from 
one model to the next because a few key assumptions have a non-negligible impact on 
the results (elasticities, shift of factors from one sector to another, real levels of customs 
duties).  
 
Also, the estimates of global gains from liberalization have fallen over time and have 
always shown a lack of positive impacts—and sometimes even negative impacts—for 
the poorest. Despite this, discourse is evolving very slowly and development policy 
design even more slowly: belief in trade liberalization and its beneficial role for 
development seems to persist in many publications and at the center of the discourse 
on development. 
 
One must therefore question the use of the results of models. By refusing to discuss 
their assumptions and know their limits, and by using them for ideological purposes 
rather than as tools for dialogue or to align phenomena, we are not preparing correctly 
for events that are, however, probable, as the recent crisis in agricultural markets 
shows. The lack of consideration of uncertainty—which plays an important role in how 
markets operate and makes up the fundamental justification for regulation policies—
does not allow one to test the costs and advantages of agricultural policies. 
 
It is appropriate to discuss the assumptions in the models and see their results as more 
or less probable possible futures. They could be improved by iterative correction 
processes, by comparing results to reality. This implies forecasts that first verify that 
they can reproduce the past and that examine objects that can be observed in reality. 
 
 
4- The Tricky Question of Food Insecurity and its Persistence 
 
In poor countries, because of socioeconomic conditions and the complexity of 
mechanisms, models can contribute to the study of food security, help evaluate 
alternative policies, and help organize negotiations among actors—a crucial element in 
policy legitimacy and credibility. 
 
As for projects, the success of economic policies probably depends on the possibility of 
redefining them during their roll out, which implies having both the necessary 
information and expertise capacities. Models are in this case effective tools to align data 
and collect statistics, and therefore to multiply analysis capacities and serve as training 
and negotiation tools. Indeed, they offer elements to support policy reflection by 
making explicit the expected consequences of various measures on each type of actor 
and their costs.  
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For this, models must: 
• be able to reproduce the main dynamics at work (in particular the cumulative 
phenomena that are decisive in household trajectories and thereby movement 
into and out of poverty), 
• be based on relatively detailed empirical foundations, 
• take into account the diversity of contexts, 
• submit their assumptions and the consequences of these assumptions to various 
actors for opinions, and 
• take into account the environmental dimension. 
 
Several recent works show the salutary impacts on food security of policies that make it 
possible to increase capital in rural areas.  These analyses use empirical models to 
reproduce theoretical approaches in terms of “poverty traps.” Indeed, food insecurity is 
here considered to come from low incomes, which are themselves generated by poor 
labor productivity linked to the absence of savings and therefore investments. Producers 
minimize their relations with the market to the exchanges necessary to cover 
incompressible monetary needs and favor self-consumption. The low use of inputs then 
lowers monetary needs. 
Liberalization does not make it possible to break this vicious circle. Market regulation 
policies then have a key role because they make it possible to make investment 
profitability more secure. They must be accompanied by measures addressing access to 
capital (credit) and public investment in infrastructures. They can only be assessed 
correctly using models if the models are dynamic and take into account uncertainty. 
 
Even though one must also examine the institutional and financial “feasibility” of 
policies, modeling can make it possible to designate the most effective levers. For this, 
one must: 
• have access to models with solid empirical foundations and relatively detailed 
depictions of specific situations,  
• clearly explain the assumptions and their consequences on the results,  
• discuss assumptions and results with the various actors concerned, 
• consequentially use models in a iterative process involving the actors concerned 
and policy designers so as to improve both the tools and the negotiation 
process, 
• integrate uncertainty in models of agricultural market operations,  
• depict the environmental impacts that result from actors’ decisions and the 
policies conducted, and  
• use dynamic models to depict cumulative processes. 
Such models would be useful as support tools to meet the 21st century’s food security 
challenges.  
 
It is easier to comply with these requirements for national questions than for questions 
addressing the global level. The larger and more complex the object depicted, the more 
simplifications will be necessary. Thus, global forecasting models addressing humanity’s 
capacity to feed itself neglect, because of the complexity of real relations and the need 
to quantify them easily, financial phenomena. Yet, current events remind us of their 
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importance. At the same time, it is not possible to depict the detailed situation of each 
household in the framework of a national study. The question of which scale is most 
efficient has not been resolved and depends on the question asked. National models are 
a compromise: they authorize the depiction of a certain degree of detail without 
requiring an excessive number of variables. They correspond to easily accessible 





3. Agricultural Market Regulation: Elements to 
Elaborate Proposals 
 





Agricultural market regulation involves the objectives that human societies and 
governments set for themselves in regard to their agricultural systems. If the aim is to 
obtain food as inexpensively as possible and, incidentally, to free farm labor for 
employment in other economic sectors, one must then accept the eviction of a large 
majority of peasants in Africa and Asia. If, on the contrary, the aim is to avoid peasant 
hemorrhages, the agricultural and food “world war” waged through the widespread 
placing of farmers in competition with each other must be ended. In this case, in the 
absence of an invisible hand, very visible hands must enforce the general interest and 
universal rights. The challenge is to work so that on all geographic scales and in all 
regions of the world, the systems of governance are or become enlightened and 
responsible. 
 
Beyond the debate on the reasonableness of public intervention in markets, it is 
therefore important to formulate proposals on intervention methods and the 
precautions to take. These proposals address several aspects: (A) the fight against price 
volatility in agricultural markets; (B) the distribution of value added throughout the 
agrifood value chain; (C) the management of temporary and structural imbalances; (D) 
the actions to negotiate to stabilize international agricultural markets; and (E) the 
factors limiting the political bodies’ power to intervene and the risks of corruption linked 
to these bodies’ actions. 
 
The Fight Against Agricultural Market Volatility 
 
To ensure that public intervention is transparent and predictable, we propose 
considering price bands or ranges for each product. The bands are defined by a floor 
under which prices become unacceptable for farmers, and by a ceiling above which 
prices become unacceptable for consumers. The distance between the floor and ceiling 
must be fairly wide, not too rigid, and not too far removed from international 
fluctuations to avoid outside pressure caused by an excessive price gap so as to limit the 
cost of intervention and adapt to unpredictable changes. 
 
The public authorities should intervene on three levels: 
- act as mediator, or even referee, between the actors concerned by the agricultural 
market so that the price band is the result of a negotiation and, if possible, a 
compromise between the actors before each crop year; 
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- prevent the price from falling below the floor by increasing demand and lowering 
the food supply through the use of stocks, exports, import restrictions, 
diversification to non-food uses, social policies targeting people suffering from 
hunger, and supply control measures in the case of structural and lasting over-
supply; and 
- prevent the price from rising above the ceiling by lowering demand and increasing 
supply through the use of de-stocking, export restrictions, imports, lowering the 
flow of agricultural products to non-food uses, and encouraging production in the 
case of structural and lasting under-supply. 
 
The Search for Greater Equity in How Value Is Shared Throughout the Agrifood 
Chain 
 
To improve proper market operation and ensure greater equity between groups of 
actors in the agrifood chain, the authorities could foster commodity chain organization 
and help actors get better organized and defend their interests. This calls for 
information and training actions, support for professional organization, and a better 
credit system. 
 
Managing the Short Term (and Temporary Imbalances) and the Long Term (and 
Structural Imbalances) 
 
The gap of several months between production decisions, the agricultural product 
harvest and food consumption introduces factors of uncertainty in how markets 
operate. Price bands are a valuable tool to lower this uncertainty because they 
guarantee the transparency and predictability of public interventions, provided the 
public authorities do indeed intervene in the ways that they promised to do. 
 
It is also difficult to know whether an unpredictable event is accidental or if it marks the 
start of a long-term trend, in other words whether temporary (infra-annual) 
supply/demand imbalances are a manifestation of structural (pluri-annual) imbalances. 
This is why it is appropriate to have tools that make it possible to regulate supply and 
demand over periods of time longer than one production cycle, either through storage 
capacity or the regulation of foreign trade:  
 
- Stocks are indispensable, at least over a one-year period, to take into account the 
seasonal nature of harvests and the daily nature of food consumption. But other 
types of stocks are indispensable. The volumetric calibration of the stock must in 
this way differ according to whether the stock is a food and strategic reserve, or 
serves to offset the seasonality of agricultural production, withstand unpredictable 
shocks (natural, economic, military, etc. disasters) or intervene in the market. 
 
- International trade is justified but on the condition that it is regulated in function of 
the needs of the markets of arrival and departure for the products traded. This 
implies reviving the first definition of trade, in the sense of contracts between 
countries with shortages and countries with surpluses, and turning one’s back on 
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market integration. International trade will only contribute to the stability of 
national markets if the national authorities have the policy space they need to 
intervene in their markets when they no longer regulate themselves or regulate 
themselves poorly. 
 
- The growth and flexibility of non-food markets (agrofuels for example) could be 
powerful stabilizers for agricultural markets. Conceived as an agricultural market 
adjustment variable, the production of ethanol or alcohol must be a light industry 
decentralized in cooperatives (or even an activity integrated into other farming 
activities) rather than a heavy industry as it is currently.  
 
- Supply control (fallow lands, forest replanting, quotas, reorienting production 
systems, etc.) is a prospect to consider in the case of structural over-production if 
one wants to limit the cost of agricultural policy and avoid the collapse of prices. 
 
- Contractualization between individual producers or their cooperatives and the 
first processors is also a path to provide farmers with predictability as long as there 
is a commitment on price levels in the contracts. But this path raises questions: can 
all producers and all products be the subject or object of a contract with an 
industrial partner? Do the public authorities or courts have the means to enforce 
these contracts? 
- The development of futures markets equals a form of contractualization with 
financial actors, even though the timeline for futures markets is often too short to 
meet farmers’ need for security.  
Cleaning Up International Markets 
 
A political authority needs to define a form of economic, environmental and social 
specifications. Global governance is not currently able to do this, and it is on the national 
level that the real or potential authority to fight agricultural price volatility is found. For 
the international level, several lines of action are proposed: 
 
- Organize international consultation on trade: the aim is to return to a contractual 
vision of international trade. The residual share of non-contractual trade, linked to 
the difficulty of precisely planning national food needs, could be highly volatile but 
would no longer destabilize the world food market. 
 
- Organize global consultation to set the volume of an international stock (different 
from national reserves) that could be used to stabilize the market, and negotiate 
the division of tasks among the countries organizing storage and supplying the 
stock. 
 
- Organize an international program to fight hunger and malnutrition around 
measures that enable the “solvabilization” of the people concerned: economic re-




- Develop commodity chains around new uses for agricultural products to absorb 
surpluses. The new products should be able to be conserved easily, correspond to 
less essential uses than food, be worth less than food products but worth enough to 
avoid discouraging their production, and have low fixed production costs. An 
international research and development program on decentralized agrofuel 
production could be launched to this effect. 
 
Improving the Capacities for and Quality of National Governance and Fighting 
the Possible Corruptions Linked to the Expansion of their Policy Spaces 
 
While a growing share of experts and government leaders admit that agricultural market 
regulation is needed, doubts remain as to the public authorities’ real power and fears 
exist as to the risks of corruption. The rigor with which public interventions are 
implemented, the objective and predictable conditions that trigger these actions, and 
the democratic control of leaders and their actions are decisive to ensure the credibility 
of market regulation policies. This implies:  
 
- Increasing national authorities’ “policy space”: we must review agricultural and 
food trade agreements, in priority those of the WTO, and reexamine the 
conditions that apply to the blunt opening of markets. We must also improve the 
quality of statistics, the capacities to analyze market evolutions and 
administrations (customs services, fiscal administrations, law enforcement 
agencies, storage infrastructures, etc.). 
 
- Avoid the risks of corruption (insider trading, clientelism, preferential treatment, 
etc.) linked to public product purchase or sale decisions, auctions, allocation of 
import or export permits, production quota transfers, etc. The parries are known: 
transparency in decision-making and implementation processes, press freedom and 
freedom of association, promotion of the state and the rule of law, strengthening 
professional organizations or unions, and more generally strengthening 
participatory democracy extending representative democracy.  
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4. International market regulation : the example of 
tropical products 
 




This paper presents the main historical stages of the debate around international 
agreements on tropical products. 
 
It shows that: 
• Product agreement plans must be interpreted in light of two essential, 
historically dated facts: (a) the existence in producer countries of state 
offices able to administer the volumes exported and control stocks; and (b) 
the convergence of strategies to enter international trade by so-called 
“developing” countries with a shared goal of maximizing currency 
revenues to finance industrialization. 
• The erosion of theses two “pillars” starting in the 1970s was what caused 
these agreements to fail.  
The conclusion attempts to draw lessons for current market regulation projects.  
 
THE FORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL MARKETS AS OLIGOPOLIES OF STATE 
OFFICES (1914-1950) 
 
After a period of openness to the exterior and intensification of long-distance trade, the 
progressive formation of national barriers—initiated at the end of the 19th century and 
strengthened during World War I and after the 1929 Crash—led, immediately after 
World War II, to the fragmentation of the world into national or imperial markets that 
were isolated, or relatively isolated, from each other. 
 
This favored development of national markets relied on a number of public and private 
national institutions that guaranteed price stabilization and agricultural incomes. 
 
On their independence, the so-called “Third World” countries adopted for themselves the 
idea of development focused on the domestic market, instituting or consolidating strict 
separations between domestic markets and the international market. The stabilization 
funds, marketing boards and other marketing offices from the imperial era survived de-
colonization. They guaranteed, in conjunction with tariff policies, domestic prices’ 
independence from international prices.  
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In this way, in the post-war years, the administered and centralized management of the 
national levels of foreign trade characterized the operation of international agricultural 
product markets. Countries thus appeared as units on international markets. The global 
stocks held by states and the near totality of international markets could be assimilated 
with state/nation oligopolies. Market regulation therefore amounted to cooperation 
among these oligopolies. 
 
A BROAD CONSENSUS IN FAVOR OF INTERNATIONAL COMMODITIES 
AGREEMENTS (1950-1970) 
The issue of international agreements had its golden hours during the post-war period, 
even though several projects had emerged as early as the mid-19th century and more 
particularly between the two wars. The two key moments were the 1947 Conference on 
Trade and Employment and the 1964 United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development.  
 
  - From the Conference on Trade and Employment (1947-1948) ... 
 
After the war, the United States wanted to promote the creation of a wide range of 
multilateral institutions. Modeled on the United Nations Organization, an organization 
would be in charge of managing the economic relations between nations. In this way, the 
aim of the International Conference on Trade and Employment that was held in Havana in 
1947-1948 and that gave rise to the Havana Charter, was to create the International Trade 
Organization.  
 
The organization of commodities markets was included in the draft initially presented by 
the United States. Indeed, noting that agreements on commodities had become common 
practices since the 1930s, the United States wanted to channel them and limit their impact.  
 
Thus, the agreements were supposed to bring together producer and consumer countries, 
and decision-making powers were supposed to be shared between the two groups. Above 
all, however, the Charter specified that they were transitional instruments (with a 
maximum duration of five years) created in response to exceptional situations (over-
production) and to allow production systems to adapt. Latin-American countries were not 
able to ensure the recognition of either producer countries’ right to unilateral action or the 
principle of lasting price stabilization to maintain their purchasing power. 
 
Nevertheless, the Havana Charter did not lead to the creation of an International Trade 
Organization. For many years, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the only 
tangible outcome of the process, was the only multilateral discussion forum on 
international trade. Guided by the free-trade prospective but riddled with derogating 
clauses—in particular for agriculture—it provided, during the post-war period, only a very 






  ... to the Conference on Trade and Development (1964) 
 
The question of international commodities agreements came back with force in 1964 
during the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. It is now profoundly 
linked to “import substitution policies” and industrialization, implemented first in Latin 
America and then in nearly all developing countries after the crisis in the 1930s and more 
particularly after World War II. 
 
Import substitution policies aim to foster the industrialization of economies specialized in 
the export of commodities. The industrialization strategy focuses on the domestic market, 
unlike the export-oriented strategies practiced at the start of the century that would once 
again be adopted a few decades later.  
 
They were fueled by multiple theoretical and ideological influences, notably through the 
work of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC) Secretariat headed by Raul Prebisch.   
 
They notably consisted of applying monetary overvaluation that allowed a direct transfer of 
purchasing power from the primary sector, the currency supplier, to the industrial sector, 
the currency user. The primary sector nevertheless conserved a preponderant place in 
exports, with their re-focusing on the few products for which each country had an 
uncontested advantage.  
 
This increased import needs. Indeed, while industrialization makes it possible to lower 
foreign purchases of consumer goods, it also triggers skyrocketing equipment purchases. 
Thus, with the dizzying drop in international prices for commodities at the end of the 
Korean War, the countries “under import substitution” ran up against insupportable trade 
balance problems. 
 
This is why the international commodity agreements were one of the main proposals put 
forth by the initiators of the UNCTAD. The approach was substantially different from the 
approach that had previously prevailed. The Havana Charter saw the agreements as 
exceptional and temporary measures to manage imbalances so as to allow sectors in crisis 
to adapt. Henceforth, the objective was much more to maximize export revenues through 
permanent price support mechanisms, with notably the establishment of minimum prices.  
 
 
THE APOGEE AND DECLINE OF NEGOTIATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL 
COMMODITIES AGREEMENTS (1970 on)  
 
The 1970s were the heyday of the North/South clash over international commodities 
markets (“coup de force” by OPEC, experiments with “untamed” cartelization of 
commodities markets by developing countries). The idea of an integrated commodities 
program was written into the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order voted in 1974 by the United Nations. Adopted during the 4th 
UNCTAD (1976), it was finalized during the 5th UNCTAD (1979). 
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The program provided for the negotiation of eighteen international agreements (on 
bananas, bauxite, tropical wood, cocoa, coffee, natural rubber, cotton, copper, tin, hard 
fibers, vegetable oils, oilseeds, jute, manganese, iron ore, sugar, tea and meat). These 
agreements were supposed to rely on buffer stocks financed jointly by a 470 million dollar 
common fund, 68% of which financed by OECD countries. A second funding line (256 
million dollars) was planned for research and development actions. 
 
This dynamic came to an abrupt end with the changing of the decade. The 6th and 7th 
UNCTAD (1983 and 1987) produced no tangible results in the implementation of the 
integrated program. Only an agreement on rubber containing a buffer stock emerged. 
OPEC wavered starting in 1984, and the few painfully established agreements disappeared 
one by one (tin in 1985, cocoa in 1987, and coffee in 1989). It was then the time of the 
minimalist approach: agreements no longer targeted global wealth redistribution, but 
aimed to accompany market cycles. 
 
This standoff in the negotiation process and the splintering of the political unity of the 
“Third World” reflect the growing heterogeneity of these countries’ economies and their 
form of insertion in international trade. Indeed, the economy differentiation trend that 
began at the end of the 1960s was accelerated by the various economic shocks in the 1970s 
and 1980s (oil shock, debt crisis, etc.). 
 
In the agricultural field, the sector taxation model ceded its place to a wide diversity of 
situations. Food self-sufficiency policies, agricultural export promotion policies, and policies 
to replace raw materials with processed products for export were accompanied by the 
elimination of the levies applied and even positive transfers in favor of agriculture.  
From the standpoint of the agricultural trade dynamic, while developing countries as a 
whole were pushed to the side in international trade from 1950 to 1975 (46% of world 
agricultural exports in 1945, compared to 27% in 1975), their trajectories diverged 
afterward depending on the continent:  
• The volume of agricultural imports skyrocketed in Africa and Latin America, 
while imports increased very slowly in Asia. 
• Africa’s agricultural exports dropped off starting in 1973 and stabilized starting 
in 1984, whereas agricultural exports grew rapidly for Latin America and Asia. 
The convergence of export strategies had made it possible to find the bases for tropical 
market stabilization through multilateral agreements. On the contrary, the heterogeneity of 
these strategies, and in particular the adoption of export promotion strategies by certain 
countries, made any attempts at lastingly sharing the market between exporters and at 
price stabilization very difficult. The choice of agreements relying on buffer stocks rather 
than on export quotas only allowed this problem to be avoided temporarily because of the 




In addition, the oligopolies were also being dismantled. Indeed, since the end of the 1980s, 
the existence of states/nations as active units in international markets had progressively 
been challenged. The Uruguay Round agreements organized state withdrawal, removing—
or at least sharply limiting—their latitude for strategic intervention (export or import 
volume control). In addition, much more rapid and sudden state withdrawal happened in 
the developing countries that had “adopted” structural adjustment policies.  
 
BY WAY OF A CONCLUSION: WHAT LESSONS FOR INTERNATIONAL MARKET 
REGULATION PROJECTS?  
 
The two pillars that allowed international agreements to exist no longer exist:  
- Producer countries’ export policies no longer converge around the objective of 
maximizing currency revenues. If there is any convergence today, it is around the 
objective of competitiveness... 
- The governments of producer countries have lost control of exports and product stocks 
to companies. 
This does not mean that, in the future, international agreements could not emerge 
around the objective of price stabilization. 
 
But for this to happen, several things must occur: 
• First, this objective must be shared by the main exporter and/or importer 
countries. This is far from the case for the moment. It would require, in these 
various countries, that the objective of price stabilization be shared by actors 
other than farmers, that it be seen as being in the general interest, and 
therefore that it would allow for the construction of vast alliances. For instance, 
in the 1960s and 1970s, maximizing export revenues was seen as necessary for 
industrialization, and therefore for “development.” 
• Second, governments must recover a minimal degree of control over stocks 
and/or exports. Yet, what countries today have the administrative and financial 
capacities necessary to implement a policy of export control and therefore a 
storage or production management policy?  What countries are likely to be able 
to acquire these capacities rapidly?  These are the questions that need further 
study.  
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5. Stabilization Policies and the WTO 
 
Tancrede Voituriez, CIRAD and IDDRI 




This paper tackles the question of the compatibility of public market stabilization 
instruments with the WTO rules applied to developing countries. 
 
We shall first examine the three pillars of the 1994 Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) 
(border protection, export regulation, and domestic support measures), then we shall 
examine whether Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) and the current negotiations make 
it possible to take into account international price volatility better than the AoA. 
 
 
The Agreement on Agriculture’s Conceptual Framework: Greater Trade 
Liberalization and Less Distortive Aid 
 
The AoA organizes the progressive opening to competition of agricultural systems 
worldwide by transforming all protections into fixed customs duties (tariff setting) and 
bringing the tariffs thus obtained down to a consolidated level. In addition to this, 
export subsidies and aid that has an impact on production are lowered. 
 
Border Protection Instruments 
 
Solely Tariff and Fixed Measures 
 
Non-tariff measures on the agricultural product trade (quantitative restrictions and 
variable import levies, minimum import prices, discretionary import regimes, non-tariff 
measures applied by state trading companies, self-limitation of exports, similar border 
measures other than customs duties strictly speaking) are now banned, with a few 
exceptions.  
 
The impossibility for WTO member countries to use price control measures can be 
illustrated by the dispute between Argentina and Chile from 2000 to 2007 over the 
question of the import price bands set up by Chile for several products.  
 
At the same time, the AoA contains provisions that can be used to respond, partially, to 
market instability. Access to these provisions is not the same for developing and 
developed countries, and the initial situation of the country when the concession lists 




Safeguards for Exceptional and Temporary Situations 
 
The AoA does not forbid recourse to certain non-tariff import restrictions: measured 
applied under the provisions on the balance of payments, general safeguard clauses, 
general exceptions, provisions in the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures, provisions in the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 
and other general WTO provisions. 
 
The “Special Safeguard Clause” permits raising tariffs above their consolidated levels, 
but only for short periods of time and as a temporary measure. It is therefore not a 
solution for prolonged drops in international prices. In addition, developing countries 
that have notified ceiling rates—notably the case for Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs)—cannot use it. 
 
Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries Not Always Advantageous 
 
Developing countries receive special treatment under the special and differential 
treatment clause. LDCs are not obliged to notify commitments to lower their customs 
duties. However, they cannot exceed their consolidated level of customs duties. 
 
In addition, developing countries have the possibility of consolidating their duties 
(making them impassable) at ceiling rates, without reference to the duties actually 
applied and without reference to past customs duties.   
 
Yet, for ceiling rates to be effective, they must: 
 
• be sufficiently high compared to the duties applied, which is not always the 
case; and 
• be able to be actually used by the developing countries that have notified them, 
which can be difficult notably for countries subject to structural adjustment. 
 
Maintaining Tariff Peaks and Instruments Other than Ad Valorem Duties 
 
The tariffication mechanism allowed some countries to notify still very high tariffs (tariff 
peaks) for certain sensitive products. This is especially the case for developed countries, 
notably the European Union and the United States. Some developing countries, while 
they were able to notify sometimes high ceiling rates (greater than 100%), apply levels 
of protection that are among the lowest in the world. For instance, the highest rate in 
WAEMU’s common external tariff (CET) is 20%. 
 
The AoA authorizes in practice protection instruments other than ad valorem customs 
duties that would allow for more effective market protections: specific duties, tariff 
quotas, seasonal duties, etc. However, most developing countries have not notified 
these types of instrument and therefore cannot use them.  
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Finally, the countries that have the means to do so have offset, at least partially, the 
drop in farmers incomes’ due to the opening of borders. However, developing countries 
have in general not notified such direct decoupled aid. 
 
The Case of Quantitative Restrictions and Export Taxes 
 
Restriction policies and export taxation remain for many developing countries the 
favored measures to meet diverse objectives, including the preservation of food 
security. In this way, the 2006-2008 food crisis led various rice exporting countries to 
limit or ban their exports in order to supply their domestic markets in priority and limit 
the price hike on these markets. These policies were denounced for their effects on the 
habitual destination markets.  
 
WTO rules do not forbid export taxes. In addition, exemptions are planned that limit the 
ban on quantitative restrictions: they may be applied temporarily to prevent or resolve a 
critical situation due to a shortage of food products or other essential products for the 
country. As long as the developing country in question is not a net exporter of the 
product (if it is, certain conditions must be met), countries can therefore , in addition to 
taxes, set up quantitative restrictions on food product exports. 
 
Production Support Policies and Managing Market Instability 
 
All domestic support measures that have an effect on prices or quantities are subject to 
reduction. 
 
Under special and differentiated treatment (SDT), developing countries are not obliged 
to lower: 
• investment subsidies and agricultural input subsidies for low-income farmers or 
farmers with limited resources, or 
• support destined to encourage the replacement of illicit narcotic crops.  
 
In addition, the “de minimis” clause allows countries to maintain: 
• agricultural product support when the support does not exceed 5% of 
the production value, and 
• support other than product support when it does not exceed 5% of the 
value of the country’s total agricultural production. This rate is 10% for 
developing countries. LDCs are subject to no reduction obligations but cannot 
increase “distortive” support. 
 
“Non-distortive” support (Green Box) is exempt from reduction: decoupled aid and 
direct payments to producers, public service programs of a general nature (research, 
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anti-pest programs, training, extension, etc.), aid in the case of natural disasters, activity 
cessation aid, environmental protection programs, etc. 
 
Spending on holding public stocks is authorized, but only if these stocks target food 
security alone. Hidden support via purchase and re-sale prices is therefore not tolerated. 
What is more, domestic food aid also seems to be among the measures that are exempt 
from reduction, as long as it is linked to nutrition-related objectives.  
 
In the last two cases, the goal of market stabilization may not be used to justify the use 
of the two types of measures in question.  
 
In sum, the WTO AoA organizes the transition to a large global market through capped 
and dropping customs duties, mostly decoupled support, and special safeguards in the 
case of price or import volume shocks. Only the pace and magnitude of commitments 
change for developing countries, with the exception of LDCs that are exempt from 
liberalization obligations. The legal alternative to liberalization is limited to (temporary 
or permanent) protection. Price stabilization is removed. Developing countries were not 
mistaken and in the framework of the Doha Round are negotiating exceptions for 
certain products labeled “special products” and a special safeguard mechanism, rather 
than instruments such as variable levies or guaranteed price policies. But what about 
RTAs involving developing countries? 
 
  
Are Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) a Better Response to the Challenge of 
Market Stabilization? 
 
WTO member countries may sign Regional Trade Agreements (customs unions or free 
trade agreements). In this way, they can depart from the non-discrimination principle as 
long as the RTAs cover a “substantial part” of the trade and are implemented within a 
“reasonable length of time.” Are RTAs a better response to the challenge of market 
regulation? Are public stabilization policies tolerated even though the WTO bans them? 
 
In principle, no, because RTAs must be compatible with WTO rules and refer to these 
rules.  
 
In practice, RTAs usually only increase trade liberalization among the parties to the 
agreements compared to their commitments with the WTO. In this way, RTAs are often 
much more restrictive when it comes to the use of trade policy instruments: they do not 
address the consolidated tariffs at the WTO but applied tariffs that they lower or 
eliminate, often with a status quo clause that prevents countries from raising the tariffs 
applied at the time the agreement was entered into. In addition, the WTO does not 
impose asymmetry between developed countries and developing countries when a RTA 
involves both types of countries, contrary to the WTO rules that include special and 
differentiated treatment. The asymmetry that may exist in the degree or pace of 
liberalization is the result of the negotiations between the parties. 
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Policy space is therefore increasingly limited: only food security or the “special” nature 
of a product for developing countries (in the terms of the current multilateral 
negotiations still underway) can justify measures influencing prices or quantities outside 
of support measures that have been capped on a historic basis (“Amber Box”) but are 
nonexistent in practice. 
 
 
Are Current Negotiations Evolving Toward Better Consideration of Price 
Volatility? 
 
The negotiations underway on the AoA have not challenged current rules at all. They 
aim to continue trade liberalization and further reduce distortive support and export 
subsidies. 
For developing countries, the most important discussions focus primarily on: 
• “special products” that could receive special treatment in regard to lowering 
consolidated tariffs; and 
• the special safeguard mechanism that allows them, as does the current Special 
Safeguard Clause, to temporarily increase their levels of protection in the case of 
sharp increases in imports or sharp drops in the price of imported products. This 
mechanism would be available to all developing countries, including those that 
consolidated their tariffs at ceiling rates, and easier to trigger than the current 
clause. 
The issue of exchange rates has been addressed relatively little in the negotiations 
whereas they are a crucial stake in international trade. 
Beyond WTO rules, some developing countries have implemented measures that bypass 
or are sometimes incompatible with the WTO’s rules; these measures deal with sanitary 
or quality criteria or criteria arising formally from agreements between private actors. 
 
 
In conclusion, the WTO framework, like the RTA framework, cannot create the 
conditions that would allow for the ambitious use of market stabilization instruments. 
Indeed, all of the rules established there, including those for developing countries, aim 
to reduce the use of such instruments. The existing flexibilities and those under 
negotiation are merely exceptional provisions or special treatment compared to the 
overall rules. Paradoxically, developed countries, which are least eligible for exceptions 
to the rules, are the ones that use stabilization instruments the most because they used 
them during the baseline periods chosen in the AoA. This situation suggests that strong 
advocacy efforts will be necessary to modify the philosophy behind the AoA to take into 
account structural market stabilization measures, and notably to authorize developing 
countries and LDCs to introduce instruments that they have not notified. 
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6. Food Security and the Economic Crisis  
 




It was thought that another crisis like the 1929 Crash was impossible because we had 
immeasurably more effective means to counter the risks. And yet, the crisis did indeed 
happen. Its magnitude and the loss of confidence that it generated were a surprise. Only 
governments’ actions were able to restore confidence: in this way, we rediscovered the 
collective essence of money!  
 
The risks have not been removed—as we can see with the Greek crisis, which illustrates 
Europe’s economic policy coordination flaws. The current skyrocketing of cereal prices—
which illustrates the dangers of unregulated trade globalization—will certainly have a 
strong impact on future agriculture policies. 
 
The Market Has Not Been a Good Indicator for Non-Renewable Goods 
 
The 2002 reversal in oil prices only became obvious in 2004. Other industrial 
commodities followed the trend.  
The principal explanation given—increased demand from emerging countries—is not 
satisfactory. Indeed, this growing demand was not new. In reality, since the 1980s, oil 
companies have not, due to the drop in petrol prices after the spike in 1980, had an 
incentive to increase their supply rapidly. Thus, for nearly twenty years, oil was three to 
four times less expensive than in 1980. This also did not encourage fossil energy savings 
or the development of substitute energies. After the 2007-2008 shock, limits were again 
discussed. But, because of the drop in prices, one can readily fear that there has not 
been any lasting changes in oil and mining companies’ investment plans. There will 
therefore be other crises if we continue to rely on the market alone, as it is not able to 
give clear signals to enable the long-term adaptation of supply to demand.  
 
The rise in oil prices also showed the dependency of industrialized countries’ agricultural 
production, and the dangers of using agricultural products to generate energy. Indeed, 
rising oil prices pull up the prices of food products. We saw this in 2006 in the United 
States with the program to produce corn ethanol. 
 
Only the United States Have Been Able to Restore Confidence 
 
A manifestation of the imbalances in the global economy (excessive household debt 
destined to increase consumption in a context of stagnating salaries), the 2008 financial 
crisis was the decisive element in the contextual change. After the collapse following the 
American government’s refusal to support the Lehman Brothers bank, only government 
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refinancing of banks was able to restore a degree of confidence in the system and avoid 
disaster.  
The consequence was a very rapid increase in government debt, sometimes leading to 
no revival of growth and to drastic drops in standards of living.  
 
But, beyond patching the holes, the causes of the problems were not really addressed: 
no suppression of fiscal paradises, no measures to limit or tax the circulation of capital, 
nor even any separation of business banks from deposit banks.   
 
The Economic Crisis Is Not Over 
 
After 2009, and under the impetus of emerging countries such as China and India, global 
growth became positive again. But the previous imbalances have not been corrected, 
notably America’s trade deficit with China. This deficit has not resulted in a depreciation 
of the dollar and an appreciation of the yuan because of China’s massive purchasing of 
American treasury bonds. The only true variable in currency adjustment has long been 
the value of the euro, which was revalued by 80% between the start of the 2000s and 
2008, threatening European exports (with the exception of Germany). The divergent 
situations among European countries generates doubts as to the durability of the euro 
and the recovery of lasting growth in the EU.  
 
A WTO Agreement Would Threaten World Food Security 
 
The WTO negotiations failed in 2008, under the pressure from an “objective” alliance of 
India and the United States, the two countries that most saw their food security as an 
inescapable element of national independence. In this context, it is not very plausible to 
pretend to deregulate agricultural trade as one would any other product.  
In reality, the negotiations were tested by the crisis. The discussions on agricultural 
trade—the outcome of which could have been very dangerous for world food security—
were a pretext in part. Indeed, all the countries feared, in reality, Chinese industry and 
no one trusted the dollar, the main currency used in international trade.  
 
The Crisis Turned a Spotlight on the Scope of Wealthy Countries’ Agricultural Aid 
 
The crisis upset the context for agricultural policy in wealthy countries. After the Berlin 
Wall fell, the EU gave up on adopting a food security policy. It returned to its colonial 
habits in a world that had once again become a “natural space” and undertook an 
“honorable withdrawal” from agriculture. As part of a strategic alliance with the United 
States, it made the rest of the world accept its direct aid by placing it in a “Blue Box” and 
then a “Green Box” (single payment entitlement or SPE, under agro-environmental 
conditions, “decoupled” from agricultural production itself). The crisis reveals the 
inoperative nature of this strategy, which furthermore cannot be generalized to the 
other countries of the world. 
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Decoupled Aid Does Not Improve Agricultural Income Security in Wealthy Countries 
 
In this way, SPEs turn out to be unjustifiable when prices are high and insufficient when 
prices are low. Calculated in function of the historic rights of each farmer and little 
capped, they seem unfair because linked to heritage. Like any land rent, they will 
progressively be integrated in the price of agricultural land. In regard to other countries, 
decoupled aid appears to be agricultural potential aid, and therefore export aid. In the 
context of growing public debt, it is becoming increasingly difficult to justify such forms 
of aid!  
 
The Crisis Calls into Question the “Inevitable” Drop in the Number of Farms 
 
For fifty years, agricultural policies have been built on the principle that the number of 
farmers will inevitably drop. The aim is to foster capitalization and an increase in farm 
size to make farms more competitive with other large exporting countries. However, at 
a time when unemployment is rising, it is appropriate to question this dogma. Indeed, 
unlike industry, there are few economies of scale available in farming, particularly if one 
does not take aid into account. If one also includes the problem of the inter-generational 
transmission of capital, increasing farm size loses much of its interest. Should public 
funds be used to finance the restructuring of agriculture and support the job seekers 
thus created? 
 
Price Volatility Lowers the Effectiveness of Agrifood Commodity Chains 
 
The sharp spike in prices in 2006-2008 revealed the inflationary effect for consumers of 
agricultural price instability. Indeed, when prices rise sharply, commodity chain 
organization is disturbed and some operators’ margins are compressed because they are 
unable to pass on the higher prices to consumers. But this then causes them to react to 
“catch up” and insure themselves against price volatility risks.  
 
The Poorest Segments’ Food Is Threatened 
 
One specificity of agrifood products compared to other products is the urgency of the 
purchase act: even if prices rise suddenly, consumers cannot delay their purchases for 
several months. However, the poorest consumers may be excluded. This is why 
agricultural policies aim to lower prices for consumers, mainly for the calories that fill 
stomachs least expensively (bread, milk, meat). 
 
The EU had long constituted buffer stocks. They notably made it possible to 
inexpensively supply institutions that provided free food to the poorest. When Europe’s 




The Energy Crisis and Agricultural Product Crisis Were Not the Cause but Rather the 
Consequence of the Economic Crisis 
 
It will be impossible to find solutions to the crisis until the crisis has been analyzed.  
 
Certain “Malthusian” theories have attributed the 2006-2008 crisis to the insufficiency 
of oil resources, agricultural production or other physical factors. In reality, the energy 
crisis and agricultural product crisis were not the cause but rather the consequence of 
the economic crisis.  And this economic crisis is the consequence of a lack of global 
governance to accompany the rapid development of international trade.  
 
The emergence of China as a powerhouse was predictable: annual growth in China has 
oscillated between 8% and 10% for thirty years! No market mechanism corrected the 
trade imbalances (American deficit and Chinese surplus) because a degree of parity was 
maintained between the yuan and the dollar. The 2008 financial crisis revealed the 
dangers of globalization without regulatory mechanisms. Markets cannot be expanded 
without also expanding the power of the authorities in charge of enforcing the rules of 
the game.   
 
A Crisis Triggered by Wealthy Countries that Is Costly for Poor Countries 
 
The sharp price hike in 2006-2008 was caused less by a change in food supply and 
demand than by insufficient stock levels when a new demand for agrofuels emerged.  
 
Thus, faced with the need to cut their budgets and in a context where they felt that 
Brazil could “feed the world,” the EU and the United States did not feel it was necessary 
to finance stocks. They therefore fell to a level insufficient to prevent speculation.  
Simultaneously, the United States decided to show the rest of the world that it had the 
means to create a substitute for oil using corn. In the space of a few months, ethanol 
production was launched and rapidly absorbed 100 million tons. 
 
In this way, the food crisis was largely the result of decisions by wealthy countries that 
had nothing to do with food. 
   
But these decisions had many unfortunate consequences on food for the poorest 
people, notably in the poorest countries that had become accustomed to feeding their 
urban populations with inexpensive imports rather than developing domestic 
agricultural production. This is one of the particularities of agricultural markets: a small 
drop in supply generates a proportionally larger increase in prices. And the number of 
people who can no longer feed themselves increases rapidly. Riots spread, and led the 
governments of poor countries to subsidize food purchases. In this way, wealthy 
countries’ savings force poor countries to spend more. Simultaneously, food 
consumption aid for the poorest has skyrocketed in the United States. Should we not 




History Has Taught Us to Resolve Certain Problems 
 
The recent accentuation of price volatility has revealed its dangers for social cohesion as 
well as for modernized farms and agricultural product processors. 
 
Yet, since the 1929 Crash, we have learned that there are ways to counter these harmful 
price changes and that doing so does not involve suppressing governments’ means of 
action. It is necessary to have, first, a precise vision of the goal to attain before defining 
the means to attain this goal.  
 
The world is therefore not done with its food security. It has been a concern for 
centuries, and we have known for as long that it is a tricky and complicated subject. 
Liberal solutions can be useful in some cases by giving economic actors greater 
accountability. But this supposes that one does not imagine that “letting things happen” 
is enough. For agricultural product markets to be efficient, there needs to be a political 
organization that does not allow just anything to be done. The recent crisis has shown us 
that the equilibriums are fragile and when they are upset, the poorest are always the 




7. The Challenges of a Regional Approach Price 
Instability Management: The Case of West 
Africa 
 
Arlène Alpha (GRET) and Raphaël Beaujeu (IRAM) 
Summary 
With the exception of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), agricultural market 
regulation and price instability management are usually envisaged in the national or 
international framework. However, at a time when regional integration processes are 
tending to become stronger and are seen as favored frameworks for development, the 
question of the regional scale to conduct such policies has arisen. This is notably the 
case for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) that is envisaging 
providing itself with regional agricultural market regulation instruments and instability 
management instruments for the most vulnerable. 
This paper aims to provide food for thought on the interest and limits of the regional 
scale to conceive this type of policy. After a rapid theoretical overview of the issue, the 
paper presents the primary challenges through the situation in West Africa. 
Regional Integration as a Factor to Reduce Price Instability 
The majority of trade worldwide takes place between countries in the same region. In 
West Africa, however, even though the institutional integration process is fairly 
advanced, intra-regional flows remain limited (around 12%). 
Beyond the static effects of trade flow creation and deviation, regional integration can 
help lower price volatility by attenuating: 
• exogenous instability thanks to the expansion of the market: less market 
segmentation, more effective resource allocation, facilitated investments;  
• imported instability through the establishment of an appropriate common 
external tariff (CET); and 
• endogenous instability, thanks to more predictable policies via the 
harmonization of national policies or even the elaboration of common policies, 
the attenuation of lobbies’ influence, better spatio-temporal decisions by 
operators, strengthening of the tradable nature of agricultural products 
(“commoditization”), and lower transaction costs. 
The Relevance of the Regional Level to Manage Price Instability in West Africa 
a) The Regional Dimension of Price Instability in West Africa 
The recent food crises in West Africa revealed: 
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• their regional dimension; 
• the growing interdependency of economies in the region and the legitimacy of 
managing instability at the level of production basins and consumption basins; 
and 
• the diversity of instruments that can be mobilized for food security in 
conjunction with the diversity of causes of instability. 
b) The Regional Integration Process in West Africa 
The choice of the regional scale to manage agricultural and food price instability is also 
justified by the fact that regional integration is tending to speed up: WAEMU customs 
union, adoption of a Trade Liberalization Scheme (TLS) by ECOWAS (even if the TLS is 
still far from reality in the field), ECOWAS common external tariff (CET) in the process of 
being finalized. In this way, the theoretical advantages of regional integration when it 
comes to lowering price instability could potentially come into play in West Africa. In 
addition, ECOWAS intends to intervene directly to regulate agricultural markets and 
limit the effects of price instability on the most vulnerable. 
c) Regional Intervention: What Types of Instruments and Prerogatives? 
One must distinguish between: 
• price stabilization instruments; and 
• instruments to correct the effects of this instability on incomes. 
The regional approach must also take into account the respective fields of intervention 
for states and the region. There can be a simple coordination among states or true 
integration (common policies). 
Various levels of delegating sovereignty can be envisaged: concurrent or shared 
responsibilities between the national and regional level; exclusive community 
responsibilities. The distribution of responsibilities relies on two principles: 
• The subsidiarity principle: with the exception of those areas under its exclusive 
responsibility, the region takes action only when its action is more effective than 
action undertaken at the national, sub-regional or local level. 
• The proportionality principle: the region’s action must be limited to what is 
necessary to attain the objectives in the treaties. 
Public Market Regulation Instruments 
a) Border Instruments in the Framework of a Customs Union 
Forming a customs union is supposed to make it possible to regulate imports at the 
borders of the union and encourage intra-regional trade within the free trade zone. For 
this to happen, it is however necessary that the CET offer sufficient protection and 
incentive, and that the free trade zone be real. WAEMU’s CET is sharply contested for 
offering insufficient protection and not being sufficiently coherent. The current effort to 
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define ECOWAS’s CET is an opportunity to correct this by introducing a 5th tariff band at 
35%. Due to the diversity of national situations, it has been difficult to reach an 
agreement, however. 
The West African experience also illustrates the methodological difficulties involved in 
reaching a political consensus on the level of protection desired with, on one side, a 
statistical approach of aggregating tariff preferences and, on the other, an approach 
based on policy negotiation. 
ECOWAS is envisaging other border instruments to mitigate instability imported from 
international markets: seasonal quotas, specific tariffs (rather than ad valorem tariffs), 
and a safeguard measure. However, the same difficulties as those involved in setting the 
CET are being encountered because of the heterogeneity of countries in the region. 
What is more, the countries in the region are not equally sensitive to imported price 
instability. Landlocked countries and countries within the franc zone are less exposed to 
price instability than coastal countries and countries outside the franc zone.  
b) Regional Networking of Public Stocks 
A regional approach to public stocks seems relevant in West Africa. Indeed, this 
approach makes it possible to: 
• have a denser “grid” of public stocks on the regional scale, and therefore greater 
efficiency in de-stocking operations and the supply of deficit zones; 
• spread the cost of storage among the countries in the region; and  
• promote regional trade between surplus and shortfall zones. 
There is already a network of the various public food security stock management 
structures, based on the principle of solidarity among the countries in the region. Each 
stock-holding country promises to liberate 5% of its stocks for the “regional stock.”   
This initiative could be the basis for reflection on setting up a buffer stock system 
combining (national and regional) public stocks and private stocks. However, the 
institutional and political conditions have not yet been met, notably in regard to 
certifying the private operators, monitoring their practices, and applying sanctions in the 
case of speculative abuses. Public stock management should furthermore be 
transparent and depend only on the general interest. Involving the private sector and in 
particular socio-professional organizations could also help improve management.  
Other technical and methodological issues must also be resolved: determining which 
markets and products to regulate, what the guaranteed purchase price should be for 
producers (including the question of possible different purchase prices in function of 
transport costs), and what the critical stock volume is. 
Social Safety Nets: Is Regional Action Possible? 
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The Justification for Safety Nets as an Instrument to Accompany Price 
Stabilization 
Safety nets (i.e. all actions destined to prevent populations from “falling” into a poverty 
trap) help manage price instability in two ways: 
• They can complete measures that tend to act directly on prices.  
• They make it possible to lower the effects of instability on incomes. They 
intervene where market mechanisms fail or are not longer enough (disasters, 
etc.).  
Safety nets for consumers can have a compensatory role as systems aiming to smooth 
producers’ incomes with the aim of increasing food production. They can in this way be 
seen as a condition for the establishment of these systems insomuch as they make them 
politically and socially possible. 
Social safety nets are a social protection policy instrument. Their regional 
implementation remains tricky on the same footing as all social protection policies. For 
instance, even the European Union—the most advanced example of regional 
integration—has not harmonized its social protection policies. 
Current State of Safety Net Policies and the Justification for Regional 
Action 
Safety net policies involve two types of actions: 
a) Preventing and Mitigating the Risk of Crisis  
Implementing safety net instruments requires a particularly high degree of information. 
Indeed: 
- Vulnerability to food insecurity, which determines the probability of crisis, 
depends on a multitude of factors that are often interdependent on each other. 
- Safety nets are net transfers to individuals, and are particularly costly for 
governments. 
On the sub-regional level, the state of food security information systems and crisis 
prevention is still heterogeneous. While the landlocked countries in the Sahel have 
relatively complete systems, the other countries usually have only very partial systems, 
essentially designed to prevent crises due to supply deficits.  
Many information systems perform poorly when it comes to grasping market availability 
problems, and do not allow one to analyze the resources households have to withstand 
the various types of risk. 
In high-potential zones, high and stable prices can be a form of incentive for net surplus 
producers. But, for the majority of producers in the sub-region—who are net cereal 
buyers—high prices increase the cost of cereal purchases.  
For vulnerable populations that have low production capacities or insufficient monetary 
resources, the issue of food prices is therefore a key risk factor. It is therefore important 
to track market prices. 
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Even more than in preventing supply deficits, preventing crises due to market access 
problems gains in efficiency when it is done on the regional scale (tracking cross-border 
flows and the sub-regional transmission of prices). 
Four strong elements can be inferred from the analysis of cereal market operations, 
notably millet and maize on the sub-regional level. They reveal the interest of regional 
information management: 
- the existence of shocks that happen simultaneously in different countries; 
- the distinction between markets “in advance” on which prices drop first with the 
arrival of new harvests;  
- the existence of a few “lead” markets: prices on these markets determine the 
prices on a large number of other markets but are determined by only a small 
number of prices on other markets; and  
- the impact of production and trade with Nigeria, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire on the 
food economies of Sahelian countries. 
This aspect of the safety net policy depends above all on governments. The region would 
intervene on three different levels: 
- on the policy level by promoting a harmonized regional framework to analyze 
structural causes of vulnerability and instruments that could lower this 
vulnerability;  
- on the institutional level by developing decision-making assistance capacities to 
prevent crises on the regional level and target interventions; and  
- on the academic level by deepening knowledge of how the major cross-border 
zones in the food economy operate. 
b) The Regional Approach and Management of Full-Blown Crises 
Most countries have set up food crisis response capacities with a panel of instruments 
used based on the elements provided by information and early warning systems. The 
proper operation of the information – alert – consultation – decision – implementation 
chain is therefore crucial to the ability to respond in a satisfactory manner. Analysis of 
the 2008 crisis shows, however, that a long road remains to be traveled to attain this 
result (poor anticipation, national measures contrary to common policy principles). It 
reveals a deep-reaching problem of national coordination and crisis management: 
temporary establishment of safety nets by outside actors (WFP, FAO, NGOs) little 
integrated in public policies and not contributing to national capacity building 
(particularly since capacities are insufficient); numerous new actors (NGOs, etc.) are not 
included in the consultation and coordination systems. 
The country-donor co-management system for National Security Stocks (NSSs) is an 
example of coordination among national institutions and external donors. However, 
while the rigor of the co-management system allows the NSSs to be mobilized in a 
timely manner, it can also limit the flexibility and reactivity necessary in the case of 
disasters. 
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To manage crises, the region cannot replace governments in the implementation of 
social safety net instruments. However, the ECOWAP program proposes measures on 
two levels: 
- Support for “innovative” national initiatives: national contingency plans, 
initiatives destined to improve continuity between the warnings issued by 
national and regional information systems.  
- The establishment of supplementary regional instruments: regional contingency 
plan; instruments destined to strengthen regional cooperation in regard to 

















1. Sub-Saharan Africa experiences 
 
1.1 Cotton in Burkina Faso: the shift from government level price controls to a 
sector-led response to price volatility 




What has been done? In 2006, Burkina Faso implemented a new mechanism to stabilize 
producer prices in the cotton sector. It is innovative in two respects. Firstly, because the 
producer price is calculated from a “moving” average of international cotton prices. 
Until 2006, standard practice was to set a purchase price based on a hypothetical value 
of average long-term cotton prices. The result was to address price levels rather than 
price volatility. The advantage of stabilization measures based on a moving average, 
which is adjusted annually, is to strike a balance between the desire to reduce price 
volatility and the need make adjustments based on international prices. Moreover, a 
purchase price determined by mathematical rules limits opportunities for lobbying. The 
second innovative characteristic of this mechanism is the creation of a risk mitigation 
fund, the fonds de lissage, managed by local players in the cotton sector. Based on a 
matching contribution and withdrawal system, the fund is designed to manage risks 
associated with short-term, highly volatile cotton prices without government 
intervention. Depending on whether the selling price of cotton is lower or higher than 
forecasts made earlier in the year, cotton companies contribute or draw from the fund 
to ensure price stability and their financial balance. To ensure transparency, the fund’s 
management has been outsourced (by tender) to a local bank.  
 
How has it been implemented? The evolution of price stabilization measures has gone 
through three distinct phases in Burkina Faso, which differ in terms of the level of 
coordination of local stakeholders and degree of government intervention. Prior to 
1999, all activities of the cotton sector were administered by a single, state-run 
company, SOFITEX, which had a legal monopoly over purchasing, trituration, marketing 
and input supply. In 1999, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed, providing for a 
five year price-fixing mechanism based on negotiation within the cotton sector trade 
association. In 2005, the sector went through a crisis triggered by a combination of 
factors, including the sharp drop in international cotton prices, which the price-fixing 
mechanism was unable to adapt to. In 2006, the new mechanism was implemented. The 
evolution of price stabilization policy in Burkina Faso reflects the gradual withdrawal of 
government involvement, combined with the reinforcement of the sector’s trade 
association and a context of low international prices, all which have facilitated reform.  
 
What were the effects? Effective smoothing of producer prices: during the 
implementation period of the new mechanism, the coefficient of variation of the 
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area yield 
Source : Financial statement of cotton 
Companies and AFD data 
Cotlook A Index was 5% compared to 4% for real prices to producers (after rebate). 
Moreover, the coefficient of variation of producer prices was also lower than under the 
old system (8%). The fonds de lissage has been divided by 6 in five years. Had cotton 
prices not improved in 2009/2010, the fund would have dried up. As regards the price 
trend, there is little capacity to predict the direction and magnitude of changes. 
Production levels have not improved despite the stabilization of producer prices.  
 
 

















Table 16 : Real producer prices (FCFA/kg) 
 














What recommendations could be derived? Various factors explain the stagnation of 
production, despite the relative stabilization of prices. (i) The “risk price” is only one 
factor of income instability. In particular, producers’ high debt levels increase 
production risk, partially nullifying the expected effect of reducing price uncertainty; (ii) 
Stabilization mechanisms cannot mitigate “trends”. A number of trends have diminished 
the margins of farmers, including lower international prices and the rising cost of inputs. 
(iii) The stabilization policy does not take a systems approach to farming. The drop in 
producer prices has led farmers to move into food crops, despite even greater price 
volatility in these markets.  
Risk mitigation fund 
Trendline price 
Equivalent grain price paid to producers 
New mechanism/after rebate Cotlook A Index 
Floor price/ceiling price 
Old mechanism/at the start of the season 
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1.2 Market regulation through a seasonal ban on potato imports: the case of 
Guinea 




What has been done? 
From 1992 to 1998, the Guinean government implemented a seasonal ban on potato 
imports. For seven years, imports were banned during the period when local potatoes 
were sold on the market, from February 1 to June 30. The measure was introduced 
under pressure from Guinean potato producers, organized under a federation of 
producers in the country’s main potato production region, the Federation of Fouta 
Djallon peasants. The seasonal ban was accompanied by significant production support 
(including distribution of certified seeds, fertilizers, extension services, management 
consulting, irrigation schemes) issued by the Federation itself to its members, thanks to 
the technical and financial support of several partners. These efforts helped overcome 
the Guinean government’s shortcomings in the matter.  
 
How has it been implemented? 
The role of the Federation was instrumental in setting up and, eventually, lifting the 
seasonal ban, once the Federation had sufficient production capacity to supply the 
Conakry market. The Federation both lobbied the government to accept the ban 
(despite the constraints of the structural adjustments that were underway), and led 
negotiations with local retailers and importers. The Federation set up a contractual 
relationship with importing traders and supported the emergence of local traders 
(mostly women) to market local potato production.  
 
What were the effects? 
The combination of seasonal import bans on potatoes and the support measures to 
producers has had spectacular results on production and price stabilization. Local potato 
production has gone from 150 tons before 1990 to about 16,000 tons today. Demand on 
Guinean markets is largely met, and the Federation is in the process of exporting its 
surplus potatoes. Markets in neighboring countries present considerable potential 
(Senegal imported approximately 50,000 tons of potatoes from the European Union, for 
example). Leveraging this potential may help to stabilize prices in Guinea and strengthen 
the regional integration process, without necessarily exporting instability. When the 
Federation set out to boost potato production, one of its priorities was to strike a 
balance between attractive producer prices—negotiated by the Federation with 
traders—and reasonable consumer prices. Indeed, replacing imported potatoes with 
local production called for price competitiveness, not just quality. Retail potato prices 
have been contained so far and fluctuations smoothed thanks to several mechanisms: 




Table 18 : Trends in harvesting costs and retail prices 
of local potato production 
 
Source: FAO DYNAFIV/GRET, Impact des mesures 
tarifaires sur l’agriculture et l’agroalimentaires, 2005; 
FPFD, Marketing Report, 2006, 2007, 2008 
 
Table 19 : Real prices of local potatoes (GNF) 
 
Source: Pierre Bal, DYNAFIV, exploitation données 
SIPAG 
 
What recommendations could be derived? 
Several factors were determinant in the Guinean experience: the combination of a 
border measure with substantial production support; negotiations that involved 
producers, traders and the government; the capacity of the Federation to lobby the 
government, support its members, link to traders, track market prices; the existence of 






















1.3 Maize marketing and trade policies in Kenya 




What has been done? Kenya has a long tradition of government intervention on maize 
markets, even during the so-called liberalization period. Recent interventions include: 
- Reinforcement of maize marketing policies since 2000 (buffer stock, regulation 
of producer prices); 
- Control of trade through non tariff measures and tariffs that tend to fluctuate 
less.  
How has it been implemented? The government has implemented a wide scope of 
policies (thanks to higher public expenditures allocated to maize market regulation since 
2000), but has not managed to enforce compliance with these policies. For example, the 
steps taken by the government related to imports ultimately exacerbated the maize 
crisis in 2008.  
What were the effects? Prices seem to have stablilized in the wake of the government’s 
renewed intervention in maize markets, particularly the tighter controls over marketing 
policies. Overall, producers have experienced higher production growth rates during 
interventionist periods. However, as our findings below show, producer prices have 
fluctuated more in the most recent period. (This is inconsistent with Jayne’s findings that 
the National Cereals and Produce Board has a smoothing effect on price instability, but it 
is possible that our findings of increased instability are related to the 2008 crisis.) 
  
Coefficient of variation 1994-2004 2005-2008 
Producer prices (yearly data, FAOSTAT) 0.23 0.37 
 
The effects of intervention on consumers has been a trend towards lower prices 
(perhaps due to a structural change in 2007?) and less volatility. 
  
Coefficient of variation  1994-2004 2005-2008 
Wholesale real price (monthly data) 0,22 0,19 
What recommendations could be derived? There is still room to regulate markets more 
actively, through buffer stocks and import controls, for instance. Periods of heavy 
intervention on markets seem to correspond to greater stability (although better 
weather conditions during these periods could be the influencing factor, as well). The 
government should be encouraged to define and implement credible policies based on a 
transparent consultative process that involves the key stakeholders. 
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1.4 Rice stabilization policies in Madagascar 
Hélène David-Benz (CIRAD), Johanna Rakotosoa (consultant), Patrick Rasolofo (Réseau 




What has been done? Government intervention in marketing and the major production 
areas has been increasing since independence in 1960, through the early 1970s. From 
1973 to 1977, state-run companies controlled all downstream marketing activities. From 
1980 to 1990, the government gradually withdrew. Structural adjustment policies were 
accompanied by the rehabilitation of irrigation systems, which came under the 
management of water user associations. During the 2000s, policies aimed at increasing 
domestic supply through production support and regulation of urban supply through 
imports.  
  
How has it been implemented? Until the late 70s, government intervention took the 
form of land development corporations in two of the main rice production areas. The 
government also intervened through parastatals, which had a monopoly over the 
purchase and distribution of rice, and set prices for both producers and consumers.  
 
After liberalization, state intervention focused on setting import levies (with rates 
ranging from 30% to 0%) and ad hoc initiatives like facilitating imports during crises. 
Efforts to increase production included investment in irrigation infrastructure 
(rehabilitation), intensification incentives based on access to inputs (such as recent 
efforts to encourage off-season rice), and incentives to expand rainfed production 
through access to mechanization. Microcredit has also expanded significantly, to finance 
production and storage.  
 
Starting in 2005, the government implemented two innovative instruments to improve 
the management of the sector: an observatory and a consultative mechanism to 
encourage dialogue between the government and industry players. 
 
What were the effects? The centralizing policies of the 70s completely destroyed 
marketing channels and producers’ interest in the market. Availability per capita fell 
(from 200 kg to 125 kg/per capita between 1970 and 2000) and imports increased. Since 
2002, production levels have shown a marked increase, and starting in 2005, 















































































































(Source: Author’s calculations based on datasets from 
INSTAT) 
















(Sources: FAO and MAEP) 
 
 
What recommendations could be derived? The period of total government control was 
catastrophic the recover long. The recent positive developments in the rice sector are 
partly the fruit of production support and infrastructure development efforts (irrigation 
and transportation), and partly due to a new form of governance that relies on well-
informed decision-makers and public-private coordination. However, multi-stakeholder 
dialogue has not eliminated the unequal balance of power: measures (including price 













































































1.5 The effectiveness of food price stabilization policies: the experience of Mali 
(2004 - 2009) 




What has been done? Since 2004, Mali has used four instruments to periodically 
stabilize domestic cereal prices (millet, sorghum, maize and rice): (i) a ban on exports 
(2007 and 2008), (ii) a recovery plan to boost production through input subsidies (for 
rice in 2008; for rice, maize and wheat in 2009), (iii) public stocks (especially since 2005, 
when two new types of stocks were set up (the State Intervention Stock and cereal 
banks), and (iv) tax exemptions on cereal imports (for rice and maize in 2005, 2007, 2008 
and 2009 and for maize only in 2005). The outreach of these government interventions 
as well as their modalities have varied considerably, depending on the instrument, the 
year and products targeted.  
  
How has it been implemented? The decision-making process is complex. The different 
instruments are often managed by different agencies (e.g., the Ministry of Commerce 
for export bans and tax exemptions on imports; the Ministry of Agriculture for recovery 
plans; the cereal bank management committee for decentralized stocks, located in 703 
of the country’s municipalities). Decisions are made by the President and the office of 
the Prime Minister, with support from the Food Security Commission. The effective 
implementation of policies has sometimes proved difficult. Export bans have been 
circumvented. Importers have not always benefited from tax exemptions. The 
subsidized inputs for producers often arrive late, and in insufficient quantities 
(particularly for seeds). Finally, purchases for certain public stocks at times came too late 
(especially for the State Intervention Stock, which lacks working capital to make timely 
purchases).  
 
What were the effects? The ban on exports has not managed to discourage cereal 
exports. Not enough, at least, to affect prices in Mali. The bans have not had the 
expected moderating effect on consumer prices, but nor have they penalized 
producers—or only very marginally. Policies to boost production have had a moderate 
impact on production levels (+ 20% below the stated goal of a 50% increase) and prices 
(which declined slightly and stabilized at a high level). Public stocks have had little effect 
on prices. Perhaps they have helped absorb fluctuations due to seasonality, but they 
have failed to contain increases in times of crisis. This is probably due to the small size 
these operations: only 28,000 tons were released during the crisis of 2005 (15,000 tons 
of dry cereals + 13,000 tons of rice) and 53,000 tons during the 2008 (32,000 tons of dry 
cereals + 21 000 tons of rice). The tax exemptions on imports has had a moderating 
effect on prices of imported rice, but have also driven down prices of locally produced 
cereals (including dry cereals). This is what happened in the Kayes region in 2005 and in 
various other areas in 2009. This phenomenon holds true for both consumer prices and 
producer prices.  
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What recommendations could be derived? The instruments that have been 
found to be potentially effective are tax exemptions on imports, recovery plans 
to boost production, and public stocks (provided they grow in size). The form of 
governance and decision-making process is at least as important as the choice of 
instruments. For example, for public stocks to be effective, their administrators 
need working capital at their disposal. Similarly, for tax exemption measures to 
be effective, importers must actually benefit from them. This implies defining the 











Source : Galtier F., Diakité L. et Diarra S. (2011) 
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1.6 The Malawian experience in maize price stabilization 




What has been done? Malawi has a long tradition of intervention in maize markets that 
dates back to the colonial period, was pursued after Independence and continued 
through the mid-1980’s: pan-territorial and pan-seasonal prices, subsidization of 
fertilizers. After a liberalization period from 1987 to 2000, during which the Agricultural 
Development Marketing Corporation (ADMARC) was privatized, maize fertilizer 
subsidies and licensing requirements for traders were removed and the government 
once again started to intervene through a vast program of input subsidies and the 
reinforcement of ADMARC. 
 
How has it been implemented? The Malawian government, which controls all formal 
maize imports, greatly influences maize trade policy. The main criticism of this policy 
concerns the unpredictable and discretionary nature of government decisions, such as 
sudden imposition of trade restrictions, import bans and changes in tariff rates. Ad-hoc 
governmental operations tend to increase risk and discourage private trade initiatives. 
They also often exacerbate food crises, driving the cost of food staples well beyond 
import parity price. 
 
What are the effects? During the 1983-1993 period, the implementation of a policy 
package combining ADMARC’s intervention on the grain market; seed, fertilizer and 
credit delivery; extension services; and rural infrastructure development resulted in 
positive effects on yield and production growth. More recently, growth in maize 
production has been striking. It is still too early to understand what is driving this trend. 
Favorable climatic factors may be at play. The free seed and fertilizer programs of 1998 
and the Agricultural Input Subsidy Program in place since 2005, combined with stronger 
ADMARC’s initiatives to guarantee producer prices and price ceilings at retail, may also 
be behind the increase of maize production. Domestic maize prices appeared to be 
more volatile than international maize prices during the 1994-2007 period. However, as 
soon as floor (and ceiling) prices were known, and other producer supports such as 
those on seed, fertilizer and credit were provided, producers took favorable decisions on 
farm investment. 
Table 23 : Domestic and International Prices of maize 
 
Source: Tschirley and Jayne (2009) 





What recommendations could be derived? Maize price stabilization is only one 
component of Malawi’s agricultural policy. Maize production growth is the result of a 
technical package that includes high-yielding varieties, fertilizer and technical advice. 
However, the unpredictable and discretionary nature of the price stabilization policy has 
weaken the policy’s legitimacy. To be legitmate, the policy must be predictable and 
include a consultative process with key stakeholders. The choice of pan-territorial 
producer prices in such a long country leads to some difficulties and inefficiencies in 
remote areas. Some actors in Malawi are currently experimenting with market-based 
instruments, but it is too early to assess their impact. 
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1.7  Maize marketing and trade policies in Zambia 




What has been done? Zambia has a long tradition of intervention on maize markets, 
even during the so-called liberalization period. Intervention has intensified since 2005, 
including (i) measures to tighten control on trade through import licenses, import tariffs 
and non tariff measures; and (ii) policies influencing maize marketing, such as input 
subsidies and security and buffer stock schemes. 
 
How has it been implemented? Zambia has implemented a wide scope of policies 
(thanks to higher public expenditures allocated to maize market regulation), but has not 
managed to enforce compliance with these policies. For instance, some discretionary 
policies have tended to discourage private actors’ involvement in maize markets 
(2001/2002 and 2002/2003 crisis).  
 
Despite the strong political influence of the Zambian National Farmers Union (ZNFU), 
small holders’ interests are not really represented due to the lack of an official 
consultative mechanism.  
 
What were the effects? Effects on producers include higher production growth rates 
during interventionist periods (no data is available on changes to producer prices).  
 
Effects on consumers include a trend towards lower prices and less volatility. 
 
Coefficient of variation  1994-2004 2005-2009 
Wholesale real prices (monthly data) 0,35 0,24 
 
Maize prices seem to have stabilized in the wake of the government’s renewed 
intervention in maize markets, particularly the tighter controls over trade and marketing 
policies, but it is unclear whether this stabilization is due to increased public 
intervention or other factors (such as favorable climatic conditions). Authors have 
emphasized ineffectiveness of public intervention and widespread mistrust between the 
public and private sector, which tend to diminish policies’ capacity to decrease food 
price volatility.  
What recommendations could be derived? There is still room to regulate food markets 
more actively, such as through buffer stock and import controls. Periods of heavy 
market intervention seem to correspond to greater stability (although improved 
weather conditions could be the influencing factor, as well). The governement should be 
encouraged to define and implement credible policies based on a transparent 
consultative process that involves the key stakeholders. 
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2. Asian experiences 
 
2.1 Biting off more than it can chew? Agricultural price stabilization policies in 
India 
Frédéric Landy, Professor of Geography, GECKO, Université de Paris Ouest Nanterre-La 





What has been done? 
Stabilization policies can be broken down into three periods. After Independence in 
1947, the government heavily intervened in agricultural prices. Before the Green 
Revolution, this involved forced levies on farmers and traders, an environment that 
shied away from private speculation, and subsidized food prices in large cities. Once the 
Green Revolution got underway (1965), policies focused on incentives to guarantee 
prices and redistribute surpluses to the entire population. Since 1991, there has been 
gradual liberalization.  
 
How has it been implemented?  
Since 1965, the Food Corporation of India, backed by state governments, has purchased 
wheat and rice at reserve prices (the same system exists for sugar), thereby amassing 
stocks that are distributed and sold at subsidized prices through a countrywide 
distribution network. Purchases by firms are still controlled, as are import-export 
transactions to a certain extent. Input subsidies (fertilizer, water, electricity) play a 
major role but ultimately, Indian agriculture is more taxed than than it is subsidized.  
 
What were the effects? 
The agricultural growth in areas influenced by the Green Revoluation has started to 
slow, the public distribution system is riddled with corruption, and food security stocks 
are poorly managed. The latter results in costly imports, less costly subsidized exports, 
and resale on the domestic market. But, India has acquired grain self-sufficiency and 
food sovereignty. Agricultural and food prices are smoothed compared to world prices, 
which (for the most part) allows the country to avoid “hunger riots”. “The coefficient of 
variation for rice and wheat prices in India held steady around 4% to 7% between 1980 
and 2000, compared to 15% to 20% for world prices” (High Level Committee, 2000, § 
1.8). 
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Table 25: Trends in wheat prices (1979-99): India and world 
 
 
What recommendations could be derived? 
Protectionism and government price policy have brought agricultural expansion and 
relative consumer satisfaction. However, India lacks flexibility in its policy (long-term 
management of stocks devoid of political pressure, food vouchers in cities, measures to 
avoid competition with distribution channels used by local producers).  
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2.2 The Indonesian experience with rice price stabilization 




What has been done? Indonesia pursued rice price stabilization through two 
instruments used simultaneously: (i) intervention in marketing through public 
storehouses managed at a local level (ii) monopoly control over international trade. 
Price stabilization protects both consumers and producers by maintaining rice prices 
within a predetermined band and by widely disseminating floor and ceiling prices. Stable 
and low rice prices were a major objective of the government following the period of 
economic and political instability that came to an end in the mid-sixties. The rice price 
policy can be split into several periods, corresponding to changes in the country’s 
context. These changes in turn have influenced the policy’s implementing agency’s 
objectives and constraints.  
 
How has it been implemented? Rice price stabilization was implemented by a special 
agency created in 1968 (BULOG). BULOG managed a nationwide network of local 
agencies and district-level warehouses (DOLOG), which enabled it to store substantial 
quantities of rice. DOLOG warehouses bought rice to bring prices in rural markets up to 
the floor price. BULOG procured rice paddy from farmers’ cooperatives as well as from 
private traders. Farmers were encouraged to establish village cooperatives. Major 
efforts were made to build capacity of BULDOG’s management and staff from the 
beginning. Extensive analytical studies were carried out on key factors such as the size of 
margins between floor and ceiling prices, the size of buffer stocks, and the price of 
fertilizer relative to floor and world prices. A monopoly control over international trade 
was established, which allowed the government to import when domestic production 
was insufficient and to export when there was a surplus and stocks levels were already 
high. 
 
What were the effects? The supply response was dramatic: rice production increased by 
10.5 millions tons over the 1978-1985 period. Fertilizer use increased by 500% between 
1970 and 1985, while yields increased from 2.5 T/ha in 1965 to 4.4 T/ha in 1990. A huge 








Figure 2 : World rice prices and domestic rice 
prices 1985 to 2002 




















































What recommendations could be derived? The Indonesian experience shows that 
government intervention can successfully adapt to a changing context and contribute to 
quick economic growth, but that it is difficult to implement. It is important to note that 
the rice price stabilization policy was only one component of the Indonesian approach to 
modernizing its rice economy. Public investment, not only in infrastructure such as roads 
and irrigation facilities, but also in human capital, through extension services and 
education, played an important role in the country’s success. One important 
characteristic of government interventions is that they focused on avoiding markets 
failures and supporting private economic initiatives rather than substituting public 
initiatives for private initiatives. The whole commodity chain was not in the hands of 
parastatal companies.  
 
The agricultural policy was part of a broader policy ensuring (i) macro-economic 
stability, (ii) making markets working more efficiently, (iii) ensuring political stability, and 
(iv) creating enabling environment for private investment. 
 
Some technical lessons on price stabilization can also be drawn from the Indonesian 
experience: 
- The target price should be aligned with international prices; 
- The policy is far less costly when the country relies on imports than when it has 
to manage a surplus. 
 
Key factors including the size of the margins between floor and ceiling prices, the size of 
buffer stocks, and the price of inputs relative to floor and world prices need to be 
constantly updated. 
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Source: USDA-FAS Source: Bank Of Thailand, Website: http://www.bot.or.th/ 
2.3 Rice price stabilization policies in Thailand 




What has been done? 1) From 1950 to 1985, the government established export taxes 
(pro-consumer policies); 2) From the mid-1980s to 1997, it removed export taxes and 
implemented modest measures to support producer prices; 3) From 2001 to 2009, it 
developed buffer stock and support price schemes (pro-producer policies). 
 
How has it been implemented? From late 1950s to the mid-1980s, Thailand used a 
combination of four instruments: a rice premium, ad valorem export duty, rice reserve 
requirement and quantitative restrictions on exports. From 2001 to 2009, the 
government purchased rice at above market prices under the Paddy Pledging Program; 
the pledged paddy was then sold through bids or “Government to Government 
contracts”. 
 
What were the effects? From late 1950s to the mid-1980s, export taxes on rice 
constituted an important source of government revenue. Domestic prices were kept 
below the export prices and stabilized during the spikes (1967 and 1973). From 2001 to 
2009, production levels grew thanks to high intervention prices. Domestic prices started 
moving upwards, levels of buffer stock rose, and the government spent a considerable 
part of the budget on the policy. There were also some undesirable effects on exports 
(lower competitiveness and availability of rice). 



































































































































































































































Figure 4 : Wholesale real price of rice 5% broken Figure 3 : Trends in production, exportation and end-of-year 
stocks 
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What recommendations could be derived? Up until the early 1980s, the comparative 
advantage of rice production in Thailand could be explained by the country’s wealth of 
resources, optimized by government policies aimed at ensuring relatively equitable land 
tenure; investments in road, railway and irrigation infrastructure; and an active credit 
policy (Phélinas, 2010). Since 2001, the Thai government’s policy to stabilize the income 
of rice producers has started to conflict with the sector’s export orientation. Above-
market intervention prices have led to significant production increases. The widespread 
outreach of intervention policies has appeared to cause difficulty for small actors on the 
market. Some undesirable effects may be related to inefficient management of buffer 
stocks and speculation on the part of market actors. Finally, there are questions as to 
whether intervention policies are equitable, as they do not benefit the poorest small-
scale farmers. 
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3. South American experiences  
 
3.1 Linking town and country: public policy as a tool to promote family farming, 
food security and market regulation 
Carlos G.A. Mielitz Netto, Agronomist, PhD in Economics, Professor of the Programa de 
Pos-Graduação em Desenvolvimento Rural da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul 




What has been done? Created in 2003, the Family Farming Food Acquisition Program 
(PAA) aims to support family farms and encourage them to market to vulnerable 
populations facing food insecurity. The PAA uses four instruments: (i) Direct purchase of 
foodstuffs from family farmers (CDAF), whereby the government purchases produce 
from farmers at subsidized or market prices to supply populations facing food insecurity. 
(ii) A guaranteed purchasing contract for family farmers (CGCAF). Farmers’ groups stock 
part of their production in exchange for a promissory note (CPR) that provides individual 
farmers access to financial resources. (iii) Direct local purchase of family farm production 
(CDLAF), whereby farmers’ groups signed an agreement with one or more entities that 
serve vulnerable populations (e.g., charities, hospitals, public schools) to provide 
foodstuffs. The agreement defines the quality, quantity, value and delivery of the 
foodstuffs. The agreements in turn facilitates farmers’ access to credit, for an amount 
that corresponds to the negotiated value placed on deposit with the national supply 
company (CONAB). (iv) Incentive program for milk production and consumption (IPCL): 
Based on the principle of sectoral preference, this instrument allows vulnerable 
populations to purchase milk directly from producers.  
 
How has it been implemented? Brazilian agricultural policy is two-pronged. The Ministry 
of Agriculture mainly addresses export-oriented agribusinesses, while the relatively 
recent Ministry of Agrarian Development supports family farming and addresses issues 
of food security. The four mechanisms of the PAA are implemented by CONAB, based on 
an agreement with the Ministry of Social Development and Fight Against Hunger (MDS), 
the Ministry of Agrarian Development, state and local governments. The mechanisms 
are managed locally by family farmers’ associations and civil society organizations. To 
participate, farmers must meet the criteria of the National Program to Strengthen 
Family Agriculture (PRONAF). Finally, there are caps on the amount of production each 
farmer can market through the PAA, to avoid supply surplus and inequality among 
beneficiaries.  
 
What were the effects? The program has increased incomes of family farmers and 
improved food security of vulnerable populations. Thanks to increased consumption of 
fresh local produce and decreased consumption of processed products, dietary habits 
have improved. In addition, the program has resulted in a number of positive 
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externalities: quality and hygiene standards that sometimes extend to all local 
production and improve the nutritional value of foodstuffs as well as the health of non-
direct beneficiaries; stronger ties between the town and country; and women’s 
empowerment through processing activities. The PAA has faced some challenges. 
Outreach is limited due to financial constraints (less than 5% of family farmers are 
involved) and bureaucratic delays are common, due to a management structure that 
invovles three levels of government. Finally, the program is simply an initiative of the 























What recommendations could be derived? The Brazilian experience is an example for 
countries with similar characteristics, i.e., a family farming sector with great production 
potential and a large segment of vulnerable consumers. In this context, food policies 
that aim to increase incomes/market access for family farmers and improve food 
security of vulnerable populations through social policies, can serve to rationalize 
resources and lay the groundwork for efficiency gains in the long term. Furthermore, the 
existence of two Ministries with different objectives allows for interventionist measures 
in favor of vulnerable populations, despite the hegemonic liberal discourse of Brazilian 
agribusiness. 
Figure 5 : Trends in the growth of the PAA per instrument 
Reserve purchase 
Budget allocation 2010 – MDS ans MDA 
Direct Purchase MDS and MDA Food stocks – MDS and MDA 
Milk Program 
Simultaneous purchase and donation 
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4. Developed countries experiences 
 
4.1 Comparative study on regulation of agriculture in the United States, Canada 
and the European Union 
 Lucien Bourgeois, Economist; Sophie Vivienne, AgroParisTech, Department of 
Comparative Agriculture and Agricultural Development; Daniel-Mercier Gouin, Chair of 




What has been done? In the 1990s, the governments of these three countries set out to 
limit budget spending without affecting the incomes of farmers: a task easier said than 
done.  
 
With the reform of the CAP in 1992, the European Union (EU) adopted a system of direct 
income aids, like those used by the United States (US). The two major powers came to 
an agreement on this basis, and imposed it on the world by including it in the “blue box” 
category, set up under the Marrakech Agreement. Initially, the EU measure involved 
compensatory aid to farmers, as a way to convince them to accept the price difference 
that might exist between the European domestic market and the global market. The aids 
were designed to be temporary. It was expected that European producers would 
gradually manage to offset the price difference by exporting larger volumes. But hopes 
for global market expansion proved overly optimistic. Markets for agricultural raw 
materials, and especially cereals, have barely increased since the early 1980s.  
 
How has it been implemented? After a period of heavy market intervention, 
governments were seeking solutions that made producers more accountable. Public 
storage systems and the export subsidies used in some sectors in the United States and 
the European Union were phased out. So-called shared responsibility mechanisms and 
crop insurance schemes were set up. The problem was that these schemes could only 
operate at a high cost to their governments. Recently, however, governments have 
encouraged the processing of bio-fuels through heavy subsidies. The US has also sharply 
increased consumer subsidies on food for the poor.  
 
What were the effects? The three countries studied have, over time, changed the 
instruments used to regulate their agricultural sectors, either as a response to internal 
pressure (often budgetary), or the international context (increased market competition 
and multilateral agreements on agriculture). In both the EU and the US, this first led to a 
decrease in the level of price support, replaced by an increase in the level of direct 
payments, with the objective of maintaining a guaranteed income to farmers. Gradually, 
direct payments have evolved and have been decoupled from production, to meet the 
constraints set by the Agreement on Agriculture of the Uruguay Round. This change is 
just about complete in the European Union, with the introduction of single payment 
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entitlements. It is still only partial in the United States, which has maintained 
countercyclical payments. In Canada, the picture is somewhat different. Price support 
policies, which target a few products (milk, poultry and eggs), continue intact to this day. 
Income support policies for other sectors of agricultural production, however, have also 
evolved towards decoupled payments.  
 
What recommendations could be derived? At first glance, these regulatory instruments 
appear to have reduced economic distortions. But this statement must be qualified. If 
we look at the changes to levels of total support to agriculture in the three countries, it 
becomes clear that while all three have respected the commitments they made at the 
WTO on domestic support, they have not decreased overall support throughout the 
period.  
 
In fact, for all three countries, total support granted to agriculture exceeds the level of 
commitments. Canada, the EU and the US have managed to respect their commitments, 
thanks to the "box game":  to agree on priorities for reducing domestic support, types of 
aid were categorized in three boxes. The orange box was for aid that cause the most 
distortion and should be reduced first; the blue box included support measures 
considered less harmful and therefore still tolerable for a short period of time; the green 
box was for support deemed to cause little market distortion. The result has been a rise 
in green box aids everywhere.  
 
The total support to agriculture remains as high as it was in 1995 in the European Union 
and even higher in Canada and the United States, before the sharp increase in 
agricultural commodity prices in 2007 and 2008. These results reflect a reality: the 
governments concerned consider the agricultural sector still needs support.  
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4.2 Corn markets in the United States 
 




What has been done? World corn production has exceeded that of wheat and rice. 
Production could reach 811 million tons in 2010-2011, which would be 2 million tonnes 
below the record high established in 2009-2010. This is exactly double 1980 production 
levels. Despite these perspectives, prices are soaring on the world market and exceeded 
$7.40 a bushel in early March 2011, compared to $3.70 a bushel in early March 2010, 
and $3.25 in early July 2010. Prices have doubled in a year.  
 
Unlike other cereals, corn production is highly concentrated in a small number of 
countries. The United States and China account for more than 60% of global harvests. 
With more than 40% of the total, the US is by far the largest player in the market. It is an 
interesting case study. Corn, which has become the most abundant food on the planet, 
depends essentially on the world’s largest economy. But curiously, American supremacy 
in corn production has not yielded impressive results in terms of entering new foreign 
markets or improving the performance of the agro-food industries that rely on them. It 
is therefore relevant to see how agricultural policy has evolved in this country and its 
consequences on the world market.  
 
How has it been implemented? Since the mid-1980s, the government has tried to 
reduce subsidies, hoping to develop demand in foreign markets. This new policy was 
fully formalized in the 1996 Farm Bill, entitled the “FAIR Act” to indicate that the US was 
ready to embrace competitive practices. Results were disappointing. Just two years 
later, prices collapsed and emergency measures were needed to once again support 
farmers’ income. Unlike the EU, which has decoupled direct aid, the bulk of aid to US 
farmers is countercyclical, which takes into account market prices.  
 
What were the effects? This strategy, aimed at developing export markets, has not been 
successful. US corn exports have not increased for 30 years and the overall balance of 
food products from the United States is in decline due to a relative inability to expand 
exports of processed products, which now make up most of the market.  
 Figure 7 : Corn prices in the US and France Figure 6 : Main corn exporters 2009 
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What recommendations could be derived? This new policy has another major 
drawback. It resulted in a long period of excessively low prices on the global market, 
which serves as a worldwide reference, despite representing just 10% of total 
production.  
 
It took a sudden demand for corn from the domestic non-food market to turn things 
around. Starting in 2003, ethanol production began to absorb more than than 10% of 
annual corn production. In 2007, this table grew to 20%, and exceeded 40% in early 
2011. This new demand now accounts for almost three times the tonnage of US corn 
exports. It is causing a decline in stocks that worries importing countries. This is what 
explains the prices spikes, even though harvest levels are record.  
 
Due to a substitution effect, the increase has affected all types of grains. Furthermore, 
the absence of buffer stocks in both the US and the EU has encouraged speculation. 
Altogether, these factors have led to rising food prices in importing countries. What is 
ironic in this new scenario based on ethanol production is that market regulation is 
clearly easier when it relies on domestic demand rather than exports. Even when it 
comes to the world’s largest economy. 
 
 
 
 
